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OVERVIEW
With its impact on efficiency and welfare distribution, the relevance of ownership has unremittingly 
inspired and divided scholars and policymakers, especially in the heavily regulated water supply 
sector. Using the analytical tools of economics and legal concepts and doctrines, the study sets 
out to explicate the role of ownership in enhancing water service delivery in developing countries, 
particularly the Philippines. Concomitantly, I explore key contractual arrangements as an 
allocation of ownership rights and other contractual incentive devices and enforcement strategies
to forestall the irrelevance of ownership.
Both theoretical and empirical studies yield inconclusive results on the relative desirability of 
private ownership and state ownership. Much of the intricacies in finding the optimal ownership 
structure in the water supply sector can be ascribed to the markedly high asset intensity of water 
supply systems, which makes long-term contracting efficient, albeit subject to contractual hazards 
as manifested by a high incidence of ex-post bargaining. With information, power and bargaining 
asymmetries and partially aligned goals, ex-post bargaining can be highly acrimonious, if not 
opportunistic. In developing countries, the bargaining asymmetries between the government and 
private operator/owner are wider and their goals are much less aligned, hence, the high likelihood 
of costly bargaining. About 75 percent of water concession contracts were renegotiated.1 The 
renegotiation of the concession contracts often leads to the downscaling of performance targets, 
repudiation and termination of contracts.2 Guasch et al. (2004) and Guasch et. al (2006) attributed 
the high incidence of renegotiation in developing countries to weak political and institutional 
support, noting the prevalence of renegotiation during elections and recessions. A concession-
based privatization has shown to work in countries where the public sector has the competence 
and political commitment to provide the necessary infrastructure support to the reform process 
combined with a market that is sufficiently mature to attract potential investors.3
Intimating the intricacies of finding a suitable ownership structure, the ownership patterns in water 
supply sector have underdone intriguing shifts within and across countries, albeit it remains vastly 
state-owned. Approximately 90 per cent of (urban) water supply services in the world are 
 1 See Guash, et al. (2004). 
 2 See Guash, et al. (2004). 
 3 See Trebilcock and  Rosenstock (2013). 
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delivered by public water utilities, most of which are corporatized utilities.4 In France, most water 
undertakings have been privately operated, but both ownership and responsibility of water remain 
within the public sector. In Germany and Italy, corporatization has been widespread, while a 
variety of ownership arrangements (e.g., mixed companies, municipalities, private undertakings) 
exist in Spain.5 Private sector participation is relatively high in Latin America and Sub-Saharan 
Africa where privatization was aggressively promoted by international financial institutions in the 
1990s. The disappointing outcomes of privatization (i.e., limited improvement in service level and 
limited cost savings of privatization), however, prompted a reversion to state ownership, 
particularly corporatization in the developing world. Government ownership is averred to be back 
in vogue with the number of public enterprises growing since the 1990s.6 Following the New 
Public Management (NPM) approach, state-owned utilities were reformed by adopting private 
operating principles that underpin the financial independence and efficiency of private 
corporations. The proponents of NPM believe that efficiency is a matter of managerial 
indoctrination and design  of incentives (e.g., gradual elimination of subsidies, separation of 
ownership, corporate oversight, and service provision, creating autonomous agencies, devolution 
of budgets and financial control and legal framework and transparency/disclosure), dismissing, in 
effect, the necessity of shifting from public management to private ownership to modify 
performance incentives.7    
 
A Review of Theoretical Underpinnings 
From a bargaining perspective, the inconclusive empirical and theoretical findings on the relative 
efficiency of privatization and public management are not as confounding as they appear. 
Ownership is a policy choice and its implementation is continually shaped by bargaining dynamics 
between and among stakeholders (e.g., politicians, bureaucrats, private operators and other 
stakeholders) subject to myriad market, legal and social constraints. In this study, the author 
draws on several theoretical frameworks, namely, the property rights theory, transaction cost 
economics, transaction cost politics, incomplete contracting, organizational theories, and political 
economy, to account for the seeming irrelevance of ownership and the  relative advantages and 
limitations of key ownership arrangements. There are two interlinked plausible explanations as to 
why a shift in ownership structure may not deliver the intended outcomes: (i) the ownership 
                                                          
 4 See Hall, et al. (2010).  
   5 See Hall and Lobina (2008). 
  6 See Mcdonald (2014). 
  7 See Larbi (1999). 
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structure is not an incentive compatible-choice; and (ii) the choice of ownership is ill-motivated 
and poorly designed and implemented.8 The property rights theorists view state-owned utilities as 
predisposed to inefficiencies on account of its insecure property rights spawning a bureaucracy 
that is overformalized and disabled by its own organization. Public ownership is thus depicted as 
an incompatible choice in situations that strongly demand efficiency and flexibility. Transaction 
cost politics, on the other hand, further elucidates the inferiority of publicly-owned firms based on 
the intensity of transaction cost owing to their susceptibility to the inherently inefficient workings 
of the political market, purporting that publicly-owned utilities are bound to be run according to the 
transaction cost-intensive political expediency rather than efficiency considerations.9  
Within the paradigm of incomplete contracting, ownership of a productive asset affords the owner 
the possession of residual control rights over the asset, i.e., the owner has the right to use the 
asset in any manner consistent with a prior contract, customs and other relevant laws.10 As 
modeled by Schmidt (1996), private ownership creates an inside information barrier to the 
government thereby limiting the scope for political interference. Subsidizing and squandering of 
profits is easier when the firm is state-owned than when it is privately-owned (Boycko et al., 1996). 
Likewise, a vote-maximizing government cannot credibly commit to the restructuring of a state-
owned firm because it holds the residual property rights on the firm’s assets. Private ownership 
thus serves as a commitment device for the government not to interfere in the operation of the 
utilities, reward the manager for a successful restructuring, and harden the budget constraint. 
Under excessive corruption, however, Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) show that privatization 
and corporatization would not facilitate restructuring as the politician, deriving substantial political 
benefits from interference, would simply “buy” the ownership rights from the private and public 
managers to accommodate excess employment. But if corruption is a serious problem, Hart, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), maintain that privatization may be more socially inefficient than in-
house provision, while the latter may be preferred when there is excessive political patronage. 
The suitable choice of ownership thus depends on the source of inefficiencies that must be 
constrained. 
Assuming a more nuanced perspective on the relative efficiency (i.e., transaction cost-
economizing effect) of public ownership and private ownership, the transaction cost economics 
                                                          
  8 See Barzel (1997) for the linkages between property rights views with those of transaction cost economics and incomplete 
contracting.  
  9 See Williamson (1999). 
  10 See Grossman and Hart (1986), and Barzel (1997) and Tirole (1999). 
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(e.g., Williamson, 1979 and 1999) posits that private ownership is well suited to some transactions 
and poorly suited to others as transactions differ in their attributes and ownership structures vary 
in their cost and competence as a mode of governance. To find the suitable ownership 
arrangement, Williamson (1999) points to the necessity of explicating the discrete structural 
attributes that define and distinguish public bureaus and organizations and are responsible for 
their powers and limitations. Dynamic and autonomous adaptation would be difficult to undertake 
under public ownership on account of its hierarchical structure, low-powered incentives (arising 
from extensive sharing of gains and losses) and administrative controls. The administrative 
controls and low-powered incentive structure of public ownership, however, would be well suited 
to transactions where functions are costly to delineate, output is hard to measure or simply 
unquantifiable, and efficiency requirement is low (e.g., foreign affairs, the military and other 
sovereign transactions). The exigency of cooperative adaptation in such transactional setting 
would be attained at relatively low transaction cost under a hierarchical structure with extensive 
administrative controls.11 As with property rights theory, the high-powered incentives of private 
ownership, such as a concession arrangement would be suitable where there is a strong demand 
for efficiency, flexibility and innovation; otherwise, long-term public contracting can be 
cumbersome and convoluted engendering various types of contractual failures.12 
 
The Coase theorem, one of the most celebrated propositions in law and economics, purports that 
when rights are well-defined and the cost of transacting is zero, the initial allocation of property 
rights set by the legal system would be irrelevant in the presence of an efficient pricing market.  
When the pricing market works costlessly, the relevant parties, in accordance with the notion of 
opportunity cost, would reach the optimal results by rearranging their entitlements via private 
bargaining.13 Private bargaining, however, may be constrained by the disparity in the valuation of 
the property rights by the transacting parties. A resource may have attributes that are difficult to 
measure and, concomitantly, the rights over the resource cannot be costlessly delineated and 
apportioned as emphasized in incomplete contracting. This results in a positive transaction cost, 
succinctly described by Barzel (1997), as the cost associated with transfer, capture and protection 
of rights; i.e., the cost of enforcing property rights. When the attribute of an asset cannot be 
sufficiently contracted for, the value of an asset is maximized if it is assigned to the party that has 
the capacity to maximize its value. As a (residual) control rights holder, the owner/investor 
                                                          
  11 See Williamson (1999). 
  12 See Vincent-Jones (2007). 
  13 See Schlag (2013) for an illuminating discussion of the Coase theorem.  
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acquires bargaining and informational advantage over hard-contract-for gains of his investment 
allowing him to capture investment gains without having to engage in costly bargaining. 
Ownership therefore matters and private ownership is favored where a sizable investment and 
other hard-to-contract-for assets (e.g., technical competence) are involved. 
Delving into the political economy of privatization, Bortolotti and Pinotti (2003) and Biais and 
Perotti (2002) detail the political incentives and motivation for privatization. The choice of 
ownership is shown to be predetermined and its design bungled rendering the outcomes 
indeterminate. Bortolotti and Pinotti (2003) purport that majoritarian’ political systems, as opposed 
to ‘consensual-corporatist’ democracies, have greater incentive  to privatize, because they are 
more competitive and able to drive down political rents, thereby, reducing the opposition to 
privatization decisions. Biais and Perotti (2002), on the other hand, aver that the right-wing 
politicians privatize in order to gain future support from the constituency of shareholders of newly 
privatized firms, while the left-wing parties can strategically make privatization decisions in order 
to win future elections, but with the aim of maximizing privatization revenues and using them to 
carry out redistributive policies.14  
Approaches and Methods of the Study 
To establish the merits and limitations of private ownership in enhancing water service delivery, I 
take a dynamic bargaining perspective anchored on the insights of transaction cost economics 
and politics, property rights and incomplete contracting and the results of my empirical 
investigation on the differences in the pricing, staffing and spending behavior of privately-owned 
utilities and public utilities in the Philippines. Building on these empirical findings and pertinent 
theories, I explore two governance strategies to forestall the irrelevance of an ownership shift to 
public contracting: (i) a partnership contracting underpinned by a government-led cooperative 
behavior bound by the legal doctrine of commercial impracticability and a proper mix of 
transactional and relational elements in the design and enforcement of public-private partnership 
(PPP) contracts, particularly a concession arrangement ; and (ii) a two-tiered unified regulatory 
framework where all ownership types and their regulators are placed under a common regulatory 
oversight.   
 
                                                          
  14 See Cavaliere, et. al (2015) for a thorough review of the privatization literature, especially on the political economy of privatization. 
See also Shleifer (1998) for a summary of the economists’ arguments for and against privatization over the years.   
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The effectiveness of the two governance strategies is anchored on the right choice of ownership. 
Ownership is depicted in the study as the utility’s control structure with its corresponding incentive 
properties which set the bargaining dynamics between the contracting parties. Nestling the 
bargaining process in a contractual relationship under sufficient private ownership brings the 
bargaining game into the open and spurs an exploration of an arsenal of ex-ante and ex-post 
incentive devices (e.g., price regulatory method, equity structure, and regulatory institutions) 
which can be adapted to the shifts in the transactional setting. These incentive devices would 
have limited enforceability under public ownership where gains and losses are extensively shared 
via a political bargaining process which is subdued and made opaque by a hierarchy of authority 
and rigid administrative controls.  In a concession arrangement, the government and the private 
entity, under the governance of a contract and third-party enforcement mechanisms, engage in a 
bargaining process on an equal legal footing. Such bargaining process would have the effect of 
keeping in check the respective biases of the private operator and the government (i.e., the private 
operator is inclined to rake in excessive profits to an extent that it blunts his incentive to be efficient 
and the regulator fixes water rates at below cost-recovery level undermining long-term financial 
sustainability) thereby inducing the appropriate balancing of the parties’ interests. The sizable 
potential efficiency and investment gains from an incentive-compatible concession arrangement 
are argued to incentivize the parties to engage in cooperative bargaining. The efficiency and 
investment gains are further boosted by a right mix of transactional and relational15 elements in 
the design and implementation of ex-ante and ex-post incentive devices embodied in the contract. 
Relational contracting shuns arm’s length, adversarial undertakings bound by procedural 
requirements and promotes ex-post risk allocation that may override contractual provisions. Full 
accommodation of relational norms, however, may not be totally feasible in public contracts 
involving essential services where a third party (i.e., consumers) stands to be prejudiced in the 
absence of carefully crafted contractual checks and balances. Public agents are restricted by 
standing orders as well as public accountability and probity constraints; hence, deviations or 
variations from the contract are generally disallowed.16  
 
As an illustrative case study, I probe into the role of ownership in enhancing the performance of 
water utilities in the Philippines. The Philippine water supply sector is an interesting case in 
several respects. Corporatization in the 1980s and the subsequent privatization in the last two 
                                                          
  15 Relational norms are embodied in governance structures, such as partnering, alliance, joint venturing, long-term contracting, joint 
risk-sharing mechanisms and other collaborative working arrangements that promote mutual trust, interpersonal attachment and 
commitment to specific partners.  
  16 See Palaneeswaran and Kumaraswamy (2000). 
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decades has been used as a key reform strategy to enhance water service delivery under a 
polycentric ownership regime and a fragmented regulatory structure (i.e., public and private 
utilities have their respective regulators). The Philippines is bucking the global trend towards 
renationalization and corporatization of water services; it has been promoting private sector 
participation since the late 1980s. The promotion of private sector participation under a polycentric 
ownership regime dominated by public utilities provides a lush environment for analyzing the role 
and limitations of ownership structure in improving utility performance. Although the Philippines’ 
Progress Report on the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) suggests that the country is on 
track to attain its MDG commitments, more than fifteen million Filipinos still do not have access 
to safe and reliable water supply services. The use of traditional ODA-dependent financing 
channeled through government lending institutions to provide financing for publicly-owned utilities 
has limited success in terms of expanding access to reasonably-priced water supply services.17 
This prompts the government to explore ambitious PPP arrangements involving substantial 
private capital investment. Private sector participation, however, remains limited, despite 
continued efforts of the government to promote it through the enactment of various laws and 
policies. 
 
Key Contributions of the Study 
 
The study attempts to table new perspectives on the fundamental differences between public and 
private ownership within the framework of contract as an allocation of ownership rights and the 
associated bargaining between transacting parties with a special focus on developing country 
context. While there exist voluminous studies on private contracting, there is a sparse body of 
literature delving into contracting between a private firm and the government. The benefits of 
contracting can be maximized and its hazards reduced by meeting the private ownership 
suitability conditions and a proper mix of transactional and relational elements in the choice of 
contractual techniques and incentive devices. This underpins the partnership approach to 
contracting which seeks to reconcile the ex-ante efficiency and investment incentive motive of 
transferring control rights to the private operator with the ex-post transaction cost-economizing 
motive (i.e., cooperative adaptation) in the long run. As a result, sufficient private ownership via a 
concession arrangement is averred in the study to be more desirable in the long run than it 
                                                          
  17 See Llanto (2013). 
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appears in the incomplete contracting and transaction cost literature. Contracting cost, especially 
the high incidence of costly renegotiation is often discussed in disjunction of structural bargaining 
deficiencies of public management which has shown to engender severe incentive problems 
making state-owned utilities difficult to regulate. 
 
A partnership contracting propounded herein underscores the importance of contract law in 
minimizing the cost of enforcing incomplete contracts; it explores an optimal mix of relational and 
transactional norms in the application of the legal doctrine of commercial impracticability. Up until 
recently, relational norms which involves continuous engagement between the contracting parties 
lay at the fringes of regulatory law and economics. Over-reliance on the efficiency of the 
predetermined terms and conditions of the initial contract under the assumption that the contract 
is sufficiently complete portrays ex-post bargaining as a source of inefficiencies. Although the 
doctrine of impracticability has been invoked in a litany of cases, the problem of excuse for non-
performance caused by the emergence of unbargained-for contingencies remains one of the 
vaguest, most difficult doctrinal concept areas of law and legal practice.18 Likewise, incomplete 
contracting has been attacked for not having a modeling consensus similar to the one that 
developed around the moral hazard and adverse selection paradigms.19  
 
The principle of impracticability permits ex-post negotiation of a contract that has become 
disproportionately burdensome to either party on account of the emergence of an equilibrium-
distorting event, the non-occurrence of which constitutes the basic assumption of the contract. 
The application of the doctrine involves judicial or third-party inference on what the parties would 
have provided had they anticipated the event in question based on the terms and conditions of 
the initial contract.20 The promisor’s absolute liability is not diminished but merely made to account 
for implied conditions to preserve contractual balance. To restore the equilibrium and preserve its 
desired incentive structure, the doctrine of impracticability accommodates burden-sharing by 
contract adaptation, i.e., excusing partial or non-performance. The judicial defense of 
impracticability is hinged on the recognition that it is counterproductive (i.e., it undermines 
incentives for efficiency, investment and cooperation) to disregard equilibrium-distorting economic 
disruptions and political upheavals that render performance commercially impracticable. 
 
                                                          
  18 See Kovac (2011). 
  19 See Tirole (1999). 
  20 See Walter (2012). 
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The doctrine of impracticability has been invoked in a litany of cases. At the beginning of twentieth 
century, the test of impracticability was introduced in Mineral Park Land v. Hoard.21 In Mineral 
Park, the promisor undertook to remove from the promisee’s land all the gravel and earth 
necessary to comply with the requirements of the contract with the public authorities for the 
construction of a bridge. But after having removed half of the amount necessary for building the 
bridge, the promisor abandoned the site and obtained the remaining gravel from another source. 
The promisee filed an action for damages, alleging that there remained enough gravel to fulfill the 
contract. But the promisor contended that his performance should be excused as the remaining 
gravel was underwater and the cost of dredging and drying the underwater gravel was about ten 
to twelve times the expense of obtaining the same gravel above ground from another source. The 
court ruled in favor of the promisor on the ground that the definition of “available” gravel applied 
to that gravel which could be obtained in a practical and reasonable way. The disparity in the 
expenses of obtaining gravel from the prescribed source and the alternate source is deemed 
sufficiently large to excuse the promisor from liability for non-performance. Another insightful case 
on the application of the doctrine of impracticability is the case of Republic of the Philippines v. 
Luzon Stevedoring Corporation. In said case, the appellant sought to be excused from paying 
damages for the collision of its barge with the piers of the Nagtahan bridge on the ground that it 
was caused by a fortuitous event, i.e., a typhoon. As held by the Court, however, the Nagtahan 
bridge was an immovable and stationary object and provided with adequate openings for the 
passage of water craft, including barges like that of appellant’s, the collision with the bridge 
support thus raises the presumption of negligence on the part of the appellant or its employees 
manning the barge or the tugs that towed it. The appellant, Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, 
knowing and appreciating the perils posed by the swollen stream and its swift current, voluntarily 
entered into a situation involving obvious danger; it therefore assumed the risk, and cannot evade 
responsibility merely because the precautions it adopted turned out to be insufficient.  
 
In this study, I endeavor to further explore the wisdom of the doctrine of impracticability and 
provide a framework for its application in an incomplete long-term water concession contract in 
developing countries. Focusing on the influence of ownership and contractual arrangement on 
the incentives for efficiency, investment and cooperative adaptation, I utilize the concept of the 
English doctrine of frustration of purpose to determine when the contract may be adjusted and 
when it should be terminated. The English doctrine of frustration of purpose is a more liberal way 
                                                          
  21 See Walter (2012). 
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of interpreting the doctrine of impracticability relative to the American jurisprudence, which 
requires an ascertainment of whether the parties intended to be bound by the contract despite 
the fundamental change in circumstances as exemplified by the ruling of the court in Republic of 
the Philippines v. Luzon Stevedoring Corporation.22 In the landmark case of Paradine v. Jane, the 
promisor was freed from his contractual obligation on the ground that the performance of the 
contract relies on the continued existence of a particular chattel and this chattel was accidentally 
destroyed, while in the widely cited coronation case of Krell v. Henry, the Court held that further 
performance, i.e., the payment of the balance, was excused as the coronation, which was the  
raison d’etre of entering into a contract of leasing the rooms with a view of the King’s processional 
route, was canceled due to the illness of the King.  
 
Within the framework of a partnership contracting, I attempt to show how the legal doctrine of 
impracticability can effectively govern incomplete long-term contracts. Anchored on the optimal 
choice of ownership, a partnership-based application of the doctrine of impracticability is shown 
to reduce the threat of double-sided opportunism and preserve the incentive for efficiency, 
investment and cooperation (i.e., public authorities setting unfair regulatory policies, depriving the 
private operator of reasonable rent, and private operator exploiting his informational and 
bargaining advantage to rake in excessive profits). Cooperation is thus depicted herein as a 
product of formal (i.e.,  enforcement of express contractual provisions and application of legal 
doctrine of commercial impracticability and arbitral institutions) and informal (i.e., good faith and 
constructive negotiation and liberal interpretation of contractual provisions) and legal and non-
legal influences with the threats of litigation depicted to be not necessarily antithetical to relational 
norms.  
 
To further govern the design and enforcement of different ownership structures, I argue for the 
aptness of a two-tiered regulatory set-up whereby the special regulators are placed under a 
common regulatory oversight that is vested with well-defined adjudicative and policymaking 
powers. In effect, I have made a refocusing of the role of a regulatory agency, making it a 
regulatory oversight with well-targeted adjudicative and policy-making functions over ownership 
and regulatory conflicts. A regulatory oversight is shown to hold far greater relevance in a 
polycentric ownership regime, especially in developing countries where the set of ownership 
choices is constrained by market and political biases against private sector participation thus 
                                                          
  22 See Walter (2012) and Kovac (2011). 
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requiring proper adjudication of ownership shifts and regulatory conflicts. By promoting strategic 
and fair competition between different ownership types and regulators via adjudication, a 
regulatory oversight is envisioned to promote efficient ownership choices  and facilitate proper 
design of ex-ante and ex-post incentive devices (i.e., regulatory principles and procedures and 
financing scheme of utilities). 
 
Structure of the Study  
 
The dissertation is organized into three key chapters. Chapter 1 motivates the analysis of the 
relevance of ownership structure through an empirical investigation (i.e., regression analysis and 
case studies) on systematic differences in the pricing, staffing, spending behavior of publicly-
owned utilities and private utilities. Chapter 2 endeavors to account for the gaps in the intended 
and actual behavior of the three ownership types by delving into the institutional details of each 
ownership arrangement and regulatory framework, and explore the relevance of a regulatory 
oversight within a two-tiered regulatory structure in promoting proper functioning of all ownership 
types. Chapter 3 discusses a partnership approach to contracting and the key ex-ante and ex-
post incentive devices to realize the gains from public contracting. The study concludes with the 
role and limitations of private ownership in enhancing service delivery and potential areas for 
further research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
Allocation of Control Rights and Water Utility Behavior:  
An Empirical Evidence from the Philippines 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The disappointing outcomes of privatization in the water supply sector in developing 
countries have ushered in a shift in policy preference towards the introduction of 
private sector operating principles to publicly-owned utilities via corporatization. 
The policy refocusing towards commercialization of utilities sans sufficient private 
ownership, however, has feeble theoretical and empirical support. Using econometric 
tests and case studies, I set out to exploit the polycentric ownership regime of the 
water supply sector in the Philippines to find systematic differences in the pricing, 
staffing and spending behavior of three key ownership types (i.e., local government-
run utilities, corporatized water districts, and private utilities) and elucidate the influence 
of ownership as an allocation of control rights on utility behavior. Of principal interest 
is whether efficiency and equity motives are better achieved through regulation 
under sufficient private ownership or via corporatization under public ownership.  
  
Key words: privatization; corporatization; ownership; control; regulation; regulated industries; 
new public management; water utilities; water service coverage, non-revenue water  
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                                                    1. Introduction 
 
Water supply services have traditionally been provided by state-owned monolithic organization. 
During the 1980s, however, a new paradigm called New Public Management (NPM) gained 
popularity whereby utilities are transformed into professional service delivery organizations via 
corporatization (Baietti, et al., 2006). By shifting crucial decision rights from politicians to 
independent public managers, corporatization is argued to help limit redistributive political 
interference and enhance efficiency incentives, while still providing adequate scope for public 
scrutiny. Corporatized utilities adopt an entrepreneurial orientation towards management and 
other corporate governance principles to promote transparency, flexibility and accountability. 
The NPM, in effect, abstracted away from the relevance of ownership structure, i.e., it purports 
that it is the adoption of a corporate approach and not a shift to private ownership that matters. 
Through the lens of NPM, public ownership and private ownership are not fundamentally 
different; they can be subject to a set of rules and organized according to the same principles 
(Rainey and Bozeman, 2002).  
 
Economic theories, however, are less sanguine about the adoption of private sector operating 
principles sans an ownership shift on account of complex agency relationship inherent in any 
hybrid ownership arrangement. For many economic scholars, political interference is intrinsically 
inefficient that a soft reallocation of control rights via corporatization would fail to meaningfully 
alter the control and incentive structure of utilities; it may even undermine transparency and 
accountability due to complex agency relations. Instead of transplanting private sector operating 
principles to publicly-owned utilities to serve efficiency and equity motives, economists 
propound variants of private ownership (i.e., concession arrangement and institutional public-private 
ownership, such as joint ventures). This begs for an empirical investigation of whether  imposing 
public purposes on private corporations via contractual techniques and other incentive devices 
is more effective in enhancing service delivery than the transfer of management techniques of 
private corporations to public utilities.  
  
ϯͮW Ă Ő Ğ 



Empirically, several case studies have shown positive impact of corporatization on the 
performance of utilities. One of the key findings is that political will crucially matters, i.e., soft 
reallocation of control rights would suffice when political interference is constrained (Lobina and Hall, 
2014).  In this regard, the Philippine water supply sector would be an interesting illustrative case 
study. The Philippines was one of those countries that ventured to corporatize water utilities 
through a water district model in the late 1970s. After almost four decades of being the dominant 
ownership arrangement, especially in urban areas, however, a significant segment of the 
population has remained unserved or underserved. In view of the disappointing outcomes of 
corporatization, there has been a proposal to privatize water districts, while local government 
unit (LGU)-run utilities are given more financial and technical support to professionalize service 
delivery. The policy environment in the last six years has been marked by an increasing policy 
bias against corporatized public utilities and towards private utilities and LGU-run utilities. 
Notably, the policy drift towards private sector participation in the Philippine water supply 
sector contrasts with the global trend towards corporatization. There has been an increase in the 
overall number of public enterprises around the world as more governments opt to take back 
control of services previously sold or contracted out to the private sector (McDonald, 2014). 
 
In this article, I probe into the relative effectiveness of corporatization vis-à-vis sufficient private 
ownership in improving service delivery using economic tests and case studies. Taking 
advantage of the polycentric ownership regime of the Philippines and shifts in ownership of a 
few local utilities, I empirically investigate systematic differences in the pricing, staffing and 
spending behavior of three ownership types, namely, LGU-run utilities, corporatized water districts 
and private utilities. Most of the questions addressed in this article have been dealt with separately 
in various policy and academic studies using different methodologies with a different motivation 
and focus. Since the 1970s, the performance evaluation of water utilities has been carried out 
using several key performance indicators (e.g., scorecards as in Tynan and Kingdom, 2002; financial 
ratios, Guerrini et al., 2011; non-parametric methods like data envelopment analysis as in Thanassoulis, 
2000 and Marques et al. 2011; and parametric methods like regression analysis as in Zschille and Walter, 
2012). Single dimension indicators are intuitive and easy to compute, but they are susceptible to 
some misinterpretation as they do not cover all relevant inputs, outputs, and explanatory factors 
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that influence the performance of decision-making units.22 Both parametric and non-parametric 
methods have been used to study the influence of ownership focusing on efficiency. The results 
of these studies, however, waded through the difficulties of controlling for concurrent policy 
reforms (e.g., market liberalization and regulatory reforms) that would have an influence on the 
effectiveness of ownership shifts. Given data constraints and the policy drive of the article, I 
employ basic multiple linear regression analysis and case studies to find systematic differences 
in the behavior of the LGU-run utilities, water districts and private utilities. The performance of 
LGU-run utilities, water districts and private utilities has been assessed in various studies 
conducted by the World Bank and local research institutions (e.g., Water and Sanitation Program 
2005 and 2009). Most of these studies are case studies using financial indicators and the findings 
have consistently been in favor of private utilities. Compared with existing studies on the water 
utilities in the Philippines, the article examines various dimensions of the pricing, spending and 
staffing attributes of the utilities to help identify specific policy interventions. 
 
Given the limited sample size and issues relating to data reliability and selection bias, the policy 
insights drawn from the results and findings assume an indicative standpoint rather than a 
directive one. At the very least, the article serves as a motivation for deeper analysis of the 
institutional details of each ownership type to gain better perspectives on the functioning of 
different ownership types, especially in water supply services. The rest of the paper is organized 
as follows. The first section presents the theoretical underpinnings of the influence of ownership 
on utility behavior and the institutional details of the three ownership structures of water utilities 
in the Philippines. The second section discusses the methodological approach of the paper, while 
the third section presents the key results and findings of econometric tests and case studies. The 
study concludes with the policy implications of the findings. 
 
 
2. Theoretical Background and Institutional Context 
 
2.1. Theoretical background. The study empirically tests the influence of ownership on utility 
behavior and performance. Ownership is defined herein in terms of control and decision-making 

  22 See Ferreira, et al. (2014). 
ϱͮW Ă Ő Ğ 



structures having their respective incentive properties. As purported by organizational theorists 
(e.g., Savas, 1982; Zald, 1978; Dahl and Lindblom, 1953), private ownership and public ownership 
are fundamental decision systems which represent modes of social control. Under private 
ownership, social control is exercised through relatively decentralized, autonomous 
organizational forms between buyers and sellers in economic exchanges who have less organized 
intent to control the trade and whose decision choices are largely driven by economic 
considerations.23 Public organizations, on the other hand, operate within the bounds of politically 
constituted hierarchy or polyarchy. State-owned utilities are vastly subject to pressure from non-
governmental political actors and interest groups exerted mainly through elected government 
officials (e.g., groups lobbying city  chief executives to intervene in a decision made by a bureau). The 
fundamental differences between market and polyarchic controls are evinced in the 
organization’s rules for establishment and termination, mission and goals, geographical sphere 
of operations, major technologies and operating procedures (e.g., personnel systems and top 
executive appointments, purchasing/procurement systems, and budgeting/financial systems).  
 
Defining ownership in terms of funding sources, economists have analyzed the incentive effects 
of ownership on private managers and public managers based on the resulting exposure of the 
agents to  political and market risks and incentives. Political and market institutions, however, 
are not static and homogeneous; public managers could have disparate levels of exposure to 
market and political risks; they may have different responses to various types of commercial and 
political risks and incentives depending on a suite of institutional constraints. Politicians and civil 
servants may be imperfect welfare maximizers, but this does not preclude englightened policy 
interventions.  Ascertaining the desirability of an ownership structure would therefore require a 
thorough comparative institutional analysis with a heavy micro-analytic dose of the 
characteristics of markets and polyarchies.  The economic theories and organization literature 
provide instructive insights on the merits and drawbacks of different ownership structures. 
 
Public Ownership. Property rights theorists (e.g., Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; and Demsetz, 1967) 
attribute the differences in the performance and behavior of public and private utilities to the ease 
of transferability of ownership and extent of risk-sharing. Unlike privately-owned utilities where 

  23 See Perry and Rainey (1988) for a detailed review of organizational theories.  
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owners can easily sell their equity shares if they are not satisfied with the performance of the 
manager, the transfer of public ownership via the political market (e.g., electoral process) is much 
less straightforward. In the private sector, management constitutes a productive input of which 
value is determined in largely efficiency-driven economic exchanges. Among public 
organizations, the distribution of managerial ability is weakly correlated with the economic value 
of managerial input on account of multiple public policy goals and extensive external influence; 
hence, the inferiority of public entities in terms of efficiency. In the principal-agent literature, 
public ownership is considered inferior on account of the lack of  profit motive. As succinctly 
explained by Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), the private manager-owner can be a residual 
claimant for his own cost savings, but the public sector manager cannot; hence, the low-powered 
incentive for cost minimization of the latter. In Haskel’s and Szymanski’s (1993) bargaining 
model, employees of public organizations tend to enjoy higher salary than their private 
counterparts as public employees capture more of the internal rent. As social welfare maximizers, 
public firms do not demand as much from their employees in terms of effort as private firms 
whose survival critically depends on efficiency. In Scandinavia, for instance, public sector 
agreements are more generous than those negotiated in the private sector.  
 
The susceptibility to external influence and accommodation of multiple objectives of public 
organizations are not necessarily undesirable (e.g., where the goals are highly interlinked it would be 
efficient to jointly pursue them as the case is with water service provision in rural areas where water utilities 
is an important source of employment; and there exists a sufficiently efficient political market) unless the 
political market is highly inefficient as posited by public choice theorists (e.g., James Buchanan, 
Gordon Tullock, William Niskanen, and Mancur Olson). The accommodation of various interests 
would lead to highly inferior trade-offs between goals. Although politicians may promise to keep 
prices at highly affordable rates, they rarely back those promises with sufficient funding (Berg, 
2013). As a result, excessive political involvement in utility operations often leads to 
underinvestment and huge efficiency losses. Under-investment in network maintenance results 
in more service interruptions, making consumers less willing to pay for the service.  
 
The adverse impact of an inefficient political market on the functioning of state utilities is 
magnified in water supply sector on account of the long life span, high capital intensity and 
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invisibility of water infrastructure. These characteristics of water supply systems reinforce the 
political bias towards short-term objectives (e.g., hiring many or transitory staff and below-cost 
pricing) at the expense of long-term goals (e.g., network expansion and reduced water distribution 
losses) (Baietti, 2006). The long life span and invisibility of water infrastructure makes it expedient 
for politicians to scrimp on network maintenance and rehabilitation and accommodate below-
cost pricing and overstaffing, which yield immediate and tangible political benefits.  

Public Regulation. To overcome the incentive problems of public ownership, water service 
delivery is taken out of administrative hierarchies by transferring virtually all control rights (i.e., 
investment, management and operational rights) to the private sector subject to external regulation. 
Given limited competition in water supply sector, external regulation is aimed at inducing profit-
maximizing private utilities to keep prices in line with cost (Berg and Tschirhart, 1988). Although 
regulated private utilities are also subject to governmental authority (i.e., a framework of laws, 
chartering provisions, regulations) and external pressures, (e.g., from industry associations, consumer 
groups, professional associations), the influence of these actors are amply restrained. With public 
regulation, public control is exercised through regulatory contracts and institutions. But while 
shifting the control rights to the private sector may limit inefficient political interference, it lays 
the transaction bare to costly regulatory bargaining. When regulatory capacity is weak, the 
regulatory bargaining may inefficiently benefit the private operator. Drawing on the capture and 
interest group theory, however, the problem of regulatory capture can be moderated by the 
presence of a contending force, such as a powerful consumer group (Tullock, 1993; Peltzman, 
1976; and Stigler, 1971). In the case of water supply sector, the chronic underpricing may constrain 
private operator from exploiting his monopoly position, (i.e., charging water rates that are not 
commensurate with service level and the consumers’ willingness and ability to pay).  
 
Corporatization. Corporatization seeks to minimize the cost of adversarial regulatory bargaining 
while precluding excessive political interference. To insulate the utility from external influence 
and induce efficiency, corporatized utilities are granted a separate juridical identity and financial 
autonomy; they are run based on corporate governance principles (i.e., gradual elimination of 
subsidies; prioritizing financial sustainability and performance-based salary schemes; separation of 
ownership, corporate oversight and service provision; selection and appointment of board of directors; 
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performance orientation; and legal framework and transparency/disclosure) as put forth by NPM 
(Eisendrath 2012; Andrés, Guasch and Azumendi, 2011). To further reduce external influence (i.e., 
multiple governmental authorities, interest groups and other political actors), the NPM approach is 
sometimes combined with the bureaucratic model, i.e., pre-eminence of rules, employment of civil 
servants with civil service careers in public administration (Schwartz, 2006; Guasch et al., 2010).  
 
But while corporatization is designed to overcome the drawbacks of administrative hierarchies, 
the adoption of the management structure of private organization without sufficient private 
ownership may complicate the governance process. The adoption of commercial principles (e.g., 
cost-recovery and performance-based compensation) may not induce efficient utility behavior without 
sufficient private ownership owing to the problem of credible commitment. The social welfare 
maximizing state cannot credibly commit to faithfully implement the private sector operating 
principles, particularly the hardening of the budget constraint and full operational independence 
as the welfare of employees and the water users and other stakeholders carries a 
disproportionately large weight in public authorities’ utility function  (Dewatripont and Roland, 
1999). The proper functioning of corporatized utilities is also hampered by enforcement problems 
brought by complex agency relations (i.e., board of directors, regulators, and other government 
agencies). Incentives for effective regulation are likewise diminished as corporatization distorts 
the balance of risks and rewards; it accommodates profit motive without political and financial 
risks making public managers much less constrained than private managers to engage in rent-
sharing with political authorities.  
 
2.2. The Institutional Context. With varied schemes of corporatization and privatization across 
countries, it is imperative to discuss the key institutional features of the three ownership types of 
water utilities in the Philippines to explicate the differences and similarities of the findings of the 
study with those of other studies. Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the local 
government units have the responsibility of providing potable water services with an option to 
directly operate its own utility through its municipal engineering or city administration 
department or delegate it to a water district or a private utility.  
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LGU-run utilities. LGU-run utilities exemplify the archetypical municipal waterworks 
departments found in many countries (Braadbaart, Blockland and Schwartz, 1999). LGU-
operated utilities are owned, managed and operated by local government units. The elected 
officials via the Sangguniang Bayan, which is the local legislative body, oversees the performance 
of LGU-run utilities. LGU-run utilities are heavily subsidized. The operating expenditures of 
LGU-run utilities are partially drawn from tariff revenues, while funding for capital 
improvements are obtained from the budget of the municipal government or sourced from loans 
obtained by the LGU from government and multilateral financing institutions. With limited 
resources of local governments, LGU-run utilities are operated alongside other economic 
enterprises such as markets, bus terminals, and slaughterhouses and compete for financial 
resources with these enterprises (WSP, 2008).  
 
Water districts. Water districts are “statutory body” organizations that are granted corporate 
powers and an exclusive franchise to operate a water supply system in a province, or one or several 
cities and municipalities. Presidential Decree 198 enacted in 1973 provides for the establishment, 
operation and dissolution of water districts. Water districts are formed through a resolution 
issued by the local legislative body and approved by the local chief executive with final approval 
from the Local LWUA. Upon approval of the resolution, the LWUA issues a Conditional 
Certificate of Conformance (CCC) which entitles the water district to LWUA’s comprehensive 
assistance programs. The corporatization of the utilities via a water district model primarily aims 
to develop self-sustaining utilities. The LWUA requires the water rates of water districts to be 
sufficiently high to cover annual operating expenses, the maintenance and repairs of the works 
and a reasonable surplus for replacement, extension, and improvements and payment of interest 
and principal. Water districts must also provide sinking fund for the payment of debts as they 
become due as well as fund for reasonable reserves. To further enable water districts to achieve 
financial sustainability, LWUA also sets operating standards (e.g., quality of construction materials, 
staff size and personnel training).  
 
The water district has a board of directors which exercises policy making powers, while the 
manager of the district is granted autonomy over the operation of the utility, including the hiring 
and firing of employees. In 1991, the Supreme Court declared water district as a government-
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owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) of which board members, management and staff  are 
subject to civil service rules, government compensation policies, and auditing rules. As provided 
in Section 45 of PD 198, as amended by Sec. 19, PD 768, a water district may be dissolved by 
resolution of its board of directors on the condition that another public authority has acquired the 
assets of the district and has assumed all its obligations and liabilities with the consent of the 
creditors and that a court of competent jurisdiction has found said dissolution to be in the best 
interest of the public.  
 
Privately-operated utilities. Privately operated utilities cover all privately-owned utilities as well as 
state-owned water utilities that are currently being managed by a private operator under various 
public-private partnership schemes. Two of these systems, Maynilad and Manila Water, are in 
Metro Manila; the two largest water service providers have been operated under a concession 
agreement since 1997.  The three other private utilities operate as public-private joint ventures in 
Tagbilaran, Subic Bay and Clark area in Pampanga (WSP, 2008). Private water utilities are 
regulated by the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) which sets essentially the same 
principles for setting tariffs as LWUA’s (i.e., a block tariff system to service equity goals). All private 
utilities are required to secure a certificate of public convenience (CPC) from the NWRB before 
they can operate and maintain waterworks system. Documentary requirements for securing CPC 
include a list of existing assets and actual financial statement and balance sheet for water 
operations and projected financial statements for five years, including a proposed tariff schedule. 
The CPC can be renewed every five years provided the utility complies with the rules and 
regulations of the NWRB.  


3. Methodology 
 
To explore the influence of ownership on water utility behavior and performance, I investigate 
systematic differences in the pricing, staffing and spending behavior of LGU-run utilities, water 
districts and private utilities using two simple methods: (i) regression analysis, i.e., ordinary least 
square (OLS) estimation; and (ii) case studies. The case studies are conducted to further validate 
the regression results and explore various aspects of the market and ownership structure.  
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3.1. Data Description. The data used in the econometric tests are drawn from the database of the 
International Benchmarking Network for Water and Sanitation (IBNET). The quality of IBNET 
database depends on the quality of the data submitted by the utilities. To ensure that the data 
sufficiently reflect the reporter’s performance, IBNET subjects the data to data checking 
procedures; albeit data accuracy cannot be guaranteed. The data are essentially financial ratios 
and accounting data used as performance indicators for benchmarking purposes.  The utilities 
used for OLS estimation include seven LGU-run utilities; six private utilities (two large private 
operators serving Metro Manila under a concession agreement; two private utilities with mixed financing; 
and two fully privately-owned water utilities); and 20 water districts covering periods 2003, 2004, 
2008 and 2009.  
 
For the case studies, the data were obtained from the financial reports submitted by the utilities 
to the regulatory agencies, except for one LGU-run utility which were directly provided by the 
utility to the author. The financial reports underwent checking procedures by the regulatory 
agencies and/or audited by the Commission on Audit. The utilities included in the case studies 
are two LGU-run utilities, eight private utilities, and nine water districts. The utilities are divided 
into three size categories, namely, small, medium-sized and large, to control for the size effect. 
Except for one private water utility and one LGU-run utility, the water utilities selected in the 
case studies are located in four provinces: Pampanga, Batangas, Laguna and Bulacan. They are 
among the most progressive provinces that are closest to the capital of the country where the 
regulatory agencies are headquartered. Batangas and Laguna are neighboring provinces which 
form part of the CALABARZON24. Pampanga and Bulacan, on the other hand, are both in the north 
of Manila. As these water utilities operate in geographically proximate provinces, they share 
similar operating environment, i.e., comparable water production cost, thus allowing the author to 
focus on the management aspect of the water utilities.  
 
3.2. Ordinary Least Square Estimation. Using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method, I test for 
systematic differences in pricing (including profit orientation and cost efficiency), staffing and spending 
behavior of LGU-run utilities, water districts and private utilities. 

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3.2.1. Key Aspects of Utility Performance. As a general assessment of the relative efficiency of 
pricing, staffing and spending behavior of LGU-run utilities, water districts and private utilities, 
I investigate how key aspects of the behavior of the three ownership arrangements correlate with 
their performance in service coverage and non-revenue water by regressing to performance 
indicators, service coverage (WC) and non-revenue water (NRW), on five measures of utility behavior: 
average revenue (AR); operating cost coverage ratio (OCCR); unit operating cost (UOC); staff productivity 
(Staff); and labor cost share (LCS): ܹܥ௜ǡ ܴܰ ௜ܹǡ= ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௪ௗܱ௪ௗ௜ ൅ ߚ௣௥ܱ௣௥௜ ൅ ߚ௞ܺ௞௜ ൅ ߚ௡ܥ௡௜  + ߝ௜ , 
where: O refers to ownership; X to the five behavioral variables of interest; and C to control 
variables; k and n are the number of coefficients of the behavioral and control variables, 
respectively; i the utilities included in the sample, subscripts wd and pri refer to water district and 
private utility, respectively; LGU-run utilities are used as the base ownership.  
 
Control variables include utility size measured by the number of connections (Conn) and market 
conditions proxied for by average monthly water consumption (WCon) and residential 
consumption share (RCS). These control variables affect utility performance and bear strong 
association with the ownership type of the utility (i.e., private utilities operate in relatively favorable 
markets and LGU-run utilities are comparably small). Utility size is an important control variable as 
there are substantial economies of scale in water supply services. Large water systems, measured 
in terms of number of connections, can produce, treat, and deliver water at lower unit cost due to 
economies in the use of labor and raw water supply, water treatment and financial and operating 
services (US National Research Council, 2002). Water systems, however, may also exhibit 
diseconomies of scale in the transmission and distribution of water as it is heavy and 
incompressible. But while water transported farther from the source and treatment facilities 
requires additional pumping facilities, long-distance transmission of water becomes more 
economical when water availability and water quality are considered. The impact of utility size 
on water rates would therefore depend on whether scale economies in the use of resources 
dominates the diseconomies of scale in water distribution. On the other hand, favorable market 
conditions do not necessarily discourage illegal water connections (i.e., industrial users may have 
better means of engaging in water theft) making its impact on non-revenue water indeterminate.   
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Service coverage. Service coverage is the percentage of the total population under the utility’s 
nominal responsibility with access to water services either through direct service connection or 
within reach of a public water point. Irrespective of ownership type, an increase in average 
revenue of an efficiently managed utility, holding other relevant variables constant, is likely to 
expand service coverage. A negative association between average revenue and service coverage 
may indicate cost inefficiencies and/or excessive profit orientation. The service coverage of 
efficiently managed water utilities also tends to increase when staff productivity improves and 
spending bias towards personnel expenses as indicated by labor cost share is reduced. The sign 
and strength of influence of behavioral variables on service coverage hint at the level of efficiency 
of the utilities. With its performance-driven control structure as discussed in Section 2.1, private 
utilities are likely to exhibit efficient pricing, staffing and spending behavior than water districts 
and LGU-run utilities, i.e., service coverage of the same is likely to respond strongly and positively to any 
increase in average revenue and staff productivity and a reduction in labor cost share. With the 
introduction of corporate governance principles, water district are less vulnerable than LGU-run 
utilities to inefficient political interference, but pricing, spending and staffing behavior of the 
former may not be more efficient than the latter due to complex agency relationship and distorted 
incentive structure arising from accommodation of profit motive sans the corresponding 
regulatory and market risks as detailed in Section 2.1.   
 
Non-revenue water. Non-revenue water refers to water that has been produced and is “lost” before 
it reaches the customers due to leaks, illegal connections, faulty meters and under-billing. Non-
revenue water tends to increase as distribution systems age, especially if not properly 
maintained. 25  Urban systems lose 10 to 15 percent water from distribution systems but in 
geographically unstable areas losses could be as high as 50 percent.26 Part of this “lost” water can 
be recovered by appropriate technical and managerial actions, such as the adoption of new 
technologies for leaks detection and community involvement to fight water theft. Water 
management can also compensate leaks in the short run by increasing the pressure or the amount 
of water input albeit increasing variable cost. Low NRW figure is an indication of managerial 
efficiency. Reducing non-revenue water can contribute to meeting unsatisfied water demand 

  25 See US National Research Council (2002) 
  26 See van den Bergh and A. Danilenko (n.d.)  
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which in turn reduces the required future capital expenditures to expand service coverage. An 
efficiently managed utility would have low NRW when unit operating cost, water rates and 
operating cost coverage ratio are high and labor cost share is low, ceteris paribus. As with service 
coverage, such efficient association between non-revenue and behavioral variables is more likely 
to be exhibited by private utilities than state-owned utilities. 
 
3.2.2. Water Utility Behavior. To further elucidate the relative efficiency of three ownership types, 
I make further investigation on their spending, staffing and pricing behavior by estimating their 
association with pertinent variables. 
  
3.2.2.1. Pricing and Profit Orientation. Water rates reflect demand and cost conditions and profit 
orientation of water utilities. The extent to which price responds to demand and cost 
circumstances may vary as a result of differences in ownership structure and associated 
regulatory policies of the utilities as discussed in Section 2.1. To find systematic differences in the 
pricing behavior and profit orientation of the three ownership types, I regress average tariff and 
operating cost coverage ratio on ownership type and demand and cost variables controlling for 
utility size: ܣܴ௜ǡ ܱܥܴ௜ǡ=ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௪ௗܱ௪ௗ௜ ൅ ߚ௣௥ܱ௣௥௜ ൅ ߚ௞ܺ௞௜ ൅ ߚ௡ܥ௡௜ + ߝ௜ 
 
Average Revenue. The Philippines adopts a rising block tariff system whereby residential users 
pay less than commercial users and higher water consumption level is charged more. As tariffs 
vary across consumer categories, the average revenue (i.e., total water revenues divided by water 
consumption or revenue per unit of water sold) is used to approximate the average tariff paid by water 
users. Under a rising tariff block system, the average revenue increases when average monthly 
consumption (WCon) increases and residential consumption share (RCS) decreases, assuming 
that residential units have lower consumption than commercial users.  Unlike private utilities 
and water districts which are prescribed to adopt a rising tariff block system, LGU-run utilities 
are at liberty to set their own pricing scheme. As a result, the ownership dummies capture the 
relative effectiveness of the implementation of the rising tariff block system among private 
utilities vis-à-vis water districts and dissimilarity of the pricing orientation of LGU-run utilities.   
 
Although all ownership types have to overcome historic underpricing, which compels utilities to avoid or 
postpone the cost of maintaining a reliable water supply system, LGU-run utilities are highly susceptible 
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to political pressure to lower prices on account of their ownership structure. With excessive political 
interference, corporatization may not adequately insulate utilities from inefficient political interference and 
may even engender perverse incentive effects (i.e., excessive spending incited by the virtual absence of 
commercial risks and strong profit orientation may result in high tariffs). Effective insulation from political 
interference on account of assignment of crucial control rights to private entities and increased 
enforceability of external regulation lead to efficient pricing patterns among private utilities.   
 
Operating Cost Coverage Ratio. To further assess the profit orientation of water utilities, I probe into 
systematic differences in the operating cost coverage ratio of the utilities. Operating cost coverage 
ratio is the ratio of total operating revenues to total operating expenses (e.g., power costs, personnel 
expenses, and maintenance expenses). An operating cost coverage ratio that is greater than one means 
that operating revenues more than cover operating costs, indicating low or zero subsidies and 
adequate reserves for network maintenance and expansion The operating cost coverage ratio of 
a utility can be improved by increasing the revenues via increased tariffs or reducing unit 
operating costs. Absent any subsidy, operating cost coverage ratio of a well-managed utility 
improves when average revenue increases and unit operating cost decreases. If pricing and 
costing behavior, however, is inefficient, i.e., price is not commensurate to service quality and/or 
willingness to pay thereby discouraging consumption, operating cost coverage ratio would be less 
responsive to an increase in average revenue or a decrease in unit operating cost. Irrespective of 
ownership type, however, water tariffs weakly respond to unit operating cost as fixed costs vastly 
account for water supply costs due to the capital intensity of water infrastructure; the scope for 
cost adjustment is therefore limited in the short run. Short-run marginal cost is unusually smaller 
than long-run marginal cost in water supply services, especially in a simple surface-water supply 
system with minimal treatment of drinking water.27 As financially self-sufficient entities, the 
operating cost coverage ratio of private utilities is expected to be more responsive to changes in 
unit operating cost and average revenue compared to water districts and LGU-run utilities.  
 
3.2.2.2. Costing, Staffing and Spending Behavior. To ascertain significant differences in the costing, 
staffing and spending behavior of the three ownership types, I regress unit operating cost, staff 
per 1,000 connections and labor cost share of the utilities on ownership type and other relevant 

  27 See W. M. Hanemann (n.d.). 
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staffing and spending variablesǡcontrolling for utility size and demand conditions. To assess the 
overall costing behavior of the utilities, I estimate the responsiveness of unit operating cost to 
staff productivity and labor cost share of the utilities and delve further into their staffing and 
spending behavior:ܷܱܥ௜ǡ ܮܥ ௜ܵǡ ܵݐ݂ܽ ௜݂=ߚ଴ ൅ ߚ௪ௗܱ௪ௗ௜ ൅ ߚ௣௥ܱ௣௥௜ ൅ ߚ௞ܺ௞௜ ൅ ߚ௡ܥ௡௜ + ߝ௜. 
 
Unit Operating Cost. The unit operating cost captures both the geophysical costs (e.g., source of 
water supply) and management-related costs, such as personnel expenses, power costs, and repairs 
and maintenance cost. In some regions, the low-cost sources of water may have been developed 
leading to low unit operating cost. Unit operating cost is affected by utility size and market 
conditions (i.e., lucrative markets demand high service quality which requires large operating expenses 
resulting in high unit operating cost), hence, these two variables are controlled for. Irrespective of 
ownership type, unit operating cost of water utilities can be reduced by enhancing staff 
productivity or minimizing operating expenses. Financial sustainability requirements are also 
expected to induce utilities to reduce unit operating cost of which impact on performance 
depends on how the utility minimizes unit operating cost, i.e., whether by enhancing staff 
productivity or scrimping on network maintenance. Scrimping on network maintenance to 
reduce unit operating cost is set to undermine service quality and affordability in the long run.  
 
With constrained political interference and enhanced viability of external regulation, private utilities are 
likely to exhibit efficient spending and staffing patterns and sound financial management yielding low unit 
operating cost as argued in Section 2.1. Depending on the extent of political interference and 
implementation capacity, corporatization via water district may not be able to overcome spending and 
staffing biases towards personnel expenses of state-owned utilities resulting in cost inefficiencies.  
 
Staff Productivity and Labor Cost Share. To find systematic differences in the staffing and spending 
patterns of the three ownership types, I delve into the association between salary, staff 
productivity and labor cost share controlling for utility size and demand conditions. Large water 
utilities require substantial capital improvements resulting in low labor cost share, hence, the 
need to control for utility size. Also, utility size affords economies of scale yielding high staff 
productivity and low labor cost share. In lucrative markets, water users demand high service 
level, requiring hefty non-personnel expenses, particularly in network maintenance and power 
costs. LGU-run utilities tend to operate in less favorable demand conditions which could generate 
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a biased estimate of the ownership influence on staffing and spending behavior of the utilities, 
making demand circumstances an important control variable. 
 
Staff productivity-based personnel compensation constitutes an efficient staffing and spending 
behavior. While salaries may enhance worker performance, exceedingly high salary may lead to 
low staff productivity as personnel expenses are increased by shrinking non-personnel expenses 
(i.e., network maintenance and expansion) under tight profit constraint.  An efficiently managed 
utility maintains optimal levels of personnel and non-personnel expenses that would afford high 
staff productivity and salaries. High labor cost share comes with low staff productivity if salary 
is weakly tied to staff productivity.  
 
Insulated by his bargaining and informational advantage from inefficient political interference, private 
utilities are likely to exhibit efficient spending and staffing patterns marked by high staff productivity level 
and low labor cost share. Depending on the prevalence of political interference and implementation capacity 
as noted earlier, water districts may not be able to sufficiently address the spending and staffing biases 
towards personnel expenses of state-owned utilities. With the adoption of commercial principles, 
particularly the accommodation of profit motive and the consequent strong revenue stance, the bias towards 
personnel expenses among water districts would have limited impact on non-personnel expenses. As a 
result, labor cost share of water districts may be lower and their staff productivity higher than LGU-run 
utilities.  
 
3.3. Case Studies. The case studies use the same financial indicators as in the regression analysis 
plus a few additional variables. As pointed out earlier, however, the set of utilities being 
considered in case studies have higher degree of comparability as they operate in provinces that 
have similar geophysical and economic conditions. Specifically, the market and regulatory 
environment is more favorable being located close to Manila where the regulatory agencies are 
headquartered. The performance of the utilities is therefore expected to be better and less 
dissimilar than in the regression results.  
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4. Estimation Results and Findings 
 
The regression results have shown systematic differences in the pricing, staffing and spending 
orientation of LGU-run utilities, water districts and private utilities. This translates to disparate 
trade-offs between key areas of performance (i.e., affordability, financial sustainability, service 
coverage and non-revenue water): 
 
i. Private utilities. Private utilities have shown to yield better trade-offs between said key 
areas of performance than the other two ownership types, albeit not to an extent that the 
same can perfectly substitute for LGU-run utilities and water districts. Also, the strong 
performance of private utilities in service coverage has shown to be chiefly a consequence 
of high staff productivity and efficient overall spending behavior; 
ii. Water districts. The strong performance of water districts in non-revenue water has shown 
to be driven by exceedingly high personnel and non-personnel expenses, which, in turn, 
undermine service affordability. Water districts have registered high average revenue 
consequent on high service level, cost inefficiencies and strong profit orientation; and  
iii. LGU-run utilities. The remarkably low water rates of LGU-run utilities have shown to 
reflect poor service level and subdued profit orientation.   In fact, the price differential of 
private utilities and LGU-run utilities is significantly explained by disparities in service 
level and market conditions, i.e., ability of users to pay.  
 
4.1. Water Utility Performance: Service Coverage and Non-Revenue Water  
 
4.1.1. Service Coverage: Private utilities have registered the highest service coverage and number 
of new connections followed by water districts and LG-run utilities. Although water districts and 
LGU-run utilities have comparably high service coverage, the former have recorded a much 
larger number of new connections.  
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Table 2. Ownership Effect to Service Coverage  
Model: 
OLS 
Private WD WCon Conn RCS LCS OCR Staff UOC AR No. 
of 
Obs. 
R2 
WC n.s. n.s.   .01 
(.02)** 
n.s.  .49 
(.09)* 
n.s. n.s.  -.03 
(.004)*** 
 1.8 
(.04)** 
 -1.3 
(.03)** 
73 .64 
Notes: AR=Average Revenue; UOC=Unit Operating Cost; OCR=Operating Cost Covera Ratio; Salary=Average Monthly Salary; WCon=Ave. 
Monthly Consumption per Household Connection; RCS=Residential Consumption Share; LCR=Labour Cost Share; Staff= Staff per 1,000 
Connections; Conn=No. of Connections 
n.s. = not statistically significant at 10% level 
 
Sources of Coverage Differential. There appears to be no systematic difference in how demand and 
cost conditions affect service coverage across three ownership types. Irrespective of ownership 
type, utilities that have high staff productivity and expenditure levels and operate in favorable 
demand conditions tend to have high service coverage. Interestingly, water service coverage is 
negatively associated with average revenue, i.e., utilities that have high average revenue tend to have 
low service coverage. A plausible explanation is that increases in water rates of most water utilities 
may have been driven by cost inefficiencies or inability to exploit economies of scale. With cost 
inefficiencies, it would be more profitable for water utilities to concentrate in lucrative areas 
where they can increase water rates than expand service coverage. 
 
Table 3. Factors Affecting Service Coverage by Ownership Type 
Model: OLS AR UOC WCon RCS Conn OCR LCS Staff Sal No. of 
Obs. 
R2 
LGU-Run  -3.3 
(.07)* 
1.9 
(.10)* 
n.s. 1.8 
(.05)** 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 12 .76 
Private n.s n.s. .03 
(.04)** 
n.s. n.s. -.06 
(.03)** 
n.s n.s n.s 15 .94 
Water 
District 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. -.05 
(.02)** 
n.s. 45 .73 
Notes: AR=Average Revenue; UOC=Unit Operating Cost; OCR=Operating Cost Coverage Ratio; Salary=Average Monthly Salary; WCon=Ave. 
Monthly Consumption per Household Connection; RCS=Residential Consumption Share; LCR=Labour Cost Share; Staff= Staff per 1,000 
Connections; Conn=No. of Connections 
n.s. = not statistically significant at 10% level 
 
Table 1. Service Coverage of Utilities by Ownership Type 
Utilities Water Service Coverage (%) No. of New Connections 
Mean Standard deviation Min Max Mean No. of New 
Conn./Yr. 
LGU (13) 41 28 9 97 314 
WD (46) 43 19 10 91 723 
Private (16) 57 20 18 87 997 
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Although the coefficients of ownership dummies are statistically insignificant, the results of a 
separate regression for each ownership type point to interesting differences in how the variables 
affect service coverage of LGU-run utilities, water districts and private utilities:  
 
i. The service coverage of private utilities has shown to be strongly driven by staff 
productivity and market conditions, i.e., private utilities that have high staff productivity and 
favorable demand conditions tend to also have high service coverage; 
ii. Staff productivity also drives service coverage of water districts. Unlike private utilities, 
however,  service coverage of water districts does not appear to be affected by variations 
in demand conditions. Water districts have low service coverage even if they operate in 
lucrative markets; and 
iii. Notably, LGU-run utilities that have high service coverage tend to have low average 
revenue. This is partly because LGU-run utilities have shown to expand service coverage 
in areas where there are more residential users than commercial users, suggesting market 
preference or segmentation with LGU-run utilities serving low-income areas, while 
private utilities and water districts operate in high-income areas. Unlike private utilities 
and water districts, staff productivity did not figure as a significant determinant of the 
service coverage of LGU-run utilities, plausibly on account of the latter’s pervasively low 
staff productivity and reliance on external funding.  
 
4.1.2. Non-Revenue Water. Water 
districts have registered the 
lowest non-revenue water. 
LGU-run utilities and private 
utilities have comparably large 
water distribution losses. The difference in the non-revenue water of water districts and LGU-
run utilities can be essentially explained by the disparity in their size, demand circumstances, 
while said variables cannot account for the gap in the non-revenue water of LGU-run utilities and 
private utilities, suggesting that ownership structure and other aspects of the market 
environment may have played a role. Irrespective of ownership type, water utilities that have 
high non-revenue water also tend to have a strong bias towards personnel expenses and those 
Table 4.  Non-Revenue Water of Utilities by Ownership Type (%) 
Model: OLS Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
LGU (16) 32 19 7 68 
WD (42) 26 10 5 42 
Private (14) 36 18 10 68 
Source: IBNET 
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that have vast supply network also have large water distribution losses. Areas with high 
consumption level and more commercial users also tend to register large water distribution 
losses, highlighting the need to improve efficiency in water management, especially in large 
service areas. As with service coverage, high water rates and strong revenue stance of water 
utilities do not translate to a reduction in non-revenue water. 
 
Further investigation on the behavior of the three ownership types has shown that the high non-
revenue water of private utilities can be traced to utility size. The sample includes two large water 
concessionaires that serve over 10 million users. Interestingly, the negative impact of a large ratio 
of personnel expenses to non-personnel expenses as measured by labor cost share on non-revenue 
water holds strongly among water districts, suggesting an inefficient spending bias towards 
personnel expenses, while LGU-run utilities that operate in areas that have more commercial 
users tend to register high non-revenue water.  
 
Table 5. Ownership Effect to Non-Revenue Water  
Model OLS Private WD WCon Conn RCS LCS OCR Staff UOC AR No. 
of 
Obs. 
R2 
NRW .15 
(.006)*** 
n.s. n.s. .8 
(.000)*** 
 -.44 
(.01)** 
 .26 
(.009)*** 
n.s.    n.s. n.s.  n.s. 73 .51 
Notes: AR=Average Revenue; UOC=Unit Operating Cost; OCR=Operating Cost Coverage Ratio; Salary=Average Monthly Salary; WCon=Ave. 
Monthly Consumption per Household Connection; RCS=Residential Consumption Share; LCR=Labour Cost Share; Staff= Staff per 1,000 
Connections; Conn=No. of Connections 
n.s. = not statistically significant at 10% level 
 
Table 6. Factors Affecting Non-Revenue Water by Ownership Type 
Model: OLS AR UOC WCon RCS Conn OCR LCS Staff Sal No. of 
Obs. 
R2 
LGU-Run  n.s. n.s. n.s. -1.3 
(.05)** 
n.s. n.s. n.s n.s n.s. 12 .85 
Private n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. .008 
(.04)** 
n.s. n.s. .05 
(.08)** 
n.s. 13 .73 
Water 
District 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. .002 
(.004)** 
n.s. .23 
(.07)* 
n.s. n.s. 42 .57 
Notes: AR=Average Revenue; UOC=Unit Operating Cost; OCR=Operating Cost Coverage Ratio; Salary=Average Monthly Salary; WCon=Ave. 
Monthly Consumption per Household Connection; RCS=Residential Consumption Share; LCR=Labour Cost Share; Staff= Staff per 1,000 
Connections; Conn=No. of Connections 
n.s. = not statistically significant at 10% level 
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4.2. Water Utility Behavior: Pricing, Costing, Staffing and Spending Behavior 
 
4.2.1. Pricing Behavior of Utilities: As can be 
gleaned from summary statistics, LGU-run 
utilities have remarkably low average tariff of 
USD.13 followed by private utilities, USD.25 and 
water districts, USD.38. Interestingly, the gap 
between the lowest average tariff of LGU-run 
utilities and the lowest average tariff of private utilities is even wider, reflecting the extent of 
subsidization and low service level of LGU-run utilities. Also, the gap in the maximum average 
tariff of LGU-run utilities and private utilities is much smaller, conveying proper regulation of 
tariff increases and/or cost efficiency of private utilities.  Quite the opposite of LGU-run utilities, 
water districts manifest a high-pricing behavior; the mean, minimum and maximum average 
tariff of water districts are higher than those of LGU-run utilities and private utilities. 
 
Sources of Price Differential. Average tariff of the utilities systematically varies across ownership 
types. Irrespective of ownership type, water utilities, on the average, increase their rates by 
USD1.12 cents given a one cent increase in unit operating cost, an average mark-up of 12 percent. 
Given similar demand and cost conditions, average tariff of water districts is higher by 10 cents 
than LGU-run utilities and by five cents relative to private utilities. Ownership is estimated to 
account for nearly 67 percent of the difference in the average tariff of water districts and LGU-
run utilities and 42 percent of the gap in the average tariff of private utilities and LGU-run 
utilities.  As suggested by the low statistical significance of ownership dummies, the price 
differential of private utilities and LGU-run utilities has shown to be principally driven by 
variations in demand conditions. 
 
Table 7. Average Revenue/Tariff (In USD) by 
Ownership Type 
Utilities Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min  Max 
LGU .13 .09 .05 .32 
WD .38 .13 .20 .72 
Private .25 .10 .12 .44 
Source: Raw data from IBNET 
Table 8. Ownership Effect to Pricing Behavior of Water Utilities 
Model: OLS Private WD UOC RCS Wcon Conn 
Average Revenue .05 
(.08)* 
.10 
(.000)*** 
1.12 
(.000)*** 
.11 
(.24) 
.002 
(.07)* 
n.s. 
No. of Obs. 73      
R2 .90      
Notes: AR=Average Revenue; UOC=Unit Operating Cost; OCR=Operating Cost Coverage Ratio; Salary=Average Monthly Salary; 
WCon=Ave. Monthly Consumption per Household Connection; RCS=Residential Consumption Share; LCR=Labour Cost Share; Staff= 
Staff per 1,000 Connections; Conn=No. of Connections 
n.s. = not statistically significant at 10% level 
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Table 9. Factors Affecting Average Tariff by Ownership Type 
Model: 
OLS 
UOC WCon RCS Conn OCR LCS Staff Sal No. of 
Obs. 
R2 
LGU-Run  n.s. -.004 
(.09) 
-.13 
(.12) 
2 
(.09)* 
.12 
(.002)*** 
-.25 
(.002)*** 
.02 
(.03)** 
.0068 
(.02)** 
13 .99 
Private 1.3 
(.000)*** 
.001 
(.08)* 
.11 
(.14) 
-.004 
(.09)* 
.18 
(.000)*** 
n.s. n.s. n.s. 15 .99 
Water 
District 
1.21 
(.000)*** 
-.002 
(.07)* 
n.s. -.002 
(.10) 
.15 
(.000)*** 
-.23 
(.01)*** 
.01 
(.06)* 
2 
(.000)*** 
45 .97 
Notes: AR=Average Revenue; UOC=Unit Operating Cost; OCR=Operating Cost Coverage Ratio; Salary=Average Monthly Salary; 
WCon=Ave. Monthly Consumption per Household Connection; RCS=Residential Consumption Share; LCR=Labour Cost Share; 
Staff= Staff per 1,000 Connections; Conn=No. of Connections 
n.s. = not statistically significant at 10% level 
 
Further investigation on the average tariff of the three ownership types indicate distinct pricing 
behavior: 
 
i. The high average tariff of water districts is chiefly a consequence of their sensitivity to 
various cost components, which in turn can be attributed to the financial sustainability 
requirements imposed on water districts; 
ii. The average tariff of LGU-run utilities appears to also respond to the variations in 
different cost components, albeit they are less sensitive to changes in cost components 
compared to water districts. Average tariff of LGU-run utilities and water districts tend 
to increase when non-personnel expenses (relative to personnel expenses) increase, i.e., 
increased spending on network maintenance and rehabilitation. Akin to water districts, the 
average tariff of LGU-run utilities also tend to increase when staff productivity decreases 
and salary increases. The water rates of LGU-run utilities and water districts thus appear 
to be driven by cost inefficiencies, which explains the negative association of water rates 
with service coverage and non-revenue water; and 
iii. In stark contrast to water districts and LGU-run utilities, the average tariff of private 
utilities responds to changes in overall unit operating cost rather than to variations in 
individual cost components. This indicates that cost variables may have been anchored 
on each other, meaning salary increases of private utilities may have been tied to staff 
productivity improvement and productivity-enhancing expenses. Although the average 
tariff of private utilities is highly sensitive to variations in operating cost coverage ratio 
and unit operating cost, water rates remain low on account of restrained profit orientation 
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and efficient spending and staffing patterns which in turn preclude substantial increases 
in unit operating cost.  
 
4.2.1.1. Operating Cost Coverage Ratio. The profit orientation of the three ownership types is also 
reflected in the operating cost coverage ratio. In view of their financial sustainability 
requirements, water districts have the highest operating cost coverage ratio followed by private 
utilities. Both the minimum and maximum operating cost coverage ratio of water districts are 
higher than that of private utilities and LGU-run utilities. Mean operating revenues of water 
districts are substantially higher than their operating expenses, thus, affording greater spending 
in network improvement and expansion. Indeed, average fixed capital formation of water 
districts is higher compared to private utilities and LGU-run utilities, albeit the average length of 
distribution network of the former is shorter than that of the latter.  
 
 
 
Table 10. Operating Cost Coverage Ratio, Length of Distribution Network and Capital Formation by 
Ownership Type (In USD) 
Utilities/Indicators Mean Standard deviation Min  Max 
Operating Cost Coverage Ratio 
LGU 1.08 .37 .37 1.68 
WD 1.46 .45 .90 4 
Private 1.28 .27 .71 1.86 
Length of Distribution Network 
LGU 23.4 18 2.3 58.1 
WD 174 258 23.45 1,162 
Private 670 1242 26 3,710 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
LGU 11.2 14.6 2.46 48.4 
WD 40.3 22.9 13 94 
Private 37.14 25.4 .05 90 
Source: IBNET 
Table 11. Ownership Effect to the Operating Cost Coverage Ratio of Water Utilities 
Indicators Private WD AR UOC WCon RCS Conn 
OCR  n.s n.s. 4.6 
(.000)*** 
-6.7 
(.000)*** 
-.01 
(.03)** 
-1.14 
(.000)*** 
n.s. 
No. of Obs. 73       
R2 .72       
Notes: AR=Average Revenue; UOC=Unit Operating Cost; OCR=Operating Cost Coverage Ratio; Salary=Average Monthly Salary; 
WCon=Ave. Monthly Consumption per Household Connection; RCS=Residential Consumption Share; LCR=Labour Cost Share; Staff= Staff 
per 1,000 Connections; Conn=No. of Connections 
n.s. = not statistically significant at 10% level 
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Factors Influencing Operating Cost Coverage Ratio. The operating cost coverage ratio of the utilities 
is driven by unit operating cost and average revenue.  The regression results do not indicate a 
significant difference in the operating cost coverage ratio of the three ownership types. 
Irrespective of ownership type, water utilities operating in lucrative markets as indicated by the  
number of commercial users tend to have high operating cost coverage ratio. Interestingly, 
operating coverage ratio is negatively related with average monthly water consumption, which 
may have been occasioned by the negative impact of sizable water distribution losses in large, 
lucrative areas on the revenues of the utilities. 
 
A separate regression for each ownership type has shown that while the operating cost coverage 
ratio is driven by average revenue and unit operating cost, the degree of sensitivity of the 
operating cost coverage ratio of the three ownership types to said two variables differ: 
 
i. As expected, the operating cost coverage ratio of LGU-run utilities are less sensitive to 
variations in average revenue and unit operating cost, indicating other sources of 
revenues and expenses.  
ii. The variations in the operating cost coverage ratio of private utilities are better explained 
by changes in unit operating cost and average revenue compared to the other two 
ownership types, plausibly a reflection of their financial self-sufficiency and 
independence and sound accounting system. The financial sustainability of private 
utilities also does not appear to be influenced by variations in labor cost share. 
Table 12. Factors Affecting Operating Cost Coverage Ratio by Ownership Type 
Model: OLS AR UOC RCS WCon Conn LCS No. of 
Obs. 
R2 
LGU-Run  4.0 
(.06) 
-3.9 
(.03) 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 13 .72 
Private 5.3 
(.000)*** 
-7.5 
(.000)*** 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 15 .98 
Water District 5.1 
(.000)*** 
-8.3 
(.000)*** 
-1.4 
(.01)** 
-.03 
(.01)** 
n.s. .65 
(.02)** 
45 .82 
Notes: AR=Average Revenue; UOC=Unit Operating Cost; OCR=Operating Cost Coverage Ratio; Salary=Average Monthly Salary; WCon=Ave. 
Monthly Consumption per Household Connection; RCS=Residential Consumption Share; LCR=Labour Cost Share; Staff= Staff per 1,000 
Connections; Conn=No. of Connections 
n.s. = not statistically significant at 10% level 
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iii. Unlike private utilities, labor cost share and operating cost coverage ratio of water districts 
are positively associated, i.e., water districts that have high operating cost coverage ratio tend to 
also have high labor cost share. It thus appears that water districts meet financial 
sustainability requirements by scrimping on non-personnel expenses.  
 
4.2.2. Costing Efficiency, Spending and Staffing Orientation  
 
4.2.2.1. Cost Efficiency. Water districts have 
registered the highest operating expenses per 
cubic meter of water produced. Average unit 
operating cost of water districts is at USD.27 
compared to private utilities, USD.20 and LGU-
run utilities, USD.14 cent. Both the maximum and 
minimum unit operating cost of water districts are also higher than the other two ownership 
types. It is interesting to note that while the minimum unit operating cost of LGU-run utilities is 
much lower than that of private utilities and water districts, the maximum unit operating cost of 
private utilities is lower than the maximum unit operating cost of the two other ownership types, 
hinting at the strong capacity of private utilities to rein in costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13. Unit Operating Cost by Ownership 
Type (In USD) 
Ownership Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min  Max 
LGU .13 .09 .03 .41 
WD .28 .09 .09 .47 
Private .20 .07 .11 .31 
Source: Raw data from IBNET 
Table 14. Ownership Effect to Unit Operating Cost of Water Utilities 
Model: 
OLS 
Private WD WCon Conn RCS AR OCR Staff LCS Salary Wcoverage 
UOC n.s. .10 
(.000)*** 
-.002 
(.000)** 
.02 
(.04)** 
-.13 
(.001)*** 
.64 
(.000)*** 
-.1 
(.000)*** 
.004 
(.005)*** 
n.s. .13 
(.000)
*** 
.04 
(.04)** 
No. of 
Obs. 
73           
R2 .91           
Notes: AR=Average Revenue; UOC=Unit Operating Cost; OCR=Operating Cost Coverage Ratio; Salary=Average Monthly Salary; WCon=Ave. 
Monthly Consumption per household connection; RCS=Residential Consumption Share; LCR=Labour Cost Share; Staff= Staff per 1,000 
connections; Conn=No. of Connections 
n.s. = not statistically significant at 10% level 
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Sources of Cost Differential. Irrespective of ownership type, average revenue, operating cost 
coverage ratio, salary, staff productivity and demand conditions appear to significantly account 
for variations in unit operating cost of water utilities. Water utilities that have high salary also 
tend to have high unit operating cost, while those that have high average revenue and face 
favorable market circumstances have also shown to have high unit operating cost. Interestingly, 
an increase in operating cost coverage ratio of water utilities is accompanied by a reduction in 
unit operating cost, indicating the strong cost-minimizing effect of financial sustainability 
requirement and the stickiness of water rates.  
 
The extent to which utilities respond to these variables does not appear to vary significantly 
across ownership types, particularly between LGU-run utilities and private utilities. Running a 
separate regression for each of ownership type, however, there are notable differences in the 
costing behavior of the three ownership types.  
 
i. Both unit operating cost of private utilities and water districts are driven by revenue and 
financial considerations, but the unit operating cost of the former has registered greater 
sensitivity to average revenue and operating coverage ratio than the latter. But since 
private utilities have lower operating cost coverage ratio and average revenue than water 
districts, their unit operating cost remains much lower than that of water districts.  
ii. Interestingly, staff productivity does not appear to significantly influence unit operating 
cost of water districts and private utilities, suggesting that staff productivity gains may 
have been buoyed by increased productivity-enhancing expenditures.  
Table 15. Factors Affecting Unit Operating Cost by Ownership Type 
Model: OLS AR OCR RCS WCon Conn Staff LCS Salary No. of 
Obs. 
R2 
LGU-Run  n.s. n.s. -.32 
(.01)** 
-.01 
(.03)** 
n.s. .03 
(.05)* 
n.s. .08 
(.05)** 
14 .99 
Private .75 
(.000)*** 
-.13 
(.000)*** 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 14 .99 
Water District .62 
(.000)*** 
-.1 
(.000)*** 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 43 .9 
Notes: AR=Average Revenue; UOC=Unit Operating Cost; OCR=Operating Cost Coverage Ratio; Salary=Average Monthly Salary; WCon=Ave. 
Monthly Consumption per household connection; RCS=Residential Consumption Share; LCR=Labour Cost Share; Staff= Staff per 1,000 
connections; Conn=No. of Connections 
n.s. = not statistically significant at 10% level 
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iii. The unit operating cost of LGU-run utilities, on the other hand, has shown to be associated 
with a different set of factors. LGU-run utilities that have high unit operating cost tend to 
have low staff productivity level and high salary evincing spending inefficiencies.  
 
4.2.2.2. Staffing and Spending Behavior. Differences in the staffing and spending behavior of LGU-
run utilities, water districts and private utilities can be readily gleaned from the summary 
statistics:  (i) Private utilities have the highest mean staff productivity level, the lowest average labor cost 
share and modest average salary, exhibiting a lack of inefficient spending bias against non-personnel 
expenses and towards personnel expenses; (ii) Water districts have substantially higher average salary than 
LGU-run utilities, but staff productivity level of corporatized former are only marginally higher than the 
latter; (iii) The minimum number of staff per 1,000 connections of private utilities is much lower than the 
minimum number of staff per 1,000 connections of water districts, indicating a strong capacity of private 
utilities to reach high staff productivity level; and (iv) The maximum number of staff per 1,000 connections 
of LGU-run utilities is much higher than that of the other two ownership types, conveying a strong 
proclivity of LGU-run utilities to maintain a disproportionately large staff size. 
 
Table 16. Labor Cost Share, Staff Productivity and Average Salary by Ownership Type 
 Labor Cost Share (%) Staff per 1,000 connections Average Annual Salary 
Utilities Mean Std. Min. Max. Mean Std. Min. Max. Mean Std. Min. Max. 
LGU 56 .17 .21 .81 8.6 4.3 3.8 17.9 1,904 1,275 804 5,386 
WD 39 .15 .15 .74 7 2.5 2.8 13.9 4,157 2,143 1,058 9,235 
Private 28 .06 .15 .41 5.8 2.7 1.2 10.6 2,851 2,096 778 8,480 
Source: IBNET 
 
 
The difference in the staff productivity of LGU-run utilities and private utilities appears to be 
driven by the former’s strong bias towards personnel expenses as suggested by the large 
Table 17. Ownership Effect to Staffing and Spending Behavior of the Utilities 
Model: OLS Private 
Utilities 
WD UOC AR LCR Staff Salary OCR WCo
n 
RCS No. of 
Conn. 
R2 
 
No. of 
Obs. 
Staff  n.s. 1.7 
(.06) 
18.8 
(.03)** 
-12.2 
(.03)*
* 
9.5 
(.000)*** 
n.s. -.0009 
(.000) 
n.s. n.s. -4.9 
(.10) 
-.7 
(.03)** 
.75 73 
LCS -.17 
(.000)**
* 
-.17 
(.000)**
* 
n.s. -.63 
(.05)*
* 
n.s. .03 
(.000)
*** 
6.8 
(.000)*
** 
.15 
(.01)*
* 
-.006 
(.006
)*** 
n.s. -.4 
(.03)** 
.60 83 
Salary  712 
(.17) 
1,315 
(.01)** 
27,503 
(.000)**
* 
7,286 
(.03)*
* 
7,649 
(.000)*** 
-283 
(.000)
*** 
n.s. n.s. 90.5 
(.000
)*** 
n.s. .006 
(.002)**
* 
.79 73 
Notes: AR=Average Revenue; UOC=Unit Operating Cost; OCR=Operating Cost Coverage Ratio; Salary=Average Monthly Salary; WCon=Ave. 
Monthly Consumption per household connection; RCS=Residential Consumption Share; LCR=Labour Cost Share; Staff= Staff per 1,000 
connections; Conn=No. of Connections 
n.s. = not statistically significant at 10% level 
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coefficient and high statistical significance of labor cost share. Differences in salary, average 
revenue and unit operating cost also account for differences in the staff productivity of LGU-run 
utilities and private utilities. LGU-run utilities’ low staff productivity can be attributed to 
inefficient overall spending. On the other hand, there appears to be a significant difference in how 
staff productivity, labor cost and salaries of LGU-run utilities affect each other vis-à-vis water 
districts, pointing to the role of ownership design. Compared to LGU-run utilities, water districts 
have lower labor cost share and higher salaries controlling for staff productivity, size, market 
conditions and revenue stance. Likewise, water districts have lower staff productivity than LGU-
run utilities when salaries and other relevant variables are controlled for, indicating water 
districts’ heavy reliance on salaries to boost staff productivity. 
Table 18. Factors Affecting Staffing and Spending Behavior of Water Utilities by Ownership 
Model: OLS Staff Productivity Labor Cost Share Salary 
LGU WD Private LGU WD Private LGU WD Private 
LCS 4.9 
(.03)** 
14 
(.000)*** 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 3,589 
(.000)*** 
10,674 
(.000)*** 
n.s. 
Staff n.s. n.s. n.s. .08 
(.006)*** 
.04 
(.000)*** 
n.s. -308 
(.004)*** 
-531 
(.000)*** 
n.s. 
Salary -.001 
(.03)** 
-.001 
(.000)*** 
n.s. .0003 
(.000)*** 
.00008 
(.000)*** 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Conn .002 
(.007)*** 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. .008 
(.02)** 
RCS 6.4 
(.14) 
n.s. n.s. -.56 
(.08)* 
n.s. -.48 
(.15) 
2,076 
(.07)* 
n.s. n.s. 
WCon .29 
(.02)** 
.18 
(.000)*** 
n.s. -.02 
(.04)** 
-.01 
(.001)*** 
-.01 
(.02)*** 
77.3 
(.03)** 
112 
(.000)*** 
n.s. 
UOC 45.7 
(.000)*** 
21.8 
(.000)*** 
-.23 
(.09)* 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
OCR n.s. n.s. n.s. .45 
(.004)*** 
.18 
(.000)*** 
n.s. -1674 
(.003)*** 
-2,034 
(.000)*** 
n.s. 
AR n.s. n.s. n.s. -3.7 
(.002)*** 
-.8 
(.000)*** 
n.s. 13,439 
(.002)*** 
10,410 
(.002)*** 
n.s. 
No. of Obs. 14 48 15 13 48 15 13 48 15 
R2 .87 .89 .76 .99 .93 .83 .98 .95 .95 
Notes: AR=Average Revenue; UOC=Unit Operating Cost; OCR=Operating Cost Coverage Ratio; Salary=Average Monthly Salary; WCon=Ave. 
Monthly Consumption per household connection; RCS=Residential Consumption Share; LCR=Labour Cost Share; Staff= Staff per 1,000 
connections; Conn=No. of Connections 
n.s. = not statistically significant at 10% level 
  
The results of a separate regression for each ownership type point to varying importance of salary 
as a performance incentive to LGU-run utilities, water districts and private utilities: 
i. Interestingly, salary, staff productivity and labor cost of private utilities do not appear to 
independently affect each other, indicating that the three components may have been 
anchored on each other, i.e., private utilities do not increase salary independent of changes in 
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staff productivity and expenditure levels. An increase in unit operating cost, however, has 
shown to translate to higher staff productivity, intimating that the private utilities’ high 
staff productivity may have been driven by efficiently large spending on both personnel 
expenses and non-personnel expenses. Private utilities do not appear to use salary as a 
key performance incentive; salary does not help explain the variations in staff 
productivity of private utilities. The salary of private utilities has shown to be driven by 
economies of scale. Large private utilities tend to have high salary; 
ii. The staff productivity of water districts appears to be driven by hefty spending on both 
non-personnel items and personnel items. Salary has shown to significantly explain the 
variations in the staff productivity of water districts. An increase in the average revenue 
of water districts translates to higher salary and non-personnel expenses, but the average 
revenue or average tariff does not influence staff productivity, suggesting that the extra 
revenues derived from increased rates are not efficiently spent. This is further supported 
by the negative association between staff productivity of water districts and their average 
revenue as noted above; i.e., an increase in the water rates of water districts has shown to be 
partly brought by a decrease in staff productivity. To meet financial sustainability 
requirement, water districts have also shown to adjust both salary and non-personnel 
expenses; and 
iii. LGU-run utilities weakly exhibit the spending and staffing proclivities of water districts. 
The low staff productivity of LGU-run utilities could be attributed to their relatively small 
size. Akin to water districts, salary also influences the staff productivity of LGU-run 
utilities. With poor revenue stance, however, the salary of LGU-run utilities weakly 
responds to improvement in staff productivity. LGU-run utilities likewise adjust both 
personnel and non-personnel expenses to improve their financial stance. Extra revenues 
derived from increased tariff have also shown to increase spending in both personnel and 
non-personnel items but without any corresponding increase in staff productivity.  
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5. Case Studies: Key Results and Findings 
 
Generally, the results of the case studies are roughly consistent with those of the regression 
results. Private utilities have yielded the most favorable trade-offs between three areas of 
performance: service coverage, non-revenue water and affordability. LGU-run utilities have registered 
the lowest rates but also the worst performance in service coverage and other areas. Profit 
orientation of private utilities is generally more restrained and strongly tied to service level 
compared to water districts. In fact, private utilities tend to adjust profit when there is a sudden 
increase in cost in order to keep water supply services affordable. Water districts have registered 
low proclivity to minimize costs. Akin to regression results, the adverse trade-offs between 
affordability and service level of the LGU-run utilities are accounted for by spending biases 
towards personnel expenses; their poor market conditions and weak financial stance do not bear 
strong explanatory power to their poor overall performance.   
 
5.1. Water Utility Performance: Affordability, Service Coverage and Non-revenue Water 
 
5.1.1. Service Affordability. Water districts have registered a slightly higher average tariff than 
private utilities. To note, the difference in the average tariff of water districts and private utilities 
is smaller compared to the larger sample used in the econometric tests.  This is an expected 
outcome given the relatively high level of comparability of water utilities in the case studies. The 
difference in the water rates between private utilities and water districts varies across size 
categories. Medium-sized water districts have a slightly lower average revenue than private 
utilities as the latter impose substantially higher rates on industrial users. Average revenue of 
large private utilities is minimally lower than that of water districts, while average revenue of a 
small private utility is significantly lower than that of a small water district.   
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Table 19. Pricing Behavior of Selected Utilities by Ownership Type 
Utility Type Min. Charge, 
Residential (Size of 
the 1st block in 
cubic meters) 
Min. Charge, 
Commercial 
(Size of the 1st 
block in cubic 
meters) 
Average 
Revenue 
UOC Mark-up 
over Cost 
(%) 
Industrial 
to 
Residential 
Tariff 
Large Utilities 
Sto. Tomas LGU 100 (10) 200 (10) 10.4 10.3 1 2 
CL Apalit Private 205 (10) 1,022 (25) 24.2 16.5 47 5 
Aquadata Private 178 (10) 890 (25) 10.3 8.1 27 5 
Sinukuan Private 177 (10) 260 (25) 17.95 16.9 6 1.5 
BP Water Private 257 (10) 1285 (25) 36.5 22.9 59 5 
Average, Private  204.25 864 22.2 16.1 34.8 4.1 
Tanauan WD 239 (10) 419 (10) 29.1 22.7 28 1.8 
Sta. Maria WD 195 (10) 292 (10) 25.5 22.6 13 1.5 
Bocaue WD 200 (10) 300 (10) 21.5 18.4 17 1.5 
Tanza* WD 150 (10) 300 (10) 22.3 14.2 57 2 
Average, WD  196 327.8 24.6 19.5 28.8 1.7 
Medium-sized Utilities 
San Carlos LGU 120 (10) - 14.9 13.6  1 
SMU Private 8.20 (10) 220 (25) - -  27 
CL Porac Private 222 (10) 1,107 (25) 26.8 22.3 20 50.3 
CL Sto. Tomas Private 167 (10) 835 (25) 20.1 14.4 40 5 
Average, Private  132.4 720.7 23.5 18.4 30.0 27.4 
Porac WD 150 (10) 180 (10) 23.3 12.9 81 1.2 
Lemery WD 150 (10) 300 (10) 19.8 12.7 56 2 
San Jose WD 225 (10) 337 (10) 25.8 11.6 122 1.5 
Angat WD 175 (10) 560 (10) 20.6 19.5 6 3.5 
San Ildefonso WD 150 (10) 380 (10) 21.7 14.4 51 1.9 
Average, WD:  170 351.4 22.2 14.2 63.2 2 
Small Utilities 
Lago Private 206 (10) 256 (25) 18.5 17.1 12 1.2 
Lobo WD 220 (10) 275 (10) 25.5 22.2 78 1.25 
Source: NWRB, LWUA 2012 
 
Although water districts charge higher average tariff than private utilities, the former tend to 
offer more lenient payment terms as indicated by the percentage of customers in arrears and 
number of disconnections. The high incidence of delayed payment appears to be a relatively 
robust pricing feature of water districts independent of demand circumstances. It is worth 
mentioning that although LWUA prohibits any abrupt increase in rates, it does not explicitly 
require water districts to offer lenient payment terms. Notwithstanding, the collection efficiency 
and number of disconnections appear to be affected more by the water rates than by demand 
conditions, as indicated by the negative correlation between average tariff and collection 
efficiency. This suggests that the seemingly lenient payment terms may not have been driven by 
equity considerations; it is a consequence of imposing disproportionately high tariffs with respect 
to the level of service and users’ ability to pay.  
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5.1.2. Water Service Coverage and Non-revenue Water. Private utilities have also outperformed water 
districts and LGU-run utilities in service coverage and non-revenue water. Despite having 
operated for more than two decades, a large proportion of the service area of these water districts 
remains unserved as the number of new connections has been persistently lower compared to 
private utilities. Comparing BP Water and Bocaue, which have comparably high net income and 
size of population served, BP registered 199 new connections compared to only 49 for Bocaue in 
2012. During period 2004 and 2009, Bocaue only had 20 and 22 new connections, respectively, 
Table 20. Demand and Cost Conditions of Selected Water Utilities by Ownership Type 
Utilities Type No. of 
Conn. 
UOC Ave. 
Monthly 
WCon. 
Com. 
Users 
(%) 
On-time 
payment 
(%) 
Customers in 
Arrears 
Collectio
n 
Efficienc
y 
# Of 
Disconnections 
Large Utilities 
Sto. Tomas LGU 10,786 10.3 23.6 -     
CL Apalit Private 12,919 16.5 24 1 52.7 568 (4%) 96.97 467 
Aquadata Private 9,142 8.1 20.4 0 - - - 25 
Sinukuan Private 9,989 16.9 20.9 2 74 2201 (20%) 94 559 
BP Water Private 8,895 22.9 17.3 2.2 92.5 2723 (31%) 108 1217 
Average, 
Private 
 10,258 16.1 20.65 1.3 83.25 1830.7 (18.3%) 99.7 567 
Tanauan WD 14,050 22.7 19 6.3 67  94.7 83 
Sta. Maria WD 17,143 22.6 22 18 67.4 1253 (7%) 98.5 532 
Bocaue WD 9,275 18.4 18.8 7 65.6 4226 (36%) 92.7 30 
Tanza* WD 9,595 14.2 19.9 3.5 76.3 3,567 (37%) 97 901 
Average, 
WD 
 13,489 21.2 20.1125 8.15 70.8125 2436 (20.4%) 96.4 303 
Medium-sized Utilities 
San Carlos LGU 6,701 13.6 26 0 - - - - 
SMU Private 5,395 - 26 1.5 - - - - 
CL Porac Private 2,706 22.3 19 2 109 0 109 144 
CL Sto. 
Tomas 
Private 5,564 14.4 21 - 98 81 (1%) 132 207 
Average, 
WD 
 4,555 18.35 22 2 103.5 40.5 9 (.5%) 120.5 175.5 
Porac WD 4,810 12.9 19 - 47  96 307 
Lemery WD 7,867 12.7 19 10 57 5,284(_) 94 27 
San Jose WD 5,723 11.6 15 8.3 56 2827(48%) 96 66 
Angat WD 6,823 19.5 17 1.6 61 2633 (39%) 96 - 
San 
Ildefonso 
WD 7,279 14.4 14 2 76  95 - 
Average, 
WD 
 6,500 14.2 16.8 21.9 59.4 3581.3 (43.5%) 95.4 133.3 
Small Utilities 
Lago Private 1,071 17.1 15 4.7 96 165(15%) 96 24 
Lobo WD 2,478 22.2 14.5 0.5 97 - 99 25 
Source: NWRB, LWUA 
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while no data was obtained for BP Water. It is worth noting, however, that BP supplies water 
services to a subdivision where water users have high ability to pay. The favorable demand 
conditions may have given BP greater incentive to expand service coverage. Notwithstanding, 
the two utilities are comparably profitable which should limit the gap in their number of new 
connections. Large private utilities have comparably high non-revenue water relative to water 
districts of similar size, but medium-sized water districts have registered higher non-revenue 
water than their private counterparts. It thus appears that the lower water rates of medium-sized 
water districts noted above were realized at the expense of service level. 
 
Table 21. Financial and Operational Performance of Selected Water Utilities by Ownership Type 
Utilities Type Date of 
Establishmen
t 
OCR Population 
Served (Water 
Coverage) 
No. of 
New 
Connectio
ns 
NRW Water 
Availability  
Large Utilities 
Sto. Tomas LGU  2002* 1.04 100 492 -  
CL Apalit Private 2009 1.13 89,141 (90%) 1,468 21 24 hrs. 
Aquadata Private 2008 1.02 - 2,122 20 24 hrs. 
Sinukuan Private 2004 1.04 9,989 (58%) 1,583 18 24 hours 
BP Water Private 1993 1.07 53,370 (89%) 199 14 24 hours 
Tanauan WD 1988 1.14 82,895  41 28 - 
Sta. Maria WD 1988 1.19 102,200  1,784 20 - 
Bocaue WD 1979 1.10 55,140  49 20 - 
Tanza WD 1988 1.29 57,570 61 19 - 
Medium-sized Utilities 
San Carlos LGU - 0.96 35,467(60%) - 26 - 
SMU Private 1992 0.94 - - 5 24 hours 
CL Porac Private 2009 1.06 2,691 (37%) 515 12 24 hours 
CL Sto. 
Tomas 
Private 2003 1.20 5,564 (95%) 482 - 24 hours 
Porac WD 1989 1.20 21,645  51 - - 
Lemery WD 1981 1.01 47,202  41 39 - 
San Jose WD 1977 1.13 34,200 26 57 - 
Angat WD 1987 1.17 40,938  4 10 - 
San 
Ildefonso 
WD 1987 
 
1.26 43,570  38 23 - 
Small Utilities 
Lago Private 1996 1.09 3,458(91%) 285 - 24 hours 
Lobo WD 1989 1.04 12,390 7 39 - 
Source: NWRB, LWUA 
Note: *Santo Tomas was used to be a water districts until it was taken over by the municipal government in 2002. 
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5.2. Profit Orientation, Spending and Staffing Patterns of Water Utilities 
 
5.2.1. Water Districts. As with results of econometric tests, the relatively high water rates of water districts 
and limited service expansion has shown to be an outcome of their: (i) inefficient spending and staffing 
patterns; and (ii) weak linkage between service level and profit.  
 
Weak Linkage between Salary and Staff Productivity. The link between average annual salary and 
staff productivity among water districts appears to be relatively weak vis-à-vis private utilities. 
The weak association between personnel expenses and staff productivity and, concomitantly, the 
spending bias towards personnel expenses is evident among medium-sized water districts. The 
staff productivity of two water districts, namely, Porac and Angat, is comparable to that of two 
private utilities, CL Porac and CL Sto. Tomas. Personnel expenses of Porac and Lemery, however, 
are much larger than those of CL Porac and CL Sto. Tomas. In fact, Angat has one of the largest 
personnel expenses among water districts. As a result, labor cost share of the two water districts 
is more than three times that of the two private utilities. The strong spending bias towards 
personnel expenses of the two water districts has resulted in remarkably high operating expenses. 
In fact, the difference in the operating expenses of private utilities and water districts is mainly 
accounted for by the gap in their personnel expenses.  
 
Inefficient Spending in Non-Personnel Expenses. The strong proclivities of water districts to spend 
more on personnel expenses appear to be just one of several sources of cost inefficiencies. While 
water districts exhibit a spending bias towards personnel expenses, they also spend a lot in non-
personnel items. Water districts register high power cost in the amount of nearly two million 
pesos to about 30 million pesos, representing 15 percent to over 30 percent of total operating 
expenses. By comparison, the electricity cost of private utilities ranges from nearly two million to 
13.6 million, about 14 percent to 42 percent of total operating expenses. High power cost of water 
districts, however, does not appear to be accompanied by strong performance in water 
availability. The same can be said of the water districts’ spending in repairs and maintenance 
which was also unaccompanied by favorable performance in non-revenue water.  
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Profitability at the Expense of Performance. Likewise, the poor performance of water districts in 
service coverage and non-revenue water was accompanied by high profitability level. Medium-
sized private utilities strongly outperformed the most profitable water districts of similar size in 
non-revenue water. The high profit level of water districts has shown to be realized at the expense 
of operational performance as exemplified by Angat and San Ildefonso. These two water districts 
are among the most profitable of all the utilities, but Angat has a remarkably low number of 
connections, while San Ildefonso is outperformed by other water districts that are less profitable. 
To a significant degree, however, these utilities compensate their limited expansion in coverage 
by performing well in non-revenue water. Notwithstanding, water districts would have been able 
to improve service coverage without compromising affordability if profit margins are kept 
sufficiently narrow. If only water districts behaved like private utilities in terms of adjusting their 
profit margin when unit operating cost was high in order to keep water rates low, water districts 
would have been able to deliver significant improvement in consumer welfare through reduced 
tariffs and expanded service coverage.  
 
5.2.2. Private Utilities. The remarkable performance of private utilities in water rates, service coverage and 
non-revenue water can be attributed to their: (i) efficient spending on both personnel and non-personnel 
expenses; (ii) staff productivity-based personnel compensation; and (ii) performance-based profit level.  
 
Substantial Staff Productivity Gains, Economies of Scale and Low Unit Operating Cost. Consistent with 
results of econometric tests, private utilities have the lowest staff per 1,000 connections and lowest 
labor cost share. Unlike water districts, high staff productivity is accompanied by an even lower 
labor cost share due to lower personnel expenses. For instance, there is a slight difference in the 
average annual salary of comparably large private utility, Sinukuan and water district, Sta. Maria, 
but staff productivity of Sinukuan is slightly higher than Sta. Maria’s. Sinukuan’s labor cost share 
is even much lower than that of the latter due to lower non-salaried personnel expenses. Although 
both Sinukuan and Sta. Maria have comparably high salaries, Sta. Maria incurred large non-
salaried personnel expenses, such as bonuses and allowances, 3.5 million pesos; life and 
retirement insurance contributions, 1.07 million pesos; and longevity pay, 1.5 million pesos. 
Salaries and wages of regular employees amounted to Php8.1 million. Sta. Maria also incurred 
800 thousand pesos and 2.58 million pesos in salaries and wages for casual employees and for 
emergency purposes, respectively. There is no similar data for private utilities.  
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The remarkably low labor cost share of private utilities has also shown to be occasioned by high 
investment in network upgrade and expansion. That is, staff productivity gains are channeled 
back to both salary and other personnel expenses, as well as, to non-personnel expenses thus 
keeping the labor cost share and unit operating cost constant. However, the large private utilities, 
which enjoy a slight advantage over water districts in staff productivity, have a slightly lower 
unit operating cost and average tariff. The size advantage may have allowed private utilities to 
exploit economies of scale and engender adequate staff productivity gains which in turn enable 
them to reduce unit operating cost.  
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Table 22. Staffing and Spending Behavior of Selected Utilities by Ownership Type 
Utilities Staff per 
1,000 
connections 
Labour 
Cost 
Share 
Total 
Operating 
Expenses 
Personnel 
Services 
(In Mil. 
Php) 
Power 
Costs 
Repairs and 
Maintenance 
Revenue per 
staff 
Ave. 
annual 
salary 
Large Utilities 
Sto. Tomas 10.5 23 31.6 7.4  17 (54%) 1.65(5%) 283,311.91 - 
CL Apalit 2.6 11 62.8 6.8  13.6 
(22%) 
5.9 (9%) 2,078,494.76 - 
Aquadata 6.1 31 22.8 7  7.8 (34%) .78 (3.5%) 380,035.34 - 
Sinukuan 3.8 17 45 7.6  11.6 
(26%) 
.81 (1.8%) 1,183,406 178,200 
BP Water - 26 62.8 16.6  9.9 (14%) .98 (1.6%) - - 
Average, 
Private: 
4.2 21.25 48.35 9.5 10.7 (.24) 2.1 (3.98) 1,213,978.7 
 
178,200 
Tanauan 5.4 36.5 98.3 31.7 28.7 
(33%) 
4.1 (4.7%) 1,228,107.4 243,192 
Sta. Maria 4.1 23.8 96.4 23 23 (24%) 4.3 (4.4%) 1,554,891.8 174,372 
Bocaue 5.3 20 53.8 10.7 18.2 (34) 2.1 (3.9) 1,191,944.2 229,740 
Tanza 6.1 19+ 39.7 7.5+ 7.9 (19) - - 134,484 
Average, WD 4.9 26.8 82.8 21.8 23.3 
(30%) 
3.5 (4.3%) 1,324,981.13 215,768 
Medium-sized Utilities 
San Carlos 6.1 47 32.9 15.6  6.2 (19%) 1.3 (4%) 748,247.8 356,940 
SMU 3.9 17 18.7 3.1  4.6 (25%) .30 (1.6%) 794,161.5 - 
CL Porac 3 12 14.3 1.7 - - - - 
CL Sto. Tomas 2.7 13 23.3 3.2  4.6 (20%) 1.2 (5.2%) 1,838,315.5 - 
Average, 
Private 
3.2 14 18.8 2.7 4.6 (22.5) .75 (3.4)  
1,316,238.5 
- 
Porac 3.3 38 17.5 6.6  5.1 (29%) .98 (6%) 1,205,984.7 - 
Lemery 6.8 39 39.8 15.7  9.5 (24%) 1.76 (4.4%) 699,858.56 192,300 
San Jose 12.1 52 32.4 16.8 4.88 
(15%) 
1.45 (4%) 529,936.7 
 
154,392 
Angat 3.4 44 25.6 11.2 7.1 (28%) .3 (1%) 1,437,546 
 
229368 
 
Ildefonso 4.1 27 27.3 7.5 8 (29%) - 1146586 
 
- 
Average, WD 5.94 40 28.52 11.56 6.9 (25%) 1.15 (3.3) 1,003,982.39 192,020 
Small Utilities 
Lago 4.7 18 4.3 .78  1.8 (42%) .20 (4.7%) 870,673.60 114,000 
Lobo 6 36 15.2 5.4  1.98 
(15%) 
.79 (5.2%) 791,872.13 227,508 
Source: IBNET, NWRB and LWUA 
Note: +salaries and wages 
 
Performance-based Profit Orientation. The profit level of private utilities has shown to be generally 
more restrained than the water districts and more strongly tied to service level. Both findings are 
weakly conveyed by the econometric results. Except for CL Santo Tomas, the profit level of the 
most profitable private utilities, CL Apalit, CL Sto. Tomas and Lago, pales in comparison with 
water districts, such as Santa Maria, Porac, Ildefonso and Angat. CL Porac and CL Santo Tomas, 
two of the most profitable private utilities, far outperformed the water districts in terms of 
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number of new connections in the category of medium-sized utilities. And large private utilities, 
which are slightly more profitable than medium-sized private utilities, have outperformed the 
medium-sized private utilities in terms of number of new connections. Also, the private utilities 
with the largest allocation to repairs and maintenance, CL Apalit and CL Santo Tomas, are also 
the most profitable evincing a significant link between investment and profit levels.  
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Table 23. Profit Orientation of Selected Utilities by Ownership Type 
Utilities Type OCR Net 
Income(Loss), 
In Php 
Net Income 
as % of 
Total 
Income 
Background Information 
Year Established/Municipality Pop. *Local Govt. 
Income in Mil 
Php 
Large Utilities 
Sto. Tomas LGU 1.04 768,776 2.3 2000/Sto. Tomas, Batangas - - 
CL Apalit Private 1.13 7,995,412 11.3 2009/Apalit, Pampanga 103,373 131.8  (1st 
income class) 
Aquadata Private 1.02 553,935 2.4 2008/Bauan, Batangas 87,990 194.1 (1st 
income class) 
Sinukuan Private 1.04 1,731,984 3.7 2004/Mexico, Pampanga 
(village) 
162,293 245.1 (1st 
income class) 
Average, 
Private: 
 1.06 2,762,527 4.9    
BP Water WD 1.19 4,590,123 6.8 1993/Bacoor, Cavite 
(subdivision) 
 
540,170 750 (1st inome 
class) 
Tanauan WD 1.13 11,736,111 11.9 1988/Tanauan, Batangas 135,237 509.2 
(city, 2nd class) 
Sta. Maria WD 1.1 18,438,038 16.1 1986/Sta. Maria, Bulacan 253,474 376.4 (1st 
income class) 
Bocaue WD 1.09 5,148,865 8.7 1979/Bocaue, Bulacan 118,350 172.5 (1st 
income class) 
Tanza WD 1.29 11,435,450 22 1988/Tanza, Cavite 57,570  
Average, 
WD: 
 1.13 9,978,284 10.9    
Medium-sized Utilities 
San Carlos LGU .96 -1,354,973 -4.3 2000/San Carlos, Negros 
Occidental 
113,578 635.1 (city, 2nd 
income class) 
SMU Private .94 -830,355 -4.7 1992/Sta. Rosa, Laguna 
(subdivision) 
310,258 2,761 (city, 
CL Porac Private 1.06 838,291 5.5 2009/Porac, Pampanga   
CL Sto. 
Tomas 
Private 1.2 4,916,953 17.5 2003/Sto. Tomas, Pampanga 37,866 54.3 (5th 
income class) 
Average, 
Private: 
 1.07 1,641,630 6.1    
Porac WD 1.13 3,472,663 16.5 1989/Porac, Pampanga 102,962 178.8  (1st 
income class) 
Lemery WD .95 404,773 1.0 1981/Lemery, Batangas 80,158 124.3 (1st 
income class) 
San Jose WD 1.13 4,118,075 11.3 1977/San Jose, Nueva Ecija 130,722 464.1 (city, 3rd 
income class) 
Angat WD 1.29 4,785,255 14.4 1987/Angat, Bulacan 50,152 83.6 (1st income 
class) 
Ildefonso WD 1.26 7,118,578 20.7 1987/San Ildefonso, Bulacan 98,326 .12 (1st income 
class) 
Average, 
WD: 
 1.15 3,979,869 12.78    
Small Utilities 
Lago Private 1.09 389,632 8.4 1996/Balibago, Angeles City 351,993 1.07 (city, huc) 
        
Lobo WD .89 562,373 3.6 1989/Lobo, Batangas 37,798 67.8 (3rd 
income class) 
Source: IBNET, NWRB and LWUA 
Note: *Municipalities are divided into income classes according to their average annual income during the previous four calendar years. To 
control for the income effect, most of the water districts and private utilities belong to the 1st income class category. 
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5.2.3. LGU-run Utilities. The inferior performance of LGU-run utilities can be largely traced to inefficient 
spending and staffing patterns; the magnitude of spending inefficiencies is somewhat constrained by less 
favorable market conditions. Restrained profit orientation has also enabled LGU-run utilities to alleviate 
the impact of inefficient spending and staffing patterns on service quality. 
 
Restrained Profit Orientation, Affordability and Poor Service: The average tariff and the profit level of 
the two LGU-run utilities, Santo Tomas and San Carlos, are among the lowest as measured by the 
operating cost coverage ratio and net income as a percentage of total income. This partly explains 
why despite their inefficient spending and staffing behavior, they are able to provide affordable 
water services. In fact, Santo Tomas outperformed many water districts in terms of number of 
new connections.  It must be noted that these two LGU-run utilities are among the better 
performing LGU-run utilities, at least in terms of information management system, which affords 
better performance monitoring. It is also worth mentioning that San Carlos is one of the few LGU-
run utilities that are regulated by NWRB on a consensual basis.  
 
Santo Tomas, which is larger than San Carlos in size, has a larger number of staff per 1,000 
connections, i.e., lower staff productivity. The lower staff productivity of larger LGU-run utilities is 
in line with the regression results suggesting that the extra-revenues of LGU-run utilities afforded 
by enlarged market or increased average tariff may have been channeled to hiring more workers 
or increasing salaries. Based on the Annual Report of Santo Tomas, personnel services rose by 50 
percent from 4.8 million pesos in 2010 to 7.4 million pesos in 2012. In particular, salaries and 
wages increased by 80 percent from 1.3 million pesos in 2010 to 2.4 million pesos in 2012. The 
salaries and wages refer to salaries and wages of regular employees as opposed to salaries and 
wages for casual employees which stood at 1.8 million pesos in 2012 from 1.6 million pesos in 
2010. Other bonuses and allowances also significantly increased by 65 percent from over 840 
thousand pesos in 2010 to 1.39 million pesos in 2012.  
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Table 24. Itemized Operating Expenses and Operating Revenues of Santo Tomas, 2008-
2012, In Million Pesos 
Indicators 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Operating Revenues 22.3 23.46 26.01 28.7 32.8 
Operating Expenses 18.3 18.4 22.46 27.51 31.56 
  Personnel Services 
   Salaries and wages: regular 
   Salaries and wages: emergency/casual 
  Other bonuses and allowances 
3 
.92 
1.2 
.33 
3.78 
.98 
1.49 
- 
4.84 
1.32 
1.56 
.84 
6.35 
1.94 
1.56 
1.22 
7.36 
2.38 
1.78 
1.39 
Maintenance and other operating expenses 
     Repairs and maintenance 
      
15.3 
.67 
18.4 
.80 
22.46 
.72 
21.16 
.99 
24.2 
1.65 
Net Income 
  % of total income 
- 3.65 4.52 .24 .77 
Operating cost coverage ratio 1.2 1.27 1.16 1.04 1.04 
Source: Santo Tomas Water District 
 
The increase in personnel expenses of Santo Tomas was accompanied by a rise in maintenance 
and operating expenses, albeit not as much as the increase in personnel costs. As a result, labor 
cost share slightly increased from 21 percent in 2010 to 23 percent in 2012.  With an increase in 
both personnel and non-personnel expenses, Santo Tomas was able to significantly expand 
service coverage. The size of expansion in service coverage, however, was accompanied by a large 
increase in the number of employees. With a disproportionately high number of staff relative to 
number of connections, staff per 1,000 connections increased from 8 in 2010 to 10 in 2012. The 
decline in staff productivity translated to increased operating expenses. As water rates stayed the 
same, the rise in operating expenses resulted in lower profit.  
  
San Carlos, on the other hand, has a higher staff productivity level than Santo Tomas, but the 
labor cost share of the former is much larger than the latter, vastly on account of large personnel 
expenses. Based on 2012 Annual Report, personnel expenses of San Carlos stood at 15.6 million 
pesos, which was more than twice that of Santo Tomas. Personnel expenses of San Carlos 
accounted for a whopping 47 percent of its total operating expenses. Repairs and maintenance, 
on the other hand, stood at 1.14 million pesos, slightly lower than that of Santo Tomas. Given its 
relatively high staff productivity, it appears that the large personnel expenses of San Carlos was 
not a result of an increase in the number of employees but of higher staff compensation.  The 
seemingly high employee compensation does not appear to be effective in reducing non-revenue 
water which was at 26 percent. The relatively high personnel compensation also does not seem 
to correspond to its revenue stance as operating revenues fall short of operating expenses. San 
Carlos incurred an income loss of 1.35 million pesos. The exceedingly high personnel expenses 
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and consequently remarkably high labor cost share has shown to negatively affect the 
performance of San Carlos in non-revenue water; they have also weakened its financial stance. 
  
5.3. Additional Case Studies: To further validate the results of the econometric tests and case studies, I 
examine the behavior of utilities that are considered as outliers over time. Outliers are the utilities that do 
not exhibit the average characteristics of the utilities of their ownership type in terms of ownership details, 
market circumstances and performance. The key findings are the following:  
 
(i) Low labor cost share and productivity-based salary increases appear to be robust characteristics 
of private utilities. These traits remain evident among private utilities that exhibit odd 
characteristics in terms of market circumstances, ownership details and financial and 
operational performance. Staff productivity, profit orientation and pricing attributes of private 
utilities, however, have shown to be largely influenced by demand circumstances consistent 
with the regression results; 
(ii) For water districts, the disproportionately high salary relative to staff productivity level and 
negative association between financial sustainability (i.e., operating cost coverage ratio) and 
service level remain evident. There is a strong trade-off between financial sustainability and 
performance in service coverage and non-revenue water;  
(iii) Better demand circumstances, higher average tariff and higher operating cost coverage ratio do 
not appear to alter the spending and staffing behavior of LGU-run utilities neither do they 
improve utility performance; and  
(iv) Examining the behavioral patterns of the utilities over several years, there seems to be a strong 
tendency of private utilities to perform better over time. In contrast, staff productivity levels of 
a water district tend to either stay the same or marginally improve over time while that of a 
LGU-run utility either stays the same or worsen over the time.  Additionally, reduction in cost 
and improvement in market conditions of water districts and LGU-run utilities have not 
shown to translate to increased affordability and improved service level.  
 
5.3.1. Efficiency of Private Utilities: Although many private utilities face relatively favorable 
demand circumstances, there are a number of private utilities that serve less favorable markets 
where water users have limited ability to pay, making affordability a pressing concern. I compare 
the behavior of three private utilities that operate in disparate market circumstances – Subic Water, 
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Calapan Waterworks Corporation (Calapan) and Bohol Water Utilities Inc. It is worth noting, however, 
that the market conditions of the three private utilities do not differ as much as those served by 
water districts and LGU-run utilities.  
 
Varying Market Circumstances: Subic Water and Sewerage Company Inc. (Subic Water hereafter) is 
a major water service provider in Olongapo, a highly urbanized city. The water utility supplies 
water services to locators in the Subic Freeport Zone and residents in the nearby Olongapo City. 
The ability to pay of water users is relatively high which is aptly matched by high service level. 
Bohol Water Utilities, Inc. (BWUI) and Calapan Waterworks Corporation, on the other hand, 
largely serve residential users which have lower consumption level and, hence, less stringent 
service requirements. Although Subic Water supplies water services to an area that was used to 
be served by a water district, BWUI provides water services to an area formerly served by a state-
run utility. The service area of Subic Water is thus more commercially attractive than that of 
BWUI. Calapan Waterworks Corporation is an old medium-sized private utility operating since 
1952 in Calapan, a third income class city in Oriental Mindoro. 
 
Ownership Details: The three private utilities also slightly differ in ownership details. SWC 
operates under a 30-year franchise agreement. SWC is the Philippines’ first water and sewerage 
system to be developed through a build-operate-transfer scheme. It acquired the contract to 
manage and operate the insolvent Olongapo Water District in 1997 under a joint ownership 
agreement (Gonzaga, 2012). The government agency, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), 
and Olongapo City have 20 percent and 10 percent equity share in the company, respectively. 
SBMA also serves as its regulator. In 2012, the SBMA divested its shares in the water utility to 
free up additional capital for the city government and to address potential conflict of interest 
arising from its being a regulator, consumer and part-owner of the utility. In 2016, however, the 
local government of Olongapo bought 10 percent stake in the utility in a bid to better represent 
its constituents who are the main customers of the SWC (Dumlao-Abadilla, 2016).  
 
In 2000, the Salcon Consortium won the bid for a joint venture with the Provincial Government 
of Bohol creating a Special Purpose Company called the Bohol Water Utilities Inc. (BWUI). BWUI 
has the rights and obligations to rehabilitate-own-operate and maintain the water supply system. 
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In 2003, the NWRB granted BWUI’s application for franchise, certificate of public convenience 
and water permits. The Provincial Government of Bohol owns 30 percent of BWUI shares with 
the remaining shares owned by Salcon Consortium.  Calapan, on the other hand, is a private 
corporation. The company was formally registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
in May 1991 under the corporate name Calapan Waterworks System and Development 
Corporation to engage in the business of development and utilizing water resources. 
 
In light of the differences in market conditions and ownership details, there are striking 
similarities as well as interesting differences in the behavior of these outliers from that of a typical 
private utility: 
 
Performance-and demand-based water rates. Of the three private utilities, Subic Water has registered 
the highest water rates. To some extent, the relatively high water rates were warranted by its 
highly favorable demand conditions. Subic Water serves commercial and industrial users in the 
free port. The high water rates may have also reflected the high opportunity cost of water given 
various competing uses of water in a highly urbanized city. The relatively high average tariff of 
Subic Water also appears to be commensurate with the level of service. Based on the data supplied 
by the water utility, it has over 40,000 accounts as of 2015 compared to 20,000 connections in 1997. 
Water production of SWC has also reached 42 million liters per day (MLD) from 10 ten MLD. 
Total investments reached P1.04 billion since the start of the company’s operation in 1997. 
Although SWC performs remarkably well in service coverage, it performs poorly in non-revenue 
water with over 30 percent of its water produced lost through leakage in distribution networks 
and/or pilferage.  
 
Efficient Staffing and Spending Patterns. Consistent with the estimation results, the favorable 
performance of SWC, particularly in service coverage can be traced to the absence of strong bias 
towards personnel expenses as indicated by its remarkably low labor cost share. While there is 
no data on staff productivity, labor cost share, the number of connections and the average annual 
salary hint at remarkably high staff productivity level.  
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Table 25. Performance of Two Private Utilities – Subic Water Corporation (SWC) and Bohol Water 
Utilities, Inc. (BWUI) 
Indicators SWC BWUI 
2004 2009 2012 2004 2009 2010 2011 2012 
No. of 
Connections 
27,530 32,000 40,000 10,260 11,608  11,979 12,170 
Water Coverage 72.8 73.6  69.5 78.4   77 
NRW 36.9 32.8  28 25.3   19.8 
OCR 1.47 2  1.47 1.03 1.24 1.35 1.35 
RCS 72 70 69     143* 
UOC .29 .31  .14    .26 
Staff per 1,000 
conectins. 
 5.6  5.85 5.2  4.9 5.3 
Ave. Annual 
Salary 
5,410   1,491 5,004  6,759 6,120 
LCS 22 23  15.2 20 18 21  
Continuity  24  24     
AR .42 .59  .2 .37   .16 
Collection Period 118 107 103 60.7     
GFA 64.5 .06  48.4     
WC 38.2 38.5 42.4 35 31.3   31.3 
Net Income - - - - 3.4 (55) 17.7(20%) 28.5 
(27%) 
 
Source: IBNET, NWRB and LWUA 
Note: *Number of Commercial Users 
 
Role of Demand Circumstances. As with the econometric results, demand circumstances influence 
the performance of private utilities, but not to a significant degree, as their behavior continues to 
differ from that of LGU-run utilities and water districts. Calapan and BWUI are illustrative 
examples.  Average tariff of Calapan is lower than other private utilities reflecting its less 
favorable demand circumstances. The imposition of relatively low rates was accompanied by 
inefficient spending and staffing patterns. The number of staff per 1,000 connections and labor 
cost share of Calapan were exceedingly high for a private utility. This resulted in dire financial 
and operational performance. Operating revenues fell short of operating expenses in 2003 and 
water service coverage was only 18 percent. In more recent periods, however, the operating cost 
coverage ratio has significantly improved owing in part to an increase in average tariff. Its 
operating cost coverage ratio is comparable to SWC. The disproportionately high operating cost 
coverage ratio was accompanied by a modest increase in the number of connections and 
reduction in non-revenue water. As with other private utilities, Calapan exhibits a performance-
driven improvement in financial stance and profitability. Furthermore, the expansion in service 
coverage and reduction in non-revenue of Calapan was accompanied by a marginal increase in 
average annual salary. With a marginal increase in average annual salary and investment in 
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network expansion, labor cost share dropped substantially making it comparable to other well-
performing private utilities.  
 
BWUI faces similar demand circumstances as Calapan but the former’s ownership arrangement 
and size approximate that of SWC. Unlike Calapan, the provincial government is a shareholder 
of the company. The close ties between the provincial government and the corporation, however, 
does not appear to influence spending and staffing decisions of BWUI, although it appears to 
affect its pricing behavior. Its labor cost share is lower than that of many private utilities while 
staff productivity is comparable to most private utilities. Average tariff of BWUI was slightly 
lower than comparable private utilities, such as Balibago Waterworks System Inc. (BWSI) and 
comparable water districts, such as Baliwag WD and Angeles WD.  
 
5.3.2. Spending Biases, Profit Orientation and Performance of Water Districts. Heavy reliance on salary 
as a performance incentive and the consequently high labor cost share, modest staff productivity 
level and strong profit orientation have shown to be typical attributes of water districts. These are 
exemplified by two water districts, Guimba and Baliwag. The water districts differ in size and 
operating environment, but they share many spending and staffing attributes; both exhibit strong 
profit orientation. Although Baliwag has higher staff productivity level than Guimba, they both 
have remarkably high labor cost share as a result of substantial salary increases accompanying 
staff productivity improvement. As with many water districts, the strong spending bias towards 
personnel expenses has shown to aggravate performance of these two water districts in service 
coverage and/or non-revenue water. 
 
The limited expansion in service coverage of water districts does not appear to be occasioned by 
less favorable demand circumstances. In fact, Guimba is providing water services to a first income 
class municipality. And yet, it only maintains 3,000 connections or about a quarter of its water 
service area despite having operated for nearly three decades. The low water service coverage in 
2003 can be partly attributed to the remarkably low staff productivity level and relatively high 
average annual salary, at least higher than that of Calapan, which was categorized as a small 
private utility. Just like Calapan, Guimba was able to make significant staff productivity 
improvement in more recent periods. The increase in staff productivity level was accompanied 
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by a substantial increase in average annual salary and a reduction in labor cost share, indicating 
that salary increases, to some extent, were proportionate to staff productivity improvement. It is 
interesting to note, however, that in 2009, average annual salary markedly increased and so did 
labor cost share. Operating cost coverage ratio also substantially improved. This was 
accompanied by an expansion in service coverage and a reduction in non-revenue water. The 
performance of Guimba in water service coverage and non-revenue water, however,  was less 
impressive than in 2012 when the average salary moderately increased, staff productivity level 
markedly improved, labor cost share was substantially reduced and operating cost coverage ratio 
was also lower than its 2009 level. Notwithstanding, the average rate and operating cost coverage 
ratio of Guimba remained higher than other well-performing water districts. A reduction in 
operating cost coverage ratio may help further expand service coverage and reduce water rates.  
Table 26. Performance of Comparable Water Utilities- Calapan Wateroworks Corporation and Guimba WD 
Indicators Calapan Guimba 
2003 2004 2011 2003 2004 2009 2012 
No. of Connections  4,370 9,617 1,660 2,180 3,000 4,784 
Water Coverage  17.9% 62 9.6 13.9 21.6 - 
NRW 40.2 40.8% 26 23.5 23.4 14 7 
OCR .72 1.86 1.68 1.05 1.37 2.1 1.36 
RCS  76.1%  82 85.7 86.6 - 
UOC .21 .16 .65 .37 .27 .33 .60 
Staff per 1,000 
conectins. 
9.3 8.7 8.1 13.9 11 9 4.8 
Ave. Annual Salary 1,828 1,913 1,978 2,028 1,058 4,274 5,736 
LCS 34 41 16 32.3 19.5 53 25 
Continuity 16 20  24 24 24 - 
AR .15 29 1.09 .39 .37 .63 .80 
Ratio of Industrial to 
Residential 
1.42 1.55 - 1.8 1.85 2.26 - 
Connection Charge 95 41 - 40.6 39.3 49.9 - 
Collection Period 48 39 - 31.8 34.5 - - 
GFA 58.5 60.3 - 29.03 86.3 - - 
WC 19.6 21.6 20.7 19.6 18.7 18.6 18.2 
Residential Fixed 
Component 
     58.6  
Net Income   44.4 (40%)    14.3 (40%) 
Source: LWUA, NWRB, IBNET 
 
Just like Guimba, Baliwag serves a first income class municipality. It is bigger than Guimba and 
is one of the best performing water districts. Baliwag has one of the highest staff productivity 
level outperforming a few private utilities, such as SWC and BWUI. The labor cost share of 
Baliwag, however, had been remarkably high at 50 percent owing largely to its high average 
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annual salary. The average annual salary of Baliwag was significantly higher than comparable 
water districts and even that of private utilities. In 2012, however, labor cost share was reduced 
to 37 percent, albeit still higher relative to comparable water districts and private utilities.  
 
The remarkably high labor cost share of Baliwag, however, does not appear to compromise its 
financial and operational performance. This may have been afforded by its favorable demand 
conditions and remarkably low non-revenue water which affords it a strong financial position to 
amply reward its employees and expand service coverage. Baliwag has one of the lowest non-
revenue water. Tariffs, however, can be further reduced as they are higher than that of 
comparable water district, Angeles and closer to the rates of BWSI. In terms of number of 
connections, Baliwag does not appear to stand out as BWSI and Angeles WD also perform 
remarkably well in this area.  
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Table 27. Performance of Comparable Water Utilities: Baliwag WD, Angeles WD and Balibago Waterowrks 
System Inc. (BWSI) 
Indicators BWSI Angeles WD Baliwag WD 
2004 2008 2009 2013 2004 2008 2009 2012 2008 2009 2012 
No. of 
Connections 
9,240 13,000 13,000 15,695 28,830 36,000 39,000 43,403 18,000 20,000 23,108 
Water 
Coverage 
66 62.18 68.14 16,984 
(93%) 
57.3 69.4 67.2  87.2 90.9  
NRW        19   1 
OCR 1.14 1.4 1.35 1.1 1.6 1.15 1.19 1.1 1.45 1.64 1.16 
RCS            
UOC .25 .31 .28  .17 .25 .21 .41 .24 .22 .50 
Staff per 1,000 
con. 
6.1 1.23 1.23 3.4 3.3 3.9 3.8 4.4 3.9 3.6 4 
Ave. Annual 
Salary 
3,079 3,274 2,499 6,923 3,681 4,106 4,427 5,318 7,758 7,103 - 
LCS 22.5 32.8 28.3 31 22.9 14.8 16.9* 15* 50.4 50.4 37 
Continuity 24 24 24  24 24 24  24 24  
AR 28 44 37 .91 26 29 25 .54 .35 .37 .53 
Ratio of 
Industrial to 
Residential 
1.46    1.9    2.37 2.17  
Connection 
Charge 
8.03 5.24 4.86  44.6    68.6 63.7  
Collection 
Period 
33.9 51.5 61.9  30.36 85.1 73.6  31.4 28.1  
GFA 90.04 15.7 23.6  53.3 48.8 43.6  23.5 24.4  
WC 27.8 32.2 32.05 24.2 26.5 36.3 37.8 26 20.5 18.5  
Residential 
Fixed 
Component 
 58.7 54.7      32.2 29.9  
Net Income    17.9 
(10%) 
   30(10%)   17.56 
(14%) 
Annual bill  58.9 54.7      32.2 29.9  
Source: LWUA, NWRB, IBNET 
 
 
5.3.3. Spending Patterns and Profitability of LGU-run Utilities: LGU-run utilities face less varied 
market circumstances than water districts, but there are LGU-run utilities that operate in lucrative 
service areas typically served by water districts or private utilities. San Carlos Waterworks 
Department (SCWD) is one of the few LGU-run utilities that supply water service to a city. It is 
run by the municipal government of San Carlos, a second class component city of Negros 
Occidental. SCWD is one of the best performing LGU-run utilities in terms of connections and 
non-revenue water. This can be partly attributed to its slightly higher staff productivity level. But 
just like many LGU-run utilities, labor cost share is rather high possibly on account of hefty staff 
compensation. 
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Consistent with the estimation results, the salaries of San Carlos rose as the number of 
connections increased. The substantial increase in salary within period 2004-2008, however, was 
accompanied by a significant improvement in staff productivity. As a result, labor cost share 
declined, albeit remained significantly higher than comparable private utilities. But compared to 
the other two LGU-run utilities that are smaller in terms of number of connections and face less 
favorable demand circumstances, staffing and spending patterns of San Carlos appear to be more 
efficient. The other two LGU-run utilities, Tubigon and Jagna, exhibit slightly different staffing 
and spending patterns.  
 
During period 2004-2008, the staff productivity of Tubigon declined, average salary also 
decreased and so did labor cost share. This was accompanied by an improvement in its financial 
position as indicated by an increase in operating cost coverage ratio and better performance in 
non-revenue water, albeit remained inferior relative to comparable utilities. Network expansion 
remains limited. Jagna, on the other hand, registered a higher staff productivity level than 
Tubigon and about the same as San Carlos’, but its average salary is much lower, suggesting that 
the utility has more employees. This translates to low non-personnel expenses, remarkably low 
water availability, but strong financial position as indicated by the operating cost coverage ratio.  
 
Given better demand conditions, San Carlos has registered a higher average tariff than Jagna and 
Tubigon. Despite high average tariff in 2009, San Carlos has recorded low operating cost coverage 
ratio. The high average tariff may thus have been driven not by strong consumption but by cost 
inefficiencies. In 2009, however, operating cost coverage ratio substantially increased consequent 
on a reduction in unit operating cost and increase in average revenue. This was not accompanied 
by an increase in the number of connections while non-revenue water worsened. Labor cost share 
also markedly increased even without any significant change in average annual salary, while staff 
productivity slightly declined indicating that the increase in labor cost share may have been 
occasioned by an increase in the number of employees or a reduction in non-personnel expenses. 
With an increase in non-revenue water and sans any change in the number of connections, the 
utility appears to scrimp on repairs and maintenance to improve financial position.  
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The inverse relationship of operating cost coverage ratio with the level of spending on non-
personnel expenses and service quality of San Carlos is also shared by the two other LGU-run 
utilities. Even water districts also exhibit such patterns, albeit with lower degree of association 
between said variables on account of the water districts’ strong revenue stance. The relatively 
favorable market conditions of water districts allow them to offer high salary without having to 
make substantial reduction in non-personnel expenses; hence, the weak impact of the spending 
bias towards personnel expense on service level.  
 
In 2008, Tubigon registered a substantial improvement in operating cost coverage ratio due 
mainly to an increase in average tariff, while unit operating cost stayed the same. This was 
accompanied by a substantial decline in staff productivity and a reduction in average annual 
salary. The extra revenues from an increase in average tariff and profitability appear to be 
funneled to hiring low-salaried workers. The decrease in salary, however, was more pronounced 
than the increase in the number of staff as labor cost share decreased. Although non-revenue 
water markedly decreased, it was a consequence of a reduction in water availability. 
 
In 2009, Jagna also registered a substantial improvement in operating cost coverage ratio while 
unit operating cost declined. The decrease in unit operating cost, however, was accompanied by 
reduced water availability. Salary increased despite a decline in staff productivity resulting in a 
large increase in labor cost share. In 2009, the operating cost coverage ratio of Jagna significantly 
increased as unit operating cost declined and average tariff increased. The improvement in 
operating cost coverage, however, was accompanied by an increase in non-revenue water, 
suggesting that the reduction in unit operating cost may have been afforded by reduced spending 
in network repairs and maintenance.  
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Table 28. Performance of Two LGU-run Utilities – San Carlos, Tubigon, and Jagna 
Indicators San Carlos Tubigon Jagna 
2004 2008 2009 2013 2004 2008 2009 2008 2009 
No. of 
Connections 
4,840 6,000 6,000 6,701 1,640 2000 2000 2000 2000 
Water Coverage 96.7 22.7 23.5  19.8 15.7 18 77.7 68.5 
NRW 6.9 16.8 21.7 26 50 30.8 18.7 43.7 11.3 
OCR .92 1.05 1.26 .96 .93 1.29 1.29 1.09 1.41 
RCS   100       
UOC .13 .24 .22 .28 .15 .15 .16 06 .04 
Staff per 1,000 
conn. 
8 6.2 6.3  3.6 8.5 8.5 6 7 
Ave. Annual 
Salary 
3,039 5,666 5,386  2,599 1,056 2,441 804.8 898.7 
LCS 53 47 52 48 33.2 21.9 43.8 39.8 48.6 
Continuity 24 24 24  12 10 10 20 12 
AR .12 .25 .27 .36 .14 .2 .2 .07 .06 
Ratio of Industrial 
to Residential 
- - -  2.16 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.6 
Connection 
Charge 
24.5 17.7 23.9  2.7 3.36 3.12 8.9 8.3 
Collection Period     22.27     
GFA  18.7 15.7  24.5 8.8 7.3 2.46 2.64 
WC 30.13 25 25 26.04 15.7 22.5 25.4 16.6 26.2 
Residential Fixed 
Component 
 21.5 29.9   34.9 32.4 6.7 6.2 
Net Income    -1.35      
Annual bill  32.3 29.9   34.9 32.4 6.7 6.2 
Source: IBNET, NWRB, LWUA 
 
 
5.3.4. Behavior of the Three Ownership Types over Time: There are striking differences in how the 
behavior of the three ownership types evolves over time. The staff productivity level of water 
districts tends to either stay the same or marginally improves over time while that of LGU-run 
utilities either stays the same or declines over the time.  On the other hand, staff productivity level 
of private utilities has shown to significantly improve over time. As regards pricing, average tariff 
of private utilities could decrease considerably. A significant decrease in unit operating cost is 
followed by a marked reduction in average revenue. Calapan is an exception as average revenue 
increased when unit operating cost decreased but the rise in average revenue only served to 
compensate for the low average tariff in the previous period which were lower than the unit 
operating cost. This does not appear to be the case with water districts where average revenue 
either increased or stayed the same when unit operating cost decreased. This partly explains their 
wide profit margin and high water rates yet modest expansion in service coverage. Although 
there are one or two water districts of which average revenue decreased slightly more than the 
decrease in unit operating cost, the average revenue remained substantially higher than the unit 
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operating cost. In stark contrast, the water rates of LGU-run utilities are rather sticky as there was 
also no significant change in unit operating cost.  
 
 
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
There are systematic differences in the pricing, spending and staffing behavior of private utilities, 
water districts and LGU-run utilities. Private utilities have exhibited efficient behavior 
characterized by strong links between profit stance and service level. Despite the introduction of 
private sector operating principles, particularly the accommodation of profit motive, the 
spending patterns of water districts resemble that of LGU-run utilities marked by a strong bias 
towards personnel expenses, while their pricing behavior could be likened to that of an ill-
regulated profit-seeking utility. With their high-pricing behavior, water districts have emerged 
as a poor alternative to LGU-run utilities in low-income areas, while their cost inefficiencies 
render them inferior to private utilities in high-income areas with high efficiency and investment 
requirement.  Introducing private sector operating principles to water utilities sans a shift to 
private ownership can generate perverse incentive effects. With the strong performance of private 
utilities and the disappointing outcomes of corporatization, abstracting away from ownership 
may be misplaced, at least for developing countries that have similar institutional realities as the 
Philippines. 
 
6.1. Perverse Incentive Effects of Corporatization 
  
The results of regression analysis and case studies bear out the low-powered incentive structure 
of public ownership as intimated by the performance of LGU-run utilities. The results of the 
econometric and case studies further show that corporatization is a delicate remedy to the 
inefficiency of publicly-owned utilities. Corporatization could generate perverse incentive effects 
in the absence of proper accountability mechanisms (i.e., a coherent regulatory framework). 
Corporatization of water utilities via a water district-LWUA model has shown to yield adverse 
tradeoff between efficiency and equity goals. Where the political market is inefficient, the results 
of the studies favor maintaining the low-powered incentive structure of public ownership and 
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confining the adoption of high-powered corporate principles within the realm of private 
ownership.  
 
The accommodation of profit motive and introduction of private sector operating principles did 
not alter the incentive structure of water districts; it simply facilitates further redistribution of 
welfare gains away from the consumers and towards the employees via unreasonably high tariffs 
and hefty personnel compensation. Employees have shown to capture the internal returns of the 
utility to the detriment of low-income consumers. Likewise, the introduction of private sector 
operating principles has shown to induce water districts to serve lucrative markets in competition 
with private utilities, while less lucrative markets are underserved by LGU-run utilities and small 
water districts. Strong revenue prospects in lucrative markets, however, afford only modest 
improvement in the performance of water districts as a larger proportion of the revenues are 
channeled to personnel expenses on account of overstaffing and hefty performance-based 
bonuses.  
 
While water districts retain the spending bias of LGU-run utilities towards personnel expenses, 
they totally abandon the slant of LGU-run utilities towards low-cost pricing. Tariffs of water 
districts have shown to be vastly driven by operational inefficiencies and profit motive, almost 
without regard for ability of consumers to pay. Water districts have registered high water rates 
even in low-income areas. Also, increased spending in non-personnel expenses has not been 
accompanied by an improvement in service quality; the most profitable water districts can be the 
worst-performing water districts. With strong emphasis on financial sustainability concerns, 
water districts, especially the small ones that operate in low-income areas scrimp on non-
personnel expenses (i.e. network maintenance and expansion) to cover operational cost inefficiencies 
and debt obligations leading to deterioration of service delivery.  
  
6.2. Advantages and Limitations of Private Utilities 
 
The performance of private utilities has shown to exemplify that of properly regulated utilities 
where tariff and profit levels are positively associated with the level of service as noted above. 
Cost efficiency of private utilities is chiefly afforded by staff productivity-based salaries. 
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Improvement in staff productivity and performance-based profit orientation up both personnel 
expenses, particularly salaries, and non-personnel expenses of private utilities. Although there is 
one private utility in the sample that exhibits inefficient pricing and spending behavior, its 
performance subsequently improves unlike LGU-run utilities and water districts whose poor 
performance tends to persist over time. Notwithstanding, the results of regression analyses and 
case studies may have to be interpreted in its proper context. There are distinct institutional 
realities in the Philippines that may have contributed to the favorable performance of private 
utilities and adverse effects of corporatization.  
 
Firstly, the Philippines espouses market-oriented policies and accords strong protection to 
property rights. The country’s legal framework for private sector participation has been laid out 
decades ago consequent on the active promotion by international financing institutions and 
development assistance providers that devoted gargantuan resources to promoting market-
oriented policy reforms. Private utilities in the Philippines thus operate in an environment that 
affords de facto transfer of crucial rights to the private operator as external influence is adequately 
institutionally constrained. Additionally, it is also worth noting that private utilities, including 
those that operate under large PPP schemes (e.g. Bohol Water Utilities Inc. and Subic Water 
Corporation) serve highly urbanized cities and municipalities that could no longer be served by 
water districts and LGU-run utilities due to large investment and efficiency requirements. This 
may have perched private utilities in a strong bargaining position to assert operational 
independence.  
 
Secondly, private utilities may have also been induced to operate efficiently as they face 
competitive pressure from water districts, which is the legally favored institutional arrangement 
and the dominant water service providers in urban areas. Many local government units delegated 
the provision of water services to a private utility when the latter could no longer provide the 
required service level. Thirdly, it is also highly likely that the local governments that opted to 
delegate the provision of water services are the ones committed to making privatization work.  
 
Notwithstanding the efficient functioning of private utilities and the institutional advantages the 
same enjoy, there are inefficient political, institutional and market biases against private utilities 
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in water supply services that need to be addressed. Private utilities may not desire to operate in 
highly politicized areas where water districts operate and in low-income areas dominated by 
LGU-run utilities. Local governments which hold the decision rights over the choice of ownership 
structure in middle-income areas may not also wish to delegate water service provision to private 
utilities given the monetary and political benefits they derive from directly providing water 
supply services. A coherent regulatory framework may have to be established to induce the 
removal of institutional biases against private utilities and promote the efficient functioning of 
the two other ownership types through proper regulation and competition between all ownership 
types and, consequently, broaden access to reliable and safe water supply services.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
Ownership and Regulation of Water Utilities:  
A Refocusing of the Role of a Regulator 
An Institutional Analysis of the Philippine Experience  
 
 
Abstract 
The water supply services in the Philippines are provided via three key ownership 
arrangements, namely, local government unit-run utilities, corporatized water districts, 
and private utilities. The three ownership types are regulated by different agencies 
which exhibit varying effectiveness as evinced by the systematic differences in the 
performance of the utilities. To account for the variations in their performance, I 
explore the nexus between ownership and regulatory process and set out to define 
the powers and functions of a regulatory oversight under a two-tiered regulatory 
system where specialized regulators are placed under the former’s control and 
supervision. Instead of an outright policy bias towards any specific ownership 
structure, I argue for a refocusing of the role of an independent regulatory 
oversight clothed with adjudication powers with policy-making functions over 
ownership shifts and regulatory conflicts. 
 
Keywords: water utilities; private sector participation; corporatization; 
ownership; regulation; decentralization. 
JEL classification: K23; L32; L95; P48 
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1.Introduction 
The withdrawal of many governments from direct production of goods and services during the 
latter part of the 1980s has led to a widespread use of regulatory instruments as tools of economic 
and social governance.28 In a survey of empirical studies conducted by Megginson and Netter 
(2001), gains from a shift to private ownership are buoyed by complementary institutional 
reforms, chief of which is the establishment of an external regulator. An external regulator has 
long been operating in many developed economies (e.g., Canada, U.S., United Kingdom) and a few 
developing economies (e.g. Chile and Argentina) as part of sector reform and privatization 
initiatives.29 The long-term nature and high level of investment required to develop water supply 
systems demand an independent regulatory agency that will monitor and enforce performance 
standards, interpret other contractual stipulations and, if necessary, adapt the terms and 
conditions of the contract to evolving circumstances. By narrowing the scope for arbitrary and 
unfair governmental actions, the presence of an external regulator has shown to encourage 
private capital investment and use of simpler contracts; it was found to minimize costly and 
opportunistic renegotiation and disputes between contracting parties.30 Regulators were also 
found to improve the performance of both state-owned and private utilities with the highest 
achivements observed among private utilities regulated by a well-functioning regulatory 
agency.31  
 
Notwithstanding the relevance of a regulatory agency, regulatory failures are not uncommon. 
The proper functioning of an external regulator would require a suitable regulatory framework 
to guarantee credible commitment on the part of public agents to faithfully enforce regulatory 
laws and policies. Although having multiple regulators has its advantages in limiting regulatory 
capture, it may undermine transparency and accountability resulting in poor enforcement of laws 
and policies.32  Proper balancing between commitment and flexibility in the implementation of 

  28 See Aryeteey (2001). 
  29 See Berg et al. (2000) for an insightful discussion on the design of an independent regulatory commission. 
  30 See Stern (2012) for an elaborate discussion on the importance of a regulator in enforcing a long-term concession contract, the 
advantages and drawbacks of different regulatory arrangements and sources of contractual breakdowns. 
  31 See Andres et al. (2008). 
  32 See Stiglitz (n.d.). 
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regulatory policies to preserve efficiency and investment incentives is weakly observed under a 
fragmented regulatory structure. Accordingly, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank 
have been pushing for the establishment of an independent regulatory commission (patterned 
after the model of US, Australia and England) in many developing countries, including the 
Philippines to harmonize regulatory policies and promote their effective enforcement.33  The 
proposed establishment of a unified regulatory framework in the Philippines where one 
regulatory agency is tasked to regulate the entry of water utilities and the performance of all 
ownership types entails an overhaul of the fragmented regulatory landscape where the three key 
ownership arrangements, namely, the local government unit-run utilities, water districts and private 
utilities, are regulated by different agencies. The existing fragmented regulatory system is similar 
to that of the United States where public utility commission only applies to privately-owned 
utilities with public utilities being largely self-regulating.34   A fragmented regulatory system, 
however, has resulted in regulatory conflicts and weak enforcement of regulatory policies. This 
has translated to significant deviations in the pricing, staffing and spending behavior of publicly-
owned utilities from what is envisioned in pertinent laws and policies.  
 
Taking a transaction cost economics-based perspective on the relevance of ownership (i.e., all 
ownership structures have their flaws but one is more suited than others in a specific transactional setting) 
and drawing on the literature on regulatory design, I explore a refocused role of a regulatory 
oversight under a two-tiered regulatory framework. To induce proper functioning of different 
ownership types, a regulatoy oversight is vested with adjudicatory powers to regulate the 
politicians’ ownership choices and promote regulatory competition and compliance among 
regulatory agencies. It is the main contention of the article that where inefficient market incentives 
and constraints abound as to render all ownership types ineffective and unviable, regulation may 
have to be aimed at promoting regulatory competition and precluding blatantly inefficient 
ownership shifts or restrictions (e.g., preventing the operation of private utilities in areas that are 
unserved by corporatized water districts). The ultimate intent of a regulatory oversight is to alleviate 
institutional (i.e., legal prohibitions on privatization of public utilities and declaration of water districts 
as a preferred institutional arrangement), political (i.e., strong preference of political authorities towards 

  33 See World Bank PPP IRC for a discussion on the regulatory systems of the US, Ausralia and UK.. 
  34 See World Bank PPP IRC . 

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directly controlling the utilities to generate employment and revenues for the local government)  and 
economic biases and constraints (e.g., low ability to pay of water users reduces the commercial viability 
of water supply services) against private ownership. In effect, a regulatory oversight acts as an ex-
ante governance mechanism with respect to the choice of ownership (e.g., proper administration of 
licenses to operate and arbitrating ownership shifts), and an ex-post governance device in terms of 
monitoring and promoting regulatory competition and compliance through the exercise of its 
adjudicatory powers.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the theoretical background 
of the study. Section 2 discusses the development of a polycentric ownership regime, the 
fragmented regulatory framework and the subsequent push for the establishment of a single 
regulatory agency. Section 3 further examines the rationale or lack thereof of the differences in 
the regulatory framework of the LGU-run utilities, water districts and private utilities. The study 
then concludes with a discussion on the relevance of a regulatory oversight in promoting efficient 
functioning of all ownership types and expanding private sector participation. 
 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
 
The study sets out to define the powers of a regulatory agency in terms of: (i) the overall 
regulatory set-up, i.e., whether it operates as  a single regulator of all ownership types or as a regulatory 
oversight under a two-tiered regulatory framework where it controls and supervises regulatory agencies, 
and (ii) its specific functions, i.e., the extent of policy-making functions of its adjudicatory powers.  
 
2.1. The Overall Regulatory Set-up 
 
A regulatory oversight body typically means a centralized government unit atop the executive 
hierarchy that holds expertise to supervise regulatory actions of agencies and harness economic 
incentives and competitive pressures to enhance regulatory effectiveness.35 In some countries, the 
water ministry alongside the finance ministry are already providing oversight for water utility 

  35 See Wiener (2013).  
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operations. For state-funded local government-owned water utilities, the elected officials serving 
in the municipal council or commission are responsible for monitoring and inducing managerial 
performance. Oversight provided by municipal councils (where the approval of prices is being 
undertaken by the council, while service quality issues are resolved through public hearings) tends to work 
for smaller cities but less so in large cities where interests are more varied and service delivery 
becomes more complicated, making it necessary to establish an independent and competent 
regulatory agency. Given the increasing policy preference towards the decentralization of 
administrative powers and functions, a regulatory oversight is deemed controversial in terms of 
its purpose and motivation. Broadly, it serves two key functions: (i) checking function; and (ii) 
harmonizing function.  
 
2.1.1. Relevance of a Regulatory Oversight 
 
 The checking function of a regulatory oversight ensures that the regulatory principles and 
standards are implemented based on efficiency and objectivity (i.e., curbing the regulatory excesses 
of overzealous bureaucrats or precluding regulatory capture); it is created to promote procedural 
fairness, political accountability and checks and balances in the exercise of regulatory powers.36 
The distance of a regulatory oversight from the water utilities suitably placed them to make 
politically unpopular decisions and perform its checking function. A regulatory commission is 
designed to be an independent organization with expertise and neutrality to make decisions that 
balance varied interests of current and future customers, taxpayers and investors. 37  Such 
regulatory body is particularly vital in promoting competitive neutrality where private utilities 
and public utilities co-exist38; it ensures that tariff issues are not resolved outside the formal 
regulatory system, or that the utility itself with the backing of the ministry is not exempt from 
regulatory compliance.39 Although specialized regulatory agencies are expected to weigh the 
costs and benefits of their regulatory policies, a regulatory oversight acts as the final arbiter of the 
aptness of regulatory policies.40  
 

  36 See Estry (2015). 
  37 See Berg (2013). 
  38 See OECD (2009) and OECD (2013). 
  39 See Berg (2013). 
  40 See OECD (2009) and OECD (2013). 
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A regulatory oversight is also established to formulate coherent regulatory principles and 
standards. Water utilities operate in disparate market settings; they have varied exposure to 
economic and political incentives and constraints as crucially influenced by their ownership 
structure. Privy to contrasting market and institutional realities faced by specialized regulators, 
a regulatory oversight has the vantage point to make proper harmonization of regulatory policies, 
promote regulatory competition and compliance, facilitate inter-agency coordination, and 
prevent wasteful duplication of scarce supervisory resources.41  
 
2.1.2. Arguments against a Single Regulator 
 
The arguments against a unified regulatory system are directed at a unitary regulatory system 
where there is only one regulator for all ownership types. A unitary regulatory system, being, in 
effect, a regulatory monopoly, may exhibit the type of inefficiencies usually associated with 
monopolies. 42  A monopoly regulator would tend to  be more rigid and bureaucratic than 
specialized regulatory agencies which work closely with their regulatees. Under such 
arrangement, regulatory failures would have broader impact on the economy, and the agency 
would have limited expertise in dealing with the peculiarities of different ownership types.43 A 
single regulator may suffer from diseconomies of scale as it tries to regulate utilities whose 
objectives and functions differ.44 For instance, linking incentives to performance and setting the 
right incentives for sound managerial decision-making based on well-defined efficiency targets 
is particularly challenging for state-owned utilities. State-owned utilities are bound to adopt 
multiple goals and accommodate conflicting interests of various stakeholders.45 Fining a private 
utility is likely to help change utility behavior since the stockholders of the utility will bear the 
cost of the fine, while it may not work for public utilities that are fully owned by the state. For 
public utilities, a fine would be a penalty on the ratepayers or on the taxpayers, especially so if 
the utility is heavily subsidized by the government. The establishment of a two-tiered regulatory 
framework is thus aimed at striking a balance between flexibility and accountability which may 

  41 See Goodhart et al. (1998)  
  42 See Mutuku (2008). 
  43 See Berg et al. (2000). 
  44 See Jadhav (n.d.). 
  45 See Eisendrath (2013). 
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be difficult to achieve by specialized regulators on account of their close relationship with their 
regulatees and the local government officials.  
 
2.2. Functions of an Independent External Regulator: Adjudication with Policy-making 
Functions 
 
An independent external regulator is defined as a governmental entity that posseses and exercises 
a specialized public authority without being directly elected by the people nor managed by 
elected officials.46 An independent regulatory commission is created to: (i) protect consumers 
from abuse of firms with substantial market power; (ii) encourage investment by protecting 
investors from arbitrary and unfair actions of the government; and (iii) promote competition.47 
All of these regulatory aims are directed at enhancing incentives for operating efficiency, system 
expansion and quality of service. There is a long standing debate, however, on whether these 
aims are better achieved by assigning to the agency an expanded adjudication powers with 
policymaking functions (i.e., fact-finding and policy elaboration). Rule-making and policy 
formulation has become a common function of regulatory commissions.48 Independent agencies 
are not only tailored to adjudication; they are tied to an executive agency that exercises 
policymaking and prosecution responsibilities (e.g., US Federal Reserve Board which is a policymaker 
of the higher order with adjudicatory functions). The most powerful and institutionalized regulatory 
agencies possess the broadest suite of regulatory functions, such as rule-making, monitoring and 
controlling, adjudication and sanctioning. In European countries, elected officials and ministries 
have delegated various functions to highly independent specialized regulatory agencies.49  
 
Adjudication is an adversarial process to ascertain individual rights and duties based on 
application of pertinent laws or policies to the factual situation. In adjudicatory proceedings, 
agencies interpret or fill gaps in statutes and regulations and determine the frameworks within 
which facts are to be evaluated. This contrasts with policy-making or quasi-legislative agency 
action which promulgates rules and regulations to promote or dissuade specific conduct of 
persons, groups or classes. Regulatory agencies do not only hear and decide contested matters 

  46 See Maggetti (2007). 
  47 See Berg et al. (2000). 
  48 See Verkul (1988). 
  49 See Maggetti (2007). 
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based on the factual circumstances of the case; they also make policies by formal and informal 
method of rule-making, or by proclaiming standards and rules of conduct; and prosecute for civil 
violations of the statutes they administer. Anchored on its primary adjudication powers, 
independent regulatory commissions are authorized to perform a broad range of functions, e.g., 
issue, deny and revoke licenses, set regulatory standards, design investment incentives, determine the pace 
of privatization, shape the legislative framework, oversee sector restructuring, set rules about ownership 
and performance requirements, establish the level and structure of tariffs, impose a uniform accounting 
system, perform management audits on regulated firms via independent consultancy, and develop human 
resources.  
 
The formulation of policies through adjudicatory process has the advantage of limiting external 
lobbying by special interest groups. Operating in a narrow and depoliticized arena, delegation to 
independent regulatory agencies may serve as a technocratic tool for developing the “best” 
regulatory action by providing reliable pieces of information and advice to decision-makers.50 
With the assignment of greater policy-making functions formally independent agencies get to be 
integrated extensively in the political processes. While this may enable regulators to promote 
informed policy decision-making, it also poses a risk of politicizing the regulatory process. Also, 
the power to make broad-based legislative rules may complicate the independent agencies’ 
functions. The collegiality nature of commissions may be undermined by advancing executive 
rulemaking priorities. The centralization of power could make independent agencies something 
they are not – single headed agencies.51  There are, however, merits to having independent 
agencies engage in rule-making.  Rules have increasingly shown to be the efficient method of 
controlling regulated entities than the incremental, time-consuming adjudicatory approach. Rule-
making that grew out of adjudication was a decisional technique that grants an independent 
regulatory agency a functional advantage over the courts, which engage in adjudication without 
the benefit of a rule-making process.52 Without having to follow the stare decisis rule imposed on 
regular courts, an agency with both quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative functions may establish 
new policies in a case-by-case determination in cases where statutory standards would need to 
be tailored or adapted to evolving circumstances.53 The agency may be authorized to fashion new 

  50 See Maggetti (2007). 
  51 See Verkul (1988). 
  52 See Verkul (1988). 
  53 See Verkul (1988). 
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policy by adjudication provided that the underlying basis of its order is well-reasoned and within 
statutory limitations. 
 
To minimize the tradeoffs of greater rule-making powers, a regulatory oversight authorized by 
law to adjudicate cases may adopt rules to supersede principles of law or policy, but it may not 
alter existing rules by adjudication process which have previous widespread application, i.e., it 
cannot make general law by adjudication. For instance, public utility commission may not impose a 
unique accounting rule without going through the mandated rule-making procedures in 
compliance with statutory requirements.Based on the experience of developed and developing 
economies, regulatory agencies should also refrain from micro-management and second-
guessing utility management, and focus instead on providing incentives for cost containment and 
system expansion and introducing competitive elements where possible.54 Likewise, it is essential 
that a regulatory agency be authorized to request information and receive appropriate responses 
thereto to facilitate regulatory review. The commission also needs the authority to penalize firms 
that do not comply with data requests and develop procedures for special issues, including non-
payment of consumer bills and consumer complaints.55    
 
 
3. Evolution of a Polycentric Ownership Regime and 
Fragmented Regulatory Framework in Water Supply Sector 
 
An incoherent regulatory framework has been identified as one of the principal reasons for the 
poor water service provision in the Philippines.56 The water supply sector operates under a 
polycentric ownership regime with a fragmented regulatory structure characterized by poor 
coordination and overlapping jurisdictions. At present, there are three dominant ownership 
arrangements of water utilities, namely, local government unit (LGU)-run utilities, water districts, and 
private utilities. The three ownership types are  subject to disparate regulatory methods and 
processes; they are under the control and supervision of different regulatory agencies. This section 

 54 See Klein and Gray (1997) and Berg et al. (2000).
  55 See Ber et al. (2000). 
  56 See ADB (2013) 
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discusses the rationale and motivation behind the emergence of a polycentric ownership regime and 
fragmented regulatory structure and the concomitant impetus for the centralization of regulatory powers.  
 
3.1. Local v. National Control over Water Supply Systems 
 
 The period of American occupation of the Philippines (1902-1935) witnessed the push for local 
autonomy, albeit in practice a highly centralized unitary politico-administrative structure was 
established chiefly due to security reasons.57 When the Philippines won its independence from 
the United States in 1946, most provincial and municipal water supply systems in the country 
were owned and operated by local authorities with financial and technical assistance from a 
national government agency, the Bureau of Public Works (BPW).58 Subsequently, however, the 
control of urban water supply systems reverted to the national government with the creation of 
the National Waterworks Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) supplanting the Bureau of Public 
Works through Republic Act 1383. Said law prescribed all local water supply systems to be placed 
under the jurisdiction, supervision and control of NAWASA. The jurisdiction of NAWASA 
covered all the territory embraced by the Metropolitan Water District (MWD), which was the 
trustee and administrator of water supply systems in Metro Manila, and those areas served by 
existing local government-owned water systems in cities and municipalities.59  
 
In 1959, the first local autonomy law was enacted, granting greater fiscal planning and regulatory 
powers to municipal governments. About the same time, the local government units questioned 
the legality of centralizing the control of water supply systems via NAWASA on the basis of the 
former’s ownership rights over local water supply systems. In Municipality of Compostela v. 
NAWASA (1961), the Supreme Court (SC) ruled in favor of the Municipality, which wished to 
recover ownership, possession, operation, jurisdiction, supervision and control over the water 
systems. The SC issued the ruling on the following grounds.60  
 
Firstly, the funds used to construct the water system were borrowed by municipality from the national 
government, an obligation which could not have existed had the waterworks system belonged to the national 

   57 See Brillantes and Moscare (n.d.). 
   58 See World Bank (2003). 
   59 The Municipality of Lucban v. NAWASA (1961), Available from http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/UNDP4/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/Case-Digest.pdf 
    60 The Municipality of Compostella, Cebu v. NAWASA (1966)
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government. Secondly, the alleged sufficiency of the RA 1381 to justify the action of NAWASA has been 
overruled by the SC in City of Baguio v. NAWASA, City of Cebu v. NAWASA and several other cases 
where it was reasoned that the National Government cannot appropriate patrimonial property of municipal 
corporations without just compensation and due process of law. Lastly, internal management decisions, 
such as the collection of water fees and the appointment of personnel of the system are not included in the 
regulatory and supervisory powers embraced in the term “Jurisdiction, supervision and control” to be 
exercised by NAWASA over the municipal waterworks systems.61 The authority of a municipality to fix 
and collect rents for water supplied by its waterworks system is expressly granted by law in Section 2317 
of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264. Without these express 
provisions, the authority of municipality to fix and collect fees from its waterworks would be justified from 
its inherent power to administer what it owns privately.
To empower LGUs to effectively discharge their responsibilities, Republic Act 1985 assigned 
more decision-making powers to local government units. In the water supply sector, further 
decentralization of water service delivery through the dissolution of NAWASA via Republic Act 
6234 in 1971 was pursued on account of the adverse impact of the rigidities of a centralized water 
supply system on service delivery. A centralized water supply system was found to be limitedly 
responsive to the needs of distant municipalities. Republic Act 6234 created the Metropolitan 
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) to provide water services in Metro Manila and its 
contiguous urban areas. The local government units were given the option to separate from the 
MWSS. The MWSS and LGUs were authorized to set their own rates with the Public Service 
Commission tasked to resolve disputes over water rates.62  
 
3.2. National Control via Regulation. 
 
Shortly after the dissolution of NAWASA, a government-commissioned study of the James 
Montgomery consultancy group found that virtually all existing provincial water supply systems 
were antiquated and poorly managed due to lack of financing, limited technical know-how, and 
weak institutional set-up.63  This led to the enactment of Provincial Water Utilities Act otherwise 
known as Presidential Decree (PD) 198 in 1973. PD 198 declared corporatization via a water 
district model as the most feasible and favored institutional arrangement. To insulate the utilities 
from inefficient political interference and enhance transparency and accountability, water 
districts are prescribed to operate independently of the LGUs with technical advisory services 

   61 The Municipality of Lucban v. NAWASA (1961). 
   62 See Jamora (2008).  
   63 See Jamora (2008). 
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and financial assistance from the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). LWUA is a 
specialized lending institution with regulatory powers; the same is under the administrative 
supervision of the Department of Public Works and Highways. With its assistance programs, the 
LWUA is tasked to entice LGUs to delegate service provision to a water district. LGUs that opt to 
deliver water services through a water district loses de jure ownership, supervision and control 
over the utility.  
 
PD 198, however, contained provisions that were found to violate the Constitution.  In Tawang 
Multi-purpose Cooperative (TMC) v. La Trinidad Water District (TWD), the Supreme Court ruled 
in favor of TMC on the exclusivity of the franchise of water districts. The SC decision allowed the 
TMC to operate and maintain a water supply system in Barangay Tawang after having secured a 
certificate of public convenience from the National Water Resources Board (NWRB), the regulator 
of private utilities. The operation of TMC was opposed by TWD for its alleged violation of Section 
47 of PD 198, which grants an exclusive franchise to water districts within their designated service 
area.64 But the SC held that the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions expressly prohibit the creation 
of franchises that are exclusive in character. The SC ruling reversed the decision of the Regional 
Trial Court (RTC). The RTC ruled in favor of the water districts on the following grounds: 
 
Granting an exclusive franchise is intended to keep and maintain ultimate control and supervision over the 
operation of public utilities to serve the requirements of public interest. What is repugnant to the 
Constitution is a grant of franchise “exclusive in character” in a manner that precludes the State itself from 
granting a franchise to any other person or entity than the present grantee when public interest so requires. 
The dissenting opinion within the SC also alluded to two reasonable and legitimate grounds for the creation 
of exclusive franchise: (i) the protection of the government’s investment; and (ii) avoidance of a situation 
where ruinous competition could compromise the supply of public utilities in poor and remote areas.65 
Section 47 of PD 198 does not violate the constitutional proscription against exclusive franchises as other 
persons and entities may still obtain franchises for water utilities within the district upon the consent of 
the local water district or upon a favorable finding by the LWUA, the entity that is in the best position to 
determine the financial and technical capacity of LTWD in order to decide whether another water service 
provider is needed in the municipality. The restrictions applied to other private persons or entities are 
intended to advance its policy of prioritizing local water districts as a means of providing water utilities 
throughout the country.  
 
The SC held that there is no “reasonable and legitimate” grounds to violate the Constitution and 
that any act, however noble its intentions, is void if it violates the Constitution. The SC cited 

  64 Tawing Multi-purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District (2011), Retrieved from 
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_166471_2011.html 
  65 Retrieved from http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_166471_2011.html
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various rulings of the highest court which annulled the exclusivity of any public franchise. The 
Constitution mandates that a franchise cannot be exclusive in nature; the President, Congress and 
the Court cannot directly or indirectly create franchises that are exclusive in character. In PD 198, 
as amended, former President Marcos created indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character 
by allowing the Board of Directors (BOD) of a water district and LWUA to create directly 
franchises that are exclusive in character. As averred by the SC, the BOD and the LWUA are not 
even legislative bodies; the former is simply a management board of a water district. Neither the 
BOD nor the LWUA can be granted the power to create any exception to the absolute prohibition 
in the Constitution, a power that Congress cannot exercise. Upholding the doctrine of 
constitutional supremacy,  the Court maintained that any law or contract that violates any norm 
of the constitution is null and void.  
 
Aside from Section 47, Section 20 of PD 198 was also declared unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court. Section 20 of PD 198 prescribes the Board of water district to require and define a system 
of business administration and accounting for the district which shall conform to the standards 
established by LWUA. Auditing shall be performed by a certified public accounting not in the 
government service, although LWUA may conduct annual audits of the fiscal operations of the 
district to be performed by an auditor retained by the Administration. In Engr. Ranulfo Feliciano, 
GM of Leyte Metropolitan Water District vs. COA, the petitioner sought to resolve the issue 
before the SC on whether Section 20 of PD 198 prohibits COA’s certified public accountants from 
auditing local water districts. Section 20 of PD 198 provides that: 
Sec. 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise 
whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. (Emphasis 
supplied) 
The petition was found to lack merit. The SC held that:  
 
Leyte Metropolitan WD is a government owned and controlled corporation and being one should be subject 
to audit by the COA. Although PD 198 explicitly requires private audit, it cannot prevail over the 
Constitution which outlaws any exemption to any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise 
whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of Commission on Audit. The framers 
of the Constitution disallows any exemption from public audit to outlaw the number of entities of the 
government who took advantage of the absence of a legislature during the martial law to obtain presidential 
decrees exempting themselves from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. 
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The SC decision on Leyte Metropolitan Water District vs. COA likewise clarified the ownership of 
water district by the state principally on the basis of the government’s crucial control rights, 
which include the appointment of  all WD directors by government officials, the dissolution of a 
water district, and the subsequent transfer of its assets and liabilities to another public entity: 
There is no private party involved as co-owner in the creation of an LWD. Just prior to the creation of 
LWDs, the national or local government owns and controls all their assets. The government controls LWDs 
because under PD 198 the municipal or city mayor, or the provincial governor, appoints all the board 
directors of an LWD for a fixed term of six years. The board directors of LWDs are not co-owners of the 
LWDs. LWDs have no private stockholders or members. The board directors and other personnel of LWDs 
are government employees subject to civil service laws and anti-graft laws. Section 45 of PD 198 recognizes 
government ownership of LWDs when Section 45 states that the board of directors may dissolve an LWD 
only on the condition that another public entity has acquired the assets of the district and has assumed 
all obligations and liabilities attached thereto. The implication is clear that an LWD is a public and not a 
private entity. Assuming for the sake of argument that an LWD is self-owned, as petitioner describes an 
LWD, the government in any event controls all LWDs. First, government officials appoint all LWD 
directors to a fixed term of office. Second, any per diem of LWD directors in excess of P50 is subject to the 
approval of the Local Water Utilities Administration, and directors can receive no other compensation for 
their services to the LWD. Third, the Local Water Utilities Administration can require LWDs to merge or 
consolidate their facilities or operations. This element of government control subjects LWDs to COAs audit 
jurisdiction. 
 
Notwithstanding the unfavorable rulings on certain provisions of PD 198, the water districts 
emerged as the dominant institutional arrangement, as intended by said decree. The outcomes of 
corporatization via a water district model, however, failed to measure up to the what the decree 
intends to achieve as discussed at length in Section 3. Water districts barely covered half of their 
service areas; they impose remarkably high tariffs. The concerns about ruinous competition and 
protection of government’s investment raised in a dissenting opinion in Tawang Multi-purpose 
Cooperative (TMC) v. La Trinidad Water District (TWD) appear to be misplaced. Water districts 
have shown to be ill-regulated, warranting increased competitive pressure and proper regulation. 
With most low-income areas remaining unserved, the Rural Waterworks Development 
Corporation (RWDC) was created in 1980 to cater for water supply in rural areas and small towns 
(populations less than 20,000), while water districts served larger towns (populations greater than 
20,000).66 The desired arrangement, however, was short-lived; the functions and responsibilities 
of the RWDC were transferred to the LWUA.  
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  66 See World Bank (2003). 
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3.3. Promoting Private Sector Participation 
 
 Following the end of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986, the policy preference veered away from 
centralization of regulatory powers. Having inherited a dysfunctional and oversized 
bureaucracy, the Corazon Aquino Administration pushed for a greater role of the private sector, 
community-based organizations and non-government organizations in the decision-making, 
planning and implementation of government programs in partnership with the local 
government. 67 Saddled with a huge amount of non-performing assets of over 200 public sector 
enterprises, the Aquino Administration ventured to create the Asset Privatization Trust in 1986 
to dispose of government-owned and-controlled properties.68 The privatization programs were 
successfully carried out, thanks to the long held tradition of protecting property rights and 
upholding the primacy of the private sector, which was temporarily abandoned during the 
Marcos dictatorship. 69  Although the water supply sector was not one of those that were 
programmed for privatization, water districts enjoyed greater operational independence under a 
policy regime of relative autonomy and accountability.  
 
The 1990s witnessed a more pronounced effort by the government to enhance the participation 
of the private sector in public utilities. The Republic Act 6967 or the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) 
law was enacted in 1990.70 The Philippines was the first country in Asia to adopt said law and, in 
effect, institutionalized private sector participation in the management and financing of public 
infrastructure and development projects. 71  The persistently low service coverage of water 
districts strengthened the rationale for promoting private sector participation in the traditionally 
government-owned and-controlled water supply sector. A study conducted by the World Bank 
two decades after the inception of water districts stressed the importance of exploring more 
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  67 See U.S. Library of Congress, The Aquino Government (n.d.) 
  68 See Manasan (1995). 
  69 “Although there was a spurt in the growth of the public enterprise sector during the post war years as the government took an 
active role in the rehabilitation of the economy, this was immediately followed by a divestment program during the mid-fifties and 
early sixties due to the poor financial performance of state enterprises. Thus, in 1965 there were only 37 government owned/controlled 
corporations (GOCCs). During the Marcos years, however, the growth of thepublic enterprise sector accelerated. The number of 
government corporations more than tripled in the first ten years of his administration to reach 120in 1975; then it grew at a slightly 
slower pace in the next ten years, totaling 303 in 1984 (See Manasan, 1995).” 
ϳϬRepublic Act No. 7718 amended the BOT Law offering additional fiscal incentives and more variants of private sector participation 
and covering a broader range of infrastructure services, including the supply of water. The Amended BOT Law also broadens the list 
of PPP government implementing agencies to include government-owned and controlled corporations, such as water districts subject 
to the approval of the President of the Philippines. The Philippines now has a very comprehensive and well-developed PPP 
framework.
  71 See PPP Country Profile: the Philippines (2013). 
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financing options for water utilities to expand service coverage, particularly in low-income 
areas.72  Although there were already hundreds of water districts formed during that time, service 
coverage in low-income areas remained extremely low.  
 
The promotion of private sector involvement in the delivery of public services was pursued in 
parallel with local government empowerment. In 1991 the Local Government Code was passed 
to establish a highly responsive and accountable local government by granting the same greater 
responsibilities, revenue-generating powers and additional resources. Section 2 of the Local 
Government Code states: 
 
It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State 
shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest 
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment 
of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable 
local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local 
government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The 
process of decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the local government 
units.  
 
The Local Government Code empowered the Sangguniang Bayan, the legislative body of the 
municipality composed of eight elected councilors, to provide for the establishment of an efficient 
waterworks system to supply water supply services for the inhabitants. Local governments were 
encouraged to partner with the private sector and adopt commercial strategies, techniques and 
technologies. Sections 17 and 302 of the Code allow LGUs to undertake BOT projects according 
to the guidelines allowed by the BOT Law.73 The impact of decentralization on public service 
delivery, however, have not been encouraging.74  LGU-run utilities have remained financially 
dependent on the national government. LGUs were hard put in managing their growing 
responsibilities. The poor outcomes of decentralization75 reignited the debate on the suitability of 

  72 See Leano (2004). 
  73 Engr. Ranulfo C. Feliciano, in his capacity as General Manager of Leyte Metropolitan Water District, Tacloban City, petitioner, vs. 
Commission on Audit, Chairman Celso D. Gangan, Commissioners Raul C. Flores and Emmanuel M. Dalman and Regional Director 
of COA, Region VIII, respondents (2004). 
Retrieved from http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jan2004/147402.htm 
  74 Brillantes and Moscare (1998) 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/EROPA/UNPAN032065.pdf 
 75 Decentralization has been argued to be beneficial when the demand for the service are rather differentiated across localities, the 
supply requires highly localized knowledge and resources, and there are no spillovers across jurisdictions. Although local 
government units may have the local knowledge and resources, local politics may not provide the appropriate incentives and devices 
to induce effective use of such knowledge (See Bardhan, 2002). Based on a 2010 Survey of the Social Weather Station, the leading 
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a decentralized system, spurring proposals ranging from devolution, phased decentralization to 
re-centralization. The succeeding administrations chose to further decentralize the decision-
making structure by promoting partnership between the local government, the private sector and 
civil society.  
 
After decades of being exempted from the privatization program, private sector participation was 
introduced into the water supply sector in the latter part of the 1990s. Metro Manila took a high 
profile privatization of its water supply in 1997. A few major cities and towns followed suit, but 
private sector participation remained concentrated in affluent areas. 76  Although it was 
acknowledged that the participation of the private sector in water service delivery would bring 
in more technical and financial resources to the sector, there are serious obstacles to promoting 
private sector participation in provinces and municipalities. LGUs are ill-equipped to prepare 
and manage contracts and regulate private sector-managed systems. 77 The Local Government 
Unit Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Project of the World Bank also pointed out the difficulty 
of working with the local government. Many LGU-run utilities are unwilling to relinquish control 
over water supply systems. Moreover, the Department of Interior and Local Government, in 
partnership with the World Bank, has been helping local government units to enhance their 
capacities in contract design, negotiations and enforcement through the Public-Private-
Partnership Center.78  
 
3.4. Towards a Unified Regulatory Framework 
 
The limited participation of private sector in service delivery and poor performance of LGU-run 
utilities and water districts on the back of overlapping jurisdictions of regulatory agencies of 
water utilities; the conflicts of interest in the current regulatory set-up; and the unconstitutionality 
of the exclusive franchise to water districts spurred a legislative proposal by the NEDA to 
establish a Water Regulatory Commission (WRC) to centralize the issuances of franchisees and 

public opinion polling body, local government units obtained a highly satisfactory rating on issues that involved relatively simple 
tasks and served immediate/basic concerns of the local constituents and tapped local information and resources, such as: maintenance 
of health centers; promoting health programs; lighting of streets; repairs and cleanliness of public markets; and implementing 
educational programs; issuance of permits; and information dissemination and promoting tourism. 
 76 See World Bank (2003). 
 77 See World Bank (2008). 
 78 Developing Public-Private Partnerships in Local Infrastructure and Development Projects: A PPP Manual for LGUs (2012).
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consolidate regulatory powers. The WRC is envisaged to provide oversight over water supply, 
setting goals and targets for all service areas, rationalizing tariffs across the country and attract 
investment in the sector. Meanwhile, there have been efforts to consolidate/harmonize 
regulatory powers via the NWRB, an agency that is tasked to regulate private utilities. In 2002, 
the NWRB was strengthened via Executive Order No. 123 expanding the jurisdiction of the same 
to include water districts. Addressing the conflicting role of LWUA as a regulator and lending 
institution, the said EO limited LWUA’s economic regulation to reviewing tariffs of only those 
WDs in which the agency has financial exposure. This allows LWUA to focus on promoting the 
financial and institutional development of water districts. Since its issuance up to now, however, 
the NWRB has not acted upon any single request for rate approval. NWRB still lacks the capacity 
and resources to exercise its regulatory powers over a much larger number of regulatees.  
 
 
4. Ownership and Regulatory Process and Effectiveness 
 
To explain the systematic differences in the performance of LGU-run utilities, water districts and private 
utilities, this section delves into the relationship between ownership structure of the utilities and regulatory 
orientation and effectiveness.  
 
The decentralization of water service provision as discussed in Section 3 yields a polycentric 
ownership and fragmented regulatory regime. Under a polycentric ownership and fragmented 
regulatory regime, there are about 5,400 water service providers, but they supply piped water to 
only 43 percent of the population.79 Urban areas have broader access to piped water at 61 percent 
compared to only 25 percent in rural areas.80 LGU-run utilities, water districts and private utilities 
run the urban water systems, while community-based organizations operate the rural water 
systems.81 The LWUA-supervised water districts dominate the urban areas; the self-regulating 
LGU-run utilities serve the less lucrative areas; and NWRB-regulated private utilities operate in 
highly urbanized cities, albeit there are regulatory and market overlaps. The NWRB regulates 
private utilities as per franchise agreement while the same supervises LGU-run utilities on 
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  79 See ADB (2013) 
  80 See ADB (2013) 
  81 See NEDA (2010)
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consensual basis.  The Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) is working closely 
with NWRB and local government bodies to professionalize service delivery of LGU-run utilities. 
LWUA and NWRB adopt similar price regulatory methods, albeit there are marked differences 
in regulatory rules and procedures and their effectiveness as discussed below.  
 
Table 1. Key Institutional Features of LGU-run Utilities, Water Districts and Private Utilities 
Utility 
Category 
Ownership 
Type 
Enabling 
Laws 
Market 
Patterns 
Regulatory Structure 
Regulator Functions Price 
Regulatory 
Method & 
Goals 
Staffing 
Patterns 
LGU-run Pure public LGC Dominate 
low-income 
areas; 
Estimated to 
be around 
1,000, only 
350 provide 
individual 
household 
connections 
DILG Oversight; provides 
funding support 
Varies         Varies 
Water 
District 
Quasi-
public/ 
Corporatize
d  
PD 198 Dominate 
urban areas 
in terms of 
population 
served; 
Over 900, 
only 500 are 
operational 
LWUA Sets tariffs and 
input/performance 
standards; 
Source of financing 
and technical 
support 
 
Rate of 
return/Fina
ncial 
governance 
rules, 
financial 
viability and 
equitable 
pricing 
Align 
staffing 
patterns 
with 
financial 
sustainabilit
y rules, 
staffing level 
tied to 
revenues 
and utility 
size 
Private 
Utilities 
Pure private Corporate 
Code  
Mainly serve 
high-income 
areas 
NWRB Sets tariff-setting 
rules, regulates 
profit 
Rate of 
return/finan
cial viability 
and 
equitable 
pricing 
 
Note: LGC=Local Government Code; PD 198=Presidential Decree 198; NWRB=National Water Resource Board; LWUA=Local Water 
Utilities Administration; DILG=Department of Interior and Local Government 
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4.1. LGU-Run Water Utilities 
 
LGU-run utilities were estimated to be around 1,000, but only a third of which provided piped 
water connections while the rest supply water through wells and hand-pumps.82 In a study titled 
Management Models for Small Towns Water Supply, direct management by LGUs was found to 
be less successful than water districts and private utilities in small towns in terms of non-revenue 
water, water availability and service coverage.83 Although private sector operating principles 
(e.g., ring-fencing) have been introduced to LGU-run utilities, they are still the archetypical 
municipal water works departments found in many developing countries with limited degree of 
independence and weak performance monitoring systems.84  
 
4.1.1. Self-regulation and its Rationale: Under Section 17 of Republic Act 7160 or Local Government 
Code of 1991, the local government units are responsible for the provision of basic services and 
facilities within their respective territorial jurisdictions. The LGUs may establish and operate their 
own water supply systems in conformity with its political and corporate existence as stipulated 
in Section 15 of the Code: 
 
Section 15: Every local government unit created or recognized under this Code is a body politic 
and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law. As such, it shall 
exercise powers as a political subdivision of the national government and as a corporate entity 
representing the inhabitants of its territory. 
 
Local political authorities formulate the general principles governing the supply of the service by 
LGU-run utilities. The Local Government Code assigns economic regulation (i.e. tariff approval and 
setting of key performance indicators) to the Sanguniang Bayan (SB), the legislative body of the 
municipal governments. SB85 sets the terms and conditions under which LGU-owned water 

  82 See ADB (2013) 
  83 See World Bank (2003)  
  84 See Braadbaart, Blockland and Schwartz (1999) and Thynne (1994) 
  85  The SB is composed of the municipal vice mayor and regular members, president of the pambayang pederasyon ng mga 
sangguniang kabataan and the sectoral representatives. The Local Government Code also provides for an additional three sector 
representatives representing women, laborers, and any of the urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, disabled persons or 
another that may be identified by the SB. The regular members of the SB and the sectoral representatives are elected for a three-year 
and may be re-elected for another two consecutive terms. The municipal vice mayor is the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, 
albeit with no voting privilege except in cases to break a deadlock. All heads of department and offices shall be appointed by the 
mayor with the concurrence of the majority of all the SB members, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations. Upon the majority 
vote of all the members of the SB, the SB may authorize the municipal mayor to negotiate and contract loans and other forms of 
indebtedness 
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systems may be operated by the municipal government or leased to private persons or entities. 
LGU-run utilities are self-regulated by both establishment and operation. If a local government 
unit decides to directly operate the utility, it may do so without having to secure certificate of 
public convenience from any government agency. Othewise, a local government unit has to 
obtain permits from designated regulators, i.e., it must secure a certificate of public convenience from 
NWRB if it opts to delegate water service delivery to a private operator and from LWUA if the water system 
is to be managed by a water district.  
 
Most LGU-run utilities operate in low-income areas where there is strong political pressure to 
keep water supply services at highly affordable rates, which partly explains the extent of 
subsidization among municipal water utilities. Often, the operating revenues of the utility only 
covered the operating expenses, with the capital improvements funded by loans extended by the 
national government through the Municipal Development Fund Office (MDFO) of the 
Department of Finance (DOF) or, directly, from government financing institutions such as the 
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP).86 To 
make do with limited funding, LGU-run utilities also share resources with other economic 
enterprises of the government. A typical LGU-run utility has no dedicated staff.87 The utility is 
operated by its municipal engineering or city administration department together with other 
economic enterprises of the municipal government, such as markets, bus terminals and 
slaughterhouses.  
 
4.1.2. Regulatory Weaknesses and Remedies. Both resource-sharing and subsidy dependence of LGU-
run utilities make internal monitoring and regulation difficult. Regulation is made even more 
difficult by the characteristics of water supply services which create a wide misalignment of 
incentives.  Water infrastructure is capital-intensive, the life span of water assets is unsually long. 
In turn, the short-term marginal cost of water service delivery is lower than its long-term marginal 
cost, making it easy for local political authorities to redirect public funds to personnel expenses 
and price water supply services at below cost-recovery levels. Once the investment is sunk, the 
operator could continue operating as long as operating revenues exceed operating cost, without 
realizing any return on sunk investment. Below-cost pricing and overstaffing are politically 

  86 See World Bank (2008).  
  87 See World Bank (2008).  
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expedient on account of their immediate and tangible benefits. With water infrastructure having 
a longer life span than local political authorities, long-term investment in network maintenance 
and expansion would appear to be a much less attractive means to signal performance and win 
votes as the local political authorities do not get to fully internalize the gains of such long-term 
investment. 

To overcome the incentive problems of state-owned utilities, numerous measures have been 
explored, such as: (i) corporatization; (ii) organizational restructuring; (iii) creating an 
independent regulatory agency; and (iv) establishment of a regulatory oversight. Corporatization 
via a water district model was introduced to strengthen efficiency incentives through the 
adoption of performance-based compensation scheme and establishment of performance 
monitoring systems. But as discussed in subsequent section, these incentive devices have not been 
effectively enforced. Organizational restructuring, on the other hand, has been continuously 
explored to facilitate better monitoring (e.g. ring-fencing their financial accounts and statements from 
the LGU’s overall accounts; establishment of financial reporting system), albeit with limited success. 
Accountability and monitoring systems may help discourage workers from engaging in acts of 
petty corruption, but they do not adequately insulate utilities from inefficient political 
interference (e.g., discriminatory installment of service connections in areas based on political affiliation, 
and hiring of political supporters).  
 
4.2. Water Districts
Water districts are the dominant service providers in urban areas, serving over 42 million user; 
they are “statutory body” organizations referred to as corporate utilities or government-owned 
and-controlled corporations.88 The institutional set-up of water district seeks to address both the 
accountability cracks, resource constraints and susceptibility to political interference of state-
owned utilities. Section 6 of PD 198 classifies the institutional arrangement of water districts as 
that of a quasi-public corporation performing public service and supplying public wants, while 
exercising powers, rights and privileges of private corporations: 

  88 See Thynne, 1994 

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Section 6: …a district shall be considered as a quasi-public corporation performing public 
service and supplying public wants. As such, a district shall exercise the powers, rights and 
privileges given to private corporations under existing laws, in addition to the powers granted 
in, and subject to such restrictions imposed, under this Act.    
 
Water districts have a separate juridical status; they are not under the jurisdiction of any political 
subdivision.  The utilities are run by independent managers based on commercial principles 
under the supervision of a Board of Directors and LWUA. PD 198 grants water districts ample 
operational independence, albeit a closer examination of the regulatory framework within which 
they operate suggests otherwise. Section 25 of PD 198 states: 
 
Section 25: The district and its employees, being engaged in a proprietary function, are hereby 
exempt from the provisions of the Civil Service Law. Collective bargaining shall be available only 
to personnel below supervisory levels: Provided, however, That the total of all salaries, wages, 
emoluments, benefits or other compensation paid to all employees in any month shall not exceed 
fifty percent (50%) of average net monthly revenue, said net revenue representing income from 
water sales and sewerage service charges, less pro-rata share of debt service and expenses for fuel 
or energy for pumping during the preceding fiscal year. 
 
Despite being granted corporate powers, the Supreme Court declared water district as a 
government-owned and-controlled corporation (GOCC) in 1992 as noted in Section 3. As a result, 
water districts would have to conform to the rules and standards of the Civil Service Commission 
on the hiring and firing of employees and be subject to public audit. Relative to LGU-run utilities, 
however, water districts still enjoy greater autonomy from the local government, especially those 
that are financially self-sufficient.  
 
Regulatory Framework and Outcomes. The Board of Directors and the LWUA are established to 
enforce PD 198 and achieve the decree’s intended objectives with the latter holding greater de jure 
regulatory powers than the former.  The local political authorities, however, continue to hold vital 
de facto and de jure control rights over water districts. For one, a water district is formed at the 
option of local political authorities. A water district is established through a resolution issued by 
the local legislative body to be approved by the local chief executive. The local chief executive 
appoints the water district board of directors from a list of nominees solicited by the local 
legislative body from well-established civic organizations. The Board of Directors appointed by 
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the mayor will have to be reviewed and confirmed by the LWUA. Any per diem of the Board is 
subject to LWUA’s approval. PD 198 prescribes staggered starts of the five-year term of the 
directors, precluding the appointment of majority of the directors by the same local chief 
executive. The Board appoints a general manager and define his duties and fix his compensation. 
The general manager, who cannot be removed from office, except for cause and after due process, 
has full supervision and control of the operation of water districts; the same appoints all 
personnel of the district subject to the approval of the Board.  
 
Upon compliance with all 
requirements 89  to form a water 
district, the LWUA grants the 
Certificate of Conformance (CC) or 
a Conditional Certificate of 
Conformance (CCC), a license for a 
water district to operate under a 
standard specification and be 
eligible for LWUA’s package of 
financial and technical assistance 
programs. Any district that holds a 
valid CC or CCC is exempt from the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission; hence, water 
districts are not subject to the profit ceiling of 12 percent of the asset value. The LWUA sets the 
appropriate tariff structure for water districts in accordance with the tariff-setting objectives 
stipulated in PD 198. Water districts are required to adopt a socialized pricing scheme where 
high-income, heavy users pay more per cubic meter of water than low-income, minimal users. 
Sections 37 and 63 of PD 198, as amended, require that rates must be adequate for the annual 
operating expense of the district, the maintenance and repairs of the works, a reasonable surplus 
for replacement, extension, and improvements and payment of interest and principal. Water 
districts are also obliged to provide sinking fund for the payment of debts of the district as they 
become due and establish fund for reasonable reserves. Financial management governance rules 

  89 The requirements include a description of the boundary of the district; a statement completely transferring any and all waterworks 
under such city, municipality or province to such district upon the filing of the resolution forming the district. 
Table 2. Service Coverage of Water Districts  
No. of 
Connections 
No. of 
Water 
Districts 
Population 
Served 
Population 
under 
Jurisdiction 
Water Supply  
Coverage 
35,001-up 7 3,728,47 5,343,036 0.70 
30,001-35,000 6 1,095,059 2,194,471 0.50 
25,001-30,000 6 1,112,031 2,163,261 0.51 
20,001-25,000 11 1,415,688 2,784,198 0.51 
15,001-20,000 12 1,167,532 2,478,463 0.47 
10,001-15,000 14 988,605 1,853,223 0.53 
5,001-10,000 44 1,957,989 4,975,277 0.39 
1-5,000 326 2,552,073 14,329,155 0.18 
TOTAL 426 14,017,451 36,121,084 0.39 
Source: Philippine Association of Water Districts (2008-2009) 
ϴϮͮW Ă Ő Ğ 



are supported by quality control of inputs and technical and institutional support. LWUA 
prescribes minimum standards and regulations in order to assure acceptable standards of 
construction materials and supplies, maintenance, operation, personnel training, accounting and 
fiscal practices for local water utilities.90The Administration also provides technical assistance and 
personnel training programs.  
 
Despite LWUA’s technical and financial support and supervision over virtually all aspects of the 
operation of water districts, the latter were found to be rarely demand-responsive. Water districts 
have relatively high tariffs, accumulated large debts and provide limited services for the poor. 91 
Large water districts serve high-income areas and enjoy disproportionately high profit level, 
while small water districts that operate in low-income areas are financially distressed. Water 
districts are found to be more successful in larger towns where they get to fully utilize their 
enhanced technical capacities and institutional support.92 Two factors could lend an explanation 
to the disappointing performance of water districts: (i) conflicting roles of the regulator; and (ii) 
persistent political interference and influence in the operation of water utilities.  
 
 LWUA’s Conflicting Roles. LWUA is a government-owned and-controlled corporation which 
primarily functions as a specialized lending institution; it is entrusted to promote, develop, and 
finance local water districts.93 The Administration was originally attached to the Office of the 
President but was transferred to Department of Public Works and Highways. The policies of the 
Administration is set by the Board of Trustees all of whom are appointed by the President. The 
trustees serve a five-year term and may be removed for cause only. PD 198 sets qualification 
criteria for the trustees (i.e., sufficient background in the field of economics, experience in management 
or systems operations). To restrain excessive borrowing, PD 198 sets the authorized capital of 
LWUA. There is an Oversight Committee on Local Water District composed of the LWUA, Civil 
Service Commission, Department of Budget and Management and the Philippine Association of 
Water Districts.  
 

 90 See WSP (2009) 
 91 See WB (2003) 
 92 See WB (2003) 
 93 Under recent enhancements to its charter, however, water districts may access non-traditional sources of funds provided that a 
“Waiver” coming from the Administrator of LWUA is issued accordingly.  
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Despite ministerial oversight and other institutional checks and balances, LWUA’s lending 
activities are highly profit-oriented to an extent that it impairs its regulatory function. LWUA 
extends loans to the utilities at an interest rate of eight to 12.5 percent, more than three times the 
concessionary rates on loans made by multilateral development banks to LWUA.94 LWUA loans 
were so expensive that around 40 water districts during period 2006-2014 decided to have their 
LWUA loans refinanced by banks with lower rates in order to trim down interest expenses. 
Additionally, LWUA charges nine percent of the gross loan amount for conducting feasibility and 
detailed design studies, plus another four percent for construction supervision. The high cost of 
financing pushed water rates up. Loans that are inefficiently spent due to poor system planning 
and design by LWUA also contributed to increased water rates, creating a vicious cycle where 
inefficient system design leads to poor but expensive services resulting in low willingness to pay 
for the service.  
 
Financial sustainability requirements imposed on both LWUA and water districts distort 
incentives for effective regulation, undermining both efficiency and equity goals. Profitability 
considerations of LWUA as a lending institution overrides the demand for proper regulation. 
Water districts are allowed to charge exceedingly high water rates to cover their debt obligations 
and stay financially sustainable. The expensive loans of LWUA have also abetted water districts 
to engage in cherry-picking, limiting their presence in low-income areas. LWUA has not been 
strictly implementing regulatory policies. Although the agency establishes and monitors key 
performance (KPI) and business efficiency measures (BEM) (e.g., service coverage, collection 
efficiency, water pressure in the distribution system and non-revenue water), the same has not been 
strictly requiring WDs to submit basic financial reports for monitoring and compliance 
assessment. Performance indicators are simply used for sharing information and identifying 
potential risks to the financial sustainability of the utility rather than as a basis for imposing  fines 
and penalties.  
 
Persistent Politicization of Water Districts. Regulation of water districts is further constrained by the 
strong de facto control rights and remaining de jure control rights of the local political authorities 
as noted earlier. Although PD 198 sets guidelines on the selection of the Board prohibiting the 

 94 See Lazaro ( 2000) 
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appointment of relatives of local political authorities, the local chief executives still appoint their 
relatives and political allies as members of the board.95 Lack of knowledge of the prohibition on 
appointing relatives is often used as a pretext by local chief executives for violating said provision 
of PD 198. LWUA being a “developmental/soft” regulator is inclined to let such infractions pass. 
Besides, the agency needs to maintain a good working relationship with the LGUs. With the grant 
of local autonomy and decentralization of water supply services, municipal governments hold 
numerous levers of influence. When a municipal government wishes to take over the utility, the 
LWUA is inclined to step aside provided that all liabilities of water district are settled or assumed 
by another public utility as prescribed by PD 198.96 Although PD 198 requires a court order for 
the dissolution of a water district, water districts are often taken over by the local government 
absent any court proceeding. There are a few cases, however, where the water district board 
resisted the takeover and filed a case before the Supreme Court. But typically the takeover of the 
utility by the municipal government is settled between the WD Board, the municipal government 
and LWUA.  
 
4.3. Private water operators 
 
Private utilities have been increasing in number, serving over two million users, excluding the 
two water concessionaires in Metro Manila, which provide water services to over 12 million users. 
They serve highly urbanized areas, as well as, exclusive subdivisions and economic zones. During 
the past two decades, private companies have secured congressional franchises and have built 
systems located in new property developments. 97 The operation of private water utilities are 
governed by general business and corporation laws. As private corporations, private water 
utilities can retain their revenues and spend them as needed without the obligation to turn to 
Congress annually for budget allocation.98  
 
 
 

  95 This has been confirmed by LWUA and staff of local government units during the author’s interview of utility stakeholders. 
  96 Based on the information gathered by the author in her interviews of LWUA officials. 
  97 Retrieved from http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/33810/files/philippines-water-supply-sector- 
assessment.pdf 
  98See Dumol (2000). 
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4.3.1. Establishment of Private Water Utilities 
 
All private utility operators should secure the Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or 
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) from the NWRB before they can operate 
as a private water utility. The CPC is renewable every five years. As a national regulatory body 
for water resources and water services under the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources, the NWRB also regulates and fixes water rates charged by waterworks operators, 
except those within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Water and Sewerage System (MWSS) and 
LWUA. NWRB serves as an appellate body for tariff-related complaints of all utilities, including 
those of water districts, but not those under the MWSS. The agency’s operations are funded by 
the National Treasury through the General Appropriations Act which is annually approved by 
Congress.99 As a regular government agency, all collections are remitted to and retained by the 
National Treasury.   
 
4.3.2. Regulatory Methods and Approaches 
 
There are striking differences in the regulatory methods and approaches of NWRB and LWUA. 
Unlike LWUA, the economic regulatory function of NWRB is confined to fixing water rates. 
NWRB sets basic service standards, but it is the firm that decides on how to meet their service 
obligations. Both NWRB and LWUA, however, adopt a socialized pricing scheme. The NWRB 
follows a quantity block method which comprises two parts: the minimum charge and 
commodity charge. The minimum charge should be able to cover all the fixed costs required to 
carry on the vital water supply functions not directly related with production and distribution. 
The minimum charge (i.e., tariff imposed on basic/minimum water consumption level of ten cubic meters) 
should not exceed 5 percent of the family income of the low-income group in the municipality 
where the water utility operates. The commodity charge, which is the amount to be charged for 
consumption beyond minimum consumption, varies according to volume produced and 
consumer category.

Price Regulatory Method. The price regulatory method is a cost reimbursement scheme whereby 
the utility has to make a tariff proposal within a five-year time frame based on projected 

  99 See Asian Development Bank (2005) 
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consumption. Private utilities calculate the operating expenses during the next five years, and 
then compute for the average water tariff that will meet the annual revenue requirements within 
the five-year period. A water utility may request for a tariff adjustment even before the end of the 
five-year validity period should there be extraordinary events beyond the control of the operator 
that affect its operations (e.g., extraordinary increase or decrease in power cost for a given year, legislated 
wage increases, service area extension or force majeur). At the end of the five-year period, the actual 
average ROI attained over the five-year period will be compared against the approved ROI. Any 
excess or deficiency will be the basis for disallowance or upward adjustment for the succeeding 
tariff review/adjustment.  

Simple and Transparent Tariff Structure. The Board requires private utilities to adopt a simple, 
transparent and predicable tariff structure for easy monitoring. For instance, there may be only 
one category of consumers if consumption of other categories is not substantial. Consumers with 
a business permit but whose consumption approximate that of a residential consumersmay be 
classified as one. Akin to water districts, the tariffs of private utilities must be adequate to cover 
all financial obligations, excluding such items that distort the results of normal operations, such 
as non-recurring expenses (e.g., losses due to typhoon or fire), and reasonable surplus equivalent to 
12 percent of net book value of property in service entitled to return, including working capital 
for two months.  
 
Interestingly, NWRB imposes less stringent financial sustainability criteria. NWRB does not 
explicitly require private utilities to make sufficient allowances for debt payments and 
unanticipated losses, plausibly, because below-cost pricing is not an issue among private utilities. 
Compared to water districts, the public hearing for private utilities is administratively simple 
with less reportorial requirements. Private utilities are encouraged to conduct prior consultation 
with customer or customer representatives to agree on the levels of service commensurate with 
the proposed tariff, and to undertake optional preliminary review with the deputized economic 
agents before filing a tariff proposal with NWRB. The proposed water rates and scheduled 
hearing date is published in a newspaper of general circulation in the utility’s province at least 
15 days before the hearing date to give the public and concerned parties a chance to be heard.  

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Violations and Sanctions. Private utilities face sanctions when they are found to violate tariff-setting 
regulations. These sanctions include the possibility of not extending the CPC term of the utility.  
In applying for a renewal of its CPC, the performance of the utility during the last five years will 
be reviewed to ascertain whether the approved water rates and the promised levels of service 
and investments were attained as projected. If the levels of service and investments were not met, 
there would be a commensurate downward adjustment to the proposed tariff in the next CPC 
period. If there is gross violation of NWRB regulations, an administrator may also be assigned to 
manage the utility until compliance is attained with the expenses related to the assignment to be 
borne by the utility, which is similar to water districts except that the LWUA tends to place the 
ailing water district under its management indefinitely. The private operator may also be 
required to post a performance bond to be forfeited in case of breach of contract. 
 
4.3.3. Functioning of Private Utilities 
 
In a study of Management Models for Small Towns Water Supply, private utilities recorded the 
highest service coverage and their water rates were lower than those of water districts.100 Based 
on the author’s interviews with the managers of the privately-owned utilities, the municipal 
government has not interfered in the operation of the utilities, although there are sporadic 
requests by the local chief executive to accommodate extension of payment terms. Local 
government oversight is directed at ensuring that private utilities comply with health and safety 
regulations. As per my interviews with utility management and personnel, the strong de facto 
control rights of private utilities may have been occasioned by the following: (i) they have 
adequate financial resources to fully finance the establishment and expansion of water supply 
systems, including making side-payments to overcome bureaucratic hurdles at the local level, (ii) 
they operate in areas where water districts and LGU-run utilities have failed to provide water 
supply services due to financial constraints and operational inefficiencies, thus, placing them in 
a strong bargaining position to secure operational independence; and (iii) they are the ownership 
choice of municipal governments who are likely to be committed to giving them operational 
independence. The positive outcomes of water privatization in the Philippines may have also 
been afforded by high degree of socialization and politicization of water services as conveyed by 

  100 See World Bank (2003).
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high incidence of non-payment and delayed payment among water districts and LGU-run 
utilities even in areas where water rates are low and users have strong capacity to pay. The strong 
social and political bias towards below-cost pricing of water services may have provided the right 
mix of constraints and incentives for independent small private utilities to align their profit 
motive with consumer satisfaction.  
 
4.4. Public-Private Partnership 
  
Another form of privatization is the contract-based private sector participation or public-private 
partnership. As noted in Section 3, the Philippines has an advanced PPP framework designed to 
encourage the private sector to get involved in public infrastructure primarily through a less 
restrictive regulation similar to what is applied to the private water operators by the NWRB. 
Although the NWRB is the national government institution tasked to review water tariffs set by 
private service providers, most contractual arrangements already include tariff adjustment 
process (or rate rebasing process). The role of the NWRB is thus to monitor the tariff adjustment 
process and ensure that it is enforced in accordance with the contract, doing away with lengthy 
review and approval process. 
 
This contract-based arrangements allow the government to address the limited financing and lack 
of expertise in operating water supply systems. Under a concession arrangement, for instance, 
the private entity has an exclusive right to operate, construct or expand the water and sewerage 
network system without financial and technical support from the government. But projects which 
would have difficulty in sourcing funds may be financed partly from direct government 
appropriations and/or from Official Development Assistance (ODA) of foreign governments and 
institutions, not exceeding 50 percent of the project cost. The right to operate the water supply 
systems and bill water users have a corresponding obligation to fulfill service obligations 
stipulated in the contract, such as the reduction of non-revenue water by a certain percentage and 
level of investment over the life of the contract. 
 
The rights and obligations of the transacting parties stipulated in PPP contracts are implemented 
and accorded further governance by a regulatory agency and local and/or international 
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arbitration mechanisms as provided for in the agreement. The two large water concessions 
serving Metro Manila, Maynilad and Manila Water, are regulated by the Metropolitan 
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS). The two large water concessions have access to 
international arbitration. The LGU concessions/leases, on the other hand, are being monitored 
and regulated by the Technical Working Group of the Contract Administration Unit (TWG-CAU) 
of the Department of Interior and Local Government Unit (DILG-CAU). The local concessionaires 
have access to local arbitration. While the performance standards for the two large water 
concessionaires in Metro Manila are set by the contract, it is the CAU-TWG and LGU Council that 
jointly set the performance standards for local concessions.    
 
The allocation of control rights by the contract and its implementation by independent 
institutions are designed to properly delineate the roles of a regulator and a regulatee so that both 
parties can be made accountable to their respective actions and decisions chiefly based on the 
reasonable terms and conditions of the contract. This is to be contrasted with the hierarchical 
system of LGU-run utilities and water districts where the elected officials being the representative 
of the people hold levers of control, albeit they extensively share decision-making powers to 
satisfy multiple goals which makes accountability difficult to enforce. Under a contractual 
arrangement, the transacting parties bargain as equals to forge a mutually beneficial agreement 
largely based on efficiency considerations. But most local government units are not yet technically 
equipped to enter into a concession arrangement. A lighter forms of private sector participation 
are being explored by local government units, such as management contracts.  
 
As noted in Section 3, private sector participation remains limited in the water supply sector with 
most of the PPP schemes operating in a few major cities and towns. Most of these PSP schemes 
replaced public utilities (e.g., Bohol Water Utilities) and water districts (e.g., Subic Water) which 
were not able to meet the demands for high-quality service of a fast-expanding urban population. 
These PPP arrangements have shown to enhance service delivery without exorbitant price 
increases. Interestingly, the PPP arrangements vary in terms of financing structure with a few 
systems being fully financed by private capital while some are partly publicly financed. They also 
vary in terms of risk-sharing and frequency and parameters of price adjustments. A few utilities 
are able to obtain highly favorable contract terms, but the impact of these contract terms on the 
ϵϬͮW Ă Ő Ğ 



performance of these utilities has not yet been studied. For instance, a few PPP-based utilities 
anchor price adjustments on movements in consumer price index, automatically adjusting water 
rates every time the price of electricity increases by more than 5 percent.101 With the two large 
water concessionaires serving Metro Manila, water rates are adjusted for movements in consumer 
price index and foreign exchange rates and reset every five years to account for actual 
investments made and approved investment commitments. 
 
 
*RYHUQDQFHRID3RO\FHQWULF2ZQHUVKLS5HJLPH7RZDUGVWKH
(VWDEOLVKPHQWRID8QLILHG5HJXODWRU\)UDPHZRUN
 
This section explores the significance of a regulatory oversight as both an ex-ante and ex-post governance 
mechanism designed to guarantee the proper functioning of all ownership types chiefly by promoting 
efficient ownership choices and enhancing regulatory competition and compliance. 
 
As detailed in Section 4, the performance and behavior of private utilities are consistent with the 
intent of regulatory laws and policies, while those of water districts grossly transgress statutory 
objectives evincing better regulation of the former. The LWUA was formed to develop water 
utilities into self-sufficient enterprises so it may be able to provide affordable water services in a 
sustainable manner. Despite the relative ease of controlling state-owned water districts, the 
LWUA has failed to make proper balancing of the financial sustainability and affordability goals 
of water districts. Water districts tend to aggressively pursue financial sustainability and shun 
cost minimization thus undermining affordability and system expansion in low-income areas. 
Notwithstanding the superior performance of private utilities relative to water districts, there are 
institutional, political and market impediments to privatizing water utilities as detailed in 
Sections 2 and 4. These constraints on ownership choice could be addressed by establishing a 
two-tiered regulatory framework. Instead of an outright promotion of private sector 
participation, I argue for an incremental governance approach whereby a regulatory oversight is 
established within a two-tiered regulatory framework to adjudicate ownership and regulatory 

  101 See World Bank, (2015).
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conflicts with a view to promoting regulatory competition and compliance and inducing efficient 
ownership choices.  
 
5.1. Rationale of a Two-tiered Regulatory Structure 
 
As noted earlier, the regulatory framework being tabled herein is a two-tiered regulatory 
structure as opposed to a unitary one. As with most developing countries, the water supply 
systems in the Philippines face serious challenges and constraints (e.g., lack of funds, limited 
profitability, and weak enforcement capacities) which would require close supervision of the utilities 
with an artillery of technical, financial and managerial advisory support similar to the assistance 
programs of LWUA. Having been in close contact with the regulatees, the specialized regulatory 
agencies are privy to how the objectives and performance of managers are affected by 
government budgeting and bureaucratic management. Without proper regulatory oversight, 
however, the specialized regulatory agencies would not be compelled to properly leverage their 
knowledge and information to effectively regulate water utilities. A regulatory oversight could 
keep specialized regulatory agencies in check so the former may faithfully play a balancing role 
in promoting the interest of both the consumers and the utilities. By enhancing regulatory 
competition and accountability, said body could induce LWUA to properly exercise its lending 
and regulatory functions to turn water utilities into self-sustaining enterprises and reliable 
partners in the government’s efforts to widen access to affordable, reliable water supply services.  
 
To provide effective control and supervision of regulatory agencies, however, a regulatory 
oversight may need to be independent exemplifying that of an independent regulatory 
commission with well-defined adjudicatory and policy-making functions. The commissioners 
may be nominated by the Judicial Bar Council, appointed by the President and confirmed by 
Congress. The independence of the regulatory oversight from the President would be necessary 
to condition the regulatory oversight to steer clear of politics so it may aptly provide incentives 
for efficiency and investment and neutralize the political vulnerabilities of specialized regulators. 
To preserve the depoliticized arena of adjudication, a regulatory oversight may have to maintain 
a consultative relationship with the utilities mainly through the specialized regulators via the 
establishment of coordination mechanisms (e.g., creating platforms for structured, high-level 
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dialogues); it must also operate within clear statutory limits (i.e., clear delineation of functions) to 
preclude arbitrary exercise of adjudicatory powers as detailed in Section 5.2. A consultative 
relationship between the lead and specialized regulators within a clear framework of 
coordination and well-defined functions would help narrow the information asymmetry between 
central, sub-national governments, utilities, and consumers leading to informed, coherent, and 
cooperative regulatory decisions-making process.  
  
A two-tiered regulatory framework under the control and supervision of an independent 
regulatory oversight with well-defined quasi-judicial functions is consistent with the policy 
orientation of the Philippine government towards decentralization and de-bureaucratization to 
promote accountability. The poor functioning of the LWUA despite its developmental and 
regulatory functions under the control of the President and the unsuccessful attempts at housing 
regulatory powers in NWRB provide support for continued decentralization and 
debureaucratization of regulatory functions. It is a cardinal principle of the system of Philippine 
government that local affairs be managed by local political authorities, and general affairs  by the 
central authority; hence, the transfer of responsibility of providing water supply services to the 
local government.102 Likewise, the growing complexity of public transactions makes it necessary 
for the national legislature to entrust the “power of subordinate legislation” to independent 
regulatory institutions. For a valid exercise of the power of subordinate legislation, the functions 
of regulatory institutions must be clearly defined; their enabling law must map out the 
boundaries of the delegate’s authority, defining their mandate and setting the circumstances 
under which it is to pursued and enforced.  
 
5.2. Defining Governance Powers of Regulatory Oversight 
 
Given limited financial and technical resources, regulatory functions would have to be directed 
where it is most needed and creates the most impact. The regulatory oversight may need to tap 
existing resources and knowledge of the specialized regulatory agencies and coordinate with 
other specialized state bodies (e.g., Commission on Audit on certification of budgeting and financial 
reporting of the utilities and the regulatory agencies) to effectively perform its harmonizing and 

  102 See dela Cruz (2014). 
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checking functions. Looking into the patterns of the performance and behavior of the utilities in 
the Philippines, the greatest benefits in terms of enhancing regulatory effectiveness can be 
derived from efficient ownership choices via proper adjudication of ownership shifts and 
regulatory conflicts to promote regulatory competition and compliance. Being the dominant 
water service providers in urban areas and a favored institutional arrangement over LGU-run 
utilities, the creation and regulation of the operation of water districts is a consequential subject 
for inquiry on why access to affordable, reliable water supply remains limited. The governance 
powers of a regulatory oversight may have to be aimed at inducing efficient functioning of water 
districts by providing regulatory checks and balances in their establishment, management and 
regulation, exposing them to adequate competitive pressure, especially from private utilities 
through proper administration of licenses to operate (i.e., compliance with the conditions on entry of 
firms into the industry and performance-based renewal of licenses).  
 
The rule-making functions of a regulatory oversight would confined to setting guiding rules and 
principles governing ownership choices and design and enforcement of licenses and contracts, 
redefining performance standards, and establishing a system of penalties, including suspension 
and revocation of licenses via pro-active adjudicative process, investigation and fact-finding. In 
effect, a regulatory oversight sets the pace of privatization and overall ownership patterns. A 
regulatory oversight would hear and decide cases involving specific performance of statutory 
and contractual obligations subject to limited review by the Supreme Court (i.e., a clear showing of 
grave abuse of discretion). In particular, the functions of a regulatory oversight may be broadly 
categorized into (i) information-gathering and monitoring functions; and (ii) investigating and 
adjudicating regulatory conflicts (e.g., tariffs and quality of service) and ownership shifts.   
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Information-Gathering and Monitoring Function: A regulatory oversight can fill the wide gap in 
performance monitoring and information gathering under the current regulatory set-up. As 
noted earlier, many water districts do not submit the required annual reports to LWUA. With the 
fragmentation of regulatory structure, there is no consolidated report on the performance of the 
utilities (not even a precise count of the number of private utilities and LGU-run utilities), making 
it difficult to monitor utility performance and assess the relative performance of different 
ownership types and that of their respective regulators. Comparative competition requires 
comparative data. Water districts, however, hesitate to provide accurate data and information to 
the public due to distrust towards municipal governments on account of continued meddling by 
the latter in the operation of water districts. An independent regulatory body that actively 
investigates and adjudicates regulatory conflicts and ownership shifts (i.e., takeover of the facility 
by the government) could induce a truthful disclosure of information.  
 
Likewise, access to relevant data and information would facilitate proper monitoring of the 
issuance of licenses to operate. The proposed regulatory oversight may suspend or revoke 
licenses in consultation with the designated regulator based on the results of the evaluation of the 
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performance of water utilities based on the results of the evaluation of the performance of water 
utilities. This should help settle the issue on the exclusive franchise of water districts, which, 
despite being ruled by the SC as unconstitutional, has been used to limit the operation of private 
utilities even in areas that are no longer served by water districts. The operation of private 
utilities, however, may also need to be monitored as there is a significant number of private 
utilities that operate without authorization from the NWRB. 
 
Fact-finding and Adjudication: The proposed national regulator is envisioned to have the authority 
to arbitrate disputes over tariff setting and ownership shifts and address overlapping and unclear 
allocation of the roles and responsibilities of specialized regulators.At present, the NWRB 
handles tariff appeals cases of all utilities to be reviewed by Appellate Court. Under the proposed 
regulatory framework, the decisions of the regulatory body will be final and executory subject to 
limited review by the court upon a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion as noted earlier. 
The creation of a regulatory oversight may have to be aimed at addressing inefficient biases that 
arise from the cooperative relationship between the regulators and the utilities where regulatory 
conflicts are settled among themselves, sidestepping  the role of the court in ensuring that the 
dissolution of a water district is in the interest of the public.  With expensive loans of LWUA, 
water districts run to the local government units for financial assistance and, subsequently, they 
are taken over by the municipal government. A takeover by the municipal governments of water 
districts is not necessarily inefficient, especially if the water district operates in a low-income area. 
A gradual shift towards private sector participation, however, can be better facilitated if the 
utilities are already corporatized via the water district model. With their corporate structure and 
relatively weak ties with the local government, water districts are easier to regulate; they are more 
susceptible to enter into PPP arrangements.
 
With the power to investigate and adjudicate regulatory conflicts and ownership shifts, a 
regulatory oversight can assert its independence and exercise its regulatory powers over the 
utilities, particularly water districts by posing the threat of privatization to underperforming 
state-owned utilities. With the threat of privatization, underinvestment and inefficiencies arising 
from politically motivated re-municipalization, overstaffing of both LGU-run utilities and water 
districts, excessive staff compensation of water districts, and predatory financing policies of 
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LWUA could be minimized. Furthermore, well-performing LGU-run utilities and water districts 
makes public utilities, particularly water districts attractive to private investors, paving the way 
for the exploration of different PPP schemes. The establishment of proper regulatory framework 
likewise reduces regulatory risk in water service provision making service provision attractive 
even to small-time local investors.  
 
Other Institutional Reforms: To aid effective performance of regulatory oversight functions, 
however, the utilities may have to be structured to make regulation possible. The establishment 
of a policy governing body (PGB) to supervise the operation of LGU-run utilities, as proposed by 
the World Bank, is one institutional reform that may have to be in place, albeit without excessive 
pressure to achieve cost-recovery as it has shown to undermine equity goals in the absence of 
proper accountability mechanisms. The PGB may have to register the utility with the regulatory 
oversight. LWUA, on the other hand, may have to be divided into three separate departments: (i) 
technical and managerial advisory services; (ii) financing; and (iii) regulatory and coordination 
between technical, managerial and financing functions. The Administration may have to focus 
on providing technical and financial support for small local water supply systems, while 
encouraging large water districts to source financing from different financial institutions to 
gradually transform them into stock corporations.  
 
 
                             6. Concluding Remarks 
 
Effective regulation has shown to be more easily exercised among private utilities compared to 
state-owned utilities in a highly politicized water service provision in developing countries like 
the Philippines. Given market and institutional constraints on the choice of ownership, however, 
privatization cannot be readily and widely adopted. An incremental regulatory governance 
approach to increasing private sector participation via the establishment of a two-tiered 
regulatory framework seeks to avoid adverse outcomes of wrongfully choosing a feasible and 
favored ownership structure. The establishment of a regulatory oversight is primarily aimed at 
harmonizing regulatory policies and monitoring the performance of regulatory institutions to 
minimize regulatory failures and preclude inefficient biases towards and against any ownership 
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structure. As can be drawn from the Philippine experience, the establishment of a unified 
regulatory framework also has much to contribute in efficiently expanding private sector 
participation by promoting regulatory compliance and competition between ownership types 
and regulators.  
 
A unified regulatory framework where specialized regulatory agencies are subject to a common 
regulatory oversight can promote efficient functioning of all ownership types by ensuring that 
regulatory policies are effectively enforced and traditional regulatory methods and approaches 
are modified or supplanted if they prove to be susceptible to rent extraction or if they weaken 
efficiency and investment incentives. By addressing the inefficiencies of water districts and LGU-
run utilities through proper regulatory oversight, cities and municipalities can favorably position 
themselves to bargain for better contract terms with investors that are interested in financing 
water supply systems under different PPP schemes. A gradual shift in regulatory governance 
approach towards a unified regulatory system with the intent of dismantling inefficient barriers 
to private sector participation may also provide the NWRB enough time to enhance its capacity 
to regulate a growing number of private utilities.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Concession as a Privatization Scheme:  
A Partnership Approach to Contracting 
An Application to Water Service Delivery in the Philippines  
 
Abstract 
Long-term contracts are necessarily incomplete in that they cannot 
unambiguously specify the rights and obligations of the contracting parties 
and, thus, contractual outcomes are not entirely governed by the explicit 
contract but, crucially so, by ex-post bargaining. The ex-post bargaining 
process, however, can be costly to an extent that it may frustrate the investment 
and efficiency objectives of a concession-based privatization. Drawing on the 
legal doctrine of commercial impracticability, this article explores a 
partnership approach to designing and enforcing a concession contract to 
induce mutual cooperation and, consequently, make the shift from public 
management to sufficient private ownership significantly welfare-enhancing. 
The concession-based privatization of water service delivery in Metro Manila, 
Philippines is used as an illustrative case study. 
 
 
Keywords: concession; private sector participation, regulated industries, water utilities, 
contract, regulatory agency, bargaining cost, legal disputes 
JEL Classification: K23; K12; L24; L32; L51; L98 
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1. Introduction 
 
The chronically poor service delivery of state-owned utilities alongside the policy bias against 
privatization has spurred the exploration of contract-based public-private partnership (PPP) 
schemes. PPPs were widely promoted by international financial institutions back in the 1990s to 
turn around the poor performance of public utilities.103 Under said arrangements, the risks and 
responsibilities in the provision of a public service are allocated between the private and public 
sectors.104  Concession is the most advanced PPP scheme, involving the transfer of complex tasks, 
i.e., the financing of capital expenditures, to the private operator. Although the government still holds 
asset ownership, the transfer of all crucial decisions rights and the obligation to finance capital 
expenditures to the private operator affords the same sufficient ownership rights, thus, 
preserving the high-powered incentive structure of full privatization.105   The expected efficiency 
and investment gains from a concession arrangement, however, have not been fully realized on 
account of implementation challenges, chief of which relates to the renegotiation of contract. 
Renegotiation has occurred if a contract undergoes a significant modification or amendment not 
provided for in the contract in any of the following areas:  tariffs, investment plans and levels, 
exclusivity rights, guarantees, lump-sum payments or annual fees, coverage targets, service 
standards and concession periods.106  Standard scheduled tariff adjustments and periodic tariff 
reviews are not considered a renegotiation. The renegotiation of agreements often leads to 
downscaling of performance targets and even breakdowns and early termination of contracts.107  
In Latin America where a concession arrangement was widely adopted. About 76 percent of 
water concession contracts were renegotiated compared to electricity, 10 percent; telecom, 

  103 See Marin (2009). 
  104 See Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, Retrieved from 
https://ppiaf.org/sites/ppiaf.org/files/documents/toolkits/highwaystoolkit/6/pdf-version/1-13.pdf 
  105 Based on 1984-2010 World Bank data, there is a total of 278 concessions projects worth USD23 billion in investments, more than a 
third of total PSP investment commitments. Latin America and East Asia and the Pacific, which represent 80 percent of all PPP 
projects. In Latin America, about 60 percent of the PPP projects in the region are concessions compared to 34 percent in East Asia and 
16 percent in Europe and Central Asia (Moszoro, 2014). 
  106 See Guasch, et al. (2004). 
ϭϬϳTo cite a few cases, the request of water consortium in Buenos Aires for an “extra-ordinary” review of tariffs due to unexpected 
operational losses led to a reduction of promised investment by almost 50 percent. The same happened in Kwadukuza, a municipality 
in Dolphin Coast, South Africa, where the concessionaire asked for a renegotiation of the concession agreement two years after it was 
awarded, as the expected development of middle-income and mass housing project did not materialize resulting in lower-than-
projected water demand. The renegotiation accommodated a price increase and a substantial reduction in investment targets (See 
Hall and Lobina, 2006).  
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virtually nil, and transportation, 55 percent.108  The water concession contracts were renegotiated 
after only two years into the agreement, which was half that in the transport sector. With limited 
competition in water service provision, the control rights holder could readily exploit his 
informational and bargaining advantage to capture practically all gains from the exchange during 
the renegotiation in consumers’ disfavor.  
 
The high incidence of contract renegotiation has led critics of privatization to declare concession 
as an impractical model for developing countries; it has likewise incited a shift in policy 
preference towards light forms of PPP schemes and even a shift back to public management. 
Renegotiation, however, does not decidedly invalidate the merits of a concession arrangement as 
shown by empirical evidence. Most empirical studies have shown either no significant difference 
in the performance of private utilities and publicly-run utilities or better performance of private 
utilities.109 Although most studies have found that prices tend to increase after a concession-based 
privatization, Gassner, Popov and Pushak (2009), one of the most comprehensive empirical 
studies on the impact of privatization on water utility performance, have found no systematic 
change in the water rates after privatization.110 Looking through the prism of transaction cost 
economics, the high incidence of renegotiation of water concession contracts only expresses the 
peculiarities of water service provision which can be remedied via an assiduous design and 
enforcement of contracts. In the schema of Williamson, a sizable sunk investment in water 
services provision makes long-term contracting efficient, but not without the hazards. Long-term 
contracting is susceptible to negotiation ex-post; contract enforcement thus needs to be accorded 
proper governance to discourage opportunistic and strategic contracting behavior.  
 

ϭϬϴSee Hall and Lobina (2006).
  109 By geographic area, the benefits of privatization appear to be relatively pronounced in Latin America where ambitious 
privatization programs were launched in the 1990s. Benitez et al. (2001) found that all segments of the population in Argentina 
benefited from improved coverage and quality of water service. Likewise, McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003) argued that evidence of 
price increases was lacking in Latin America while job losses are minimal. A much less favorable finding for privatization was 
presented by Bitrán and Valenzuela (2003). Looking into the experience of Chile, the said authors found a higher increase in rates and 
unaccounted-for water among private utilities compared to the public water utilities, but private utilities have shown to invest more 
and register higher labor productivity. Le Lannier and Porcher (2011) found that private management, on average, is less efficient 
than public management. 
ϭϭϬThe magnitude of tariff increases depends on the extent of subsidization, that is, tariff increases can be substantial even with 
significant efficiency gains if the services were heavily subsidized under public management.  Guasch et al. (2006) made similar claim 
attributing the increase in tariffs following the implementation of privatization projects to below-cost pricing under public 
management. Carpentier et al. (2006), on the other hand, found that private management tends to lead to higher prices due to complex 
water operations. Notwithstanding, Gassner, Popov and Pushak (2009) found that the improvement in the level of service appears to 
be disproportionately smaller to the efficiency gains suggesting that the private operators may have reaped all the gains through 
profits consequent on the relatively nascent regulatory system in developing countries. 
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Where the quality of regulatory institutions is high and the operating environment is unstable, 
there appears to be a strong preference towards simple and flexible contracts accommodating of 
ex-post negotiation.111 In most developing economies, however, regulatory institutions are weak 
while the operating environment is highly unstable. The impact of economic and political shocks 
on interrelated dimensions of water supply services could be prohibitively difficult to 
(unambiguously) describe and accorded proper treatment in the contract ex-ante, especially so in 
a context of severe informational deficiencies (e.g., informational deficiencies arising from absence of 
updated maps detailing network routes and an inventory of all types of equipment). The contract is thus 
left incomplete and open to ex-post bargaining, making ex-post governance mechanisms and 
enforcement strategies of paramount importance.  
 
To promote welfare-preserving ex-post bargaining, I propound a partnership contracting 
anchored on ascertaining the suitable choice of ownership and an optimal mix of relational and 
transactional norms in the design and enforcement of key ex-ante and ex-post incentive devices 
in the contract. The law and economics scholarship has shown that over-reliance on ex-ante 
incentive devices (i.e., contract design relating to ex-ante risk allocation) where there is severe 
information deficit may lead to ruinous bargaining, pointing to the importance of ex-post 
government devices (i.e., regulatory and arbitral institutions). Within the framework of a 
partnership contracting, I explore the interplay of ex-ante and ex-post incentive devices to induce 
parties to engage in cooperative bargaining. The rudiments of a partnership contracting chiefly 
draw inspiration from incomplete contracting literature (e.g., Gross and Hart, 1986; Hart and 
Moore, 1990; Hart and Shleifer, 1997; and Hart, 2003), transaction cost economics and law and 
economics scholarship. Through the lens of transaction cost economics, transaction is more 
suitably internalized if it requires sizable investment in highly uncertain environments, while 
small or moderate transaction-specific investments in moderately uncertain settings is better 
governed through contracts. Administrative contracts, however, are in a class of their own. With 
its coercive powers and multiple goals, contracting with the state engenders problems different 
from those in private contracting.  
 

  111 See Stern (2012). 
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There is a paucity of literature examining the impact of ownership on the bargaining process and 
outcomes in public contracting.112 The article is most similar in intent and approach to Besly and 
Ghatak (2001) and Schmitz (2015) who also analyze the relevance of ownership in an incomplete 
contract setting from a bargaining perspective. Analysing whether the government or an NGO 
should own the physical assets used in the provision of a public good, Besley and Ghatak (2001) 
show that ownership should be assigned to the party who values the public good most, 
irrespective of the investment technology. Schmitz (2015), on the other hand posits that 
ownership of the public good may reside with the party that has the technological advantage, 
even if the other party has a larger valuation of the public good on the ground that assigning 
ownership to the party that has a technological advantage would result in enhanced investment 
incentives, greater trade gains, and reduced bargaining costs.  
 
The thrust of the article is two-fold. Firstly, the article presents a dynamic bargaining approach 
in exploring long-term advantages and drawbacks of private ownership vis-à-vis public 
management. Until recent years, a bargaining account of privatization as a contractual 
arrangement remains at the fringes of regulatory law and economics. It was not long ago when 
economists began to acknowledge the significance of coordinating economic activities through 
bargaining.113 Contracting has been typically limited to discrete bargains between the firm and 
governmental bodies, neglecting the dynamic, relational governance of long-term contracting. 
Likewise, renegotiation as a contractual hazard is often discussed in disjunction of the structural 
bargaining deficiencies of public management arising from internalization of the bargaining 
game. Analyzing the incomplete contract setting of water service provision in developing 
countries, the article brings sharply into focus how the ownership structure affects bargaining 
dynamics and, consequently, influences incentives for investment, efficiency and cooperation. 
The article presents a complementary rather than a nullifying relationship between the incentive 
motive, on which the expected benefits of sufficient private ownership are anchored, and the 
transaction cost motive, which highlights the enforcement cost of contracting.  
 

  112 See Brousseau and Saussier (2009). 
  113 See Rossi (2001). 
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 A central proposition of the article is that the incentive [alignment] motive, which crucially 
involves a transfer of risk to a private entity to incentivize investment and efficiency, is wedded 
to the transaction cost-minimizing motive of entering into a contractual arrangement.114 The two 
motives can be dissociated in an incomplete contract setting with the ex-ante incentive properties 
enfeebled by enforcement problems, such as opportunistic renegotiation by either party. The 
problem of double-sided opportunism, however, can be maneuvered to create incentives for 
mutual cooperation. Relational partnership contracting has been explored to promote 
cooperative bargaining in French administrative contracts. Anticipating the ex-post lock-in and 
its overall bargaining disadvantage, the government is induced to develop a relational 
partnership to align the interest of the private concessionaire with that of the public. With the risk 
of retaliation, the best strategy of the private operator is to maximize long-term rent by revealing 
himself as a reliable partner to the government, i.e., split potential efficiency gains between the 
company owners and customers; otherwise, the private operator faces a high risk of retaliation by the 
government. In this article, I set out to reason along the same line but with significant deviations 
on account of the specificities in the contractual setting.  
 
Secondly, a partnership contracting as an approach to designing and enforcing a concession 
contract provides a developing country perspective on the legal doctrine of impracticability, 
which remains one of the vaguest concepts of law and legal practice. Said legal doctrine has been 
explored to safeguard incomplete contracts against costly, opportunistic ex-post negotiation. 
Economists and sociologists, however, differ in their approach to governing incomplete contracts 
with the former stressing the need to preserve the integrity of contracts and the importance of 
achieving an efficient level of contractual completeness based on the legal doctrine of 
impracticability, while the latter deem adversarial legal undertakings and procedures as 
antithetical to relational contracting, i.e., legal undertakings forestall the development of cooperative 
behavior. The legal doctrine of commercial impracticability bears a relational orientation in 
enforcing contracts; but there is a wide disagreement among law and economics scholars over 
the conditions under which contracts may assume a relational slant.115 Traditionally, economists 
accorded limited role for excuse doctrines to preserve the efficiency incentives embodied in ex-

  114 See Cheung (1969) and Masten (1999) for the transaction cost of contracting. 
ϭϭϱInconsistent application of said legal doctrines created confusion over the proper conditions for adjusting the obligations of the 
parties to long-term contracts. The courts have generally resolved any ambiguities inherent in the doctrines by construing them 
narrowly against the party that has attempted to use them, albeit there remains significant inconsistencies in the case law.
ϭϬϰͮW Ă Ő Ğ 



ante contractual risk allocation and to insulate the transaction from various forms of 
opportunism. Renegotiation is thus confined within the realm of strict impossibility or those 
which involve contingencies with “severe hardship” or “catastrophic consequences”. There are, 
however, a growing number of law and economics scholars (e.g., Kovac, 2011; Smythe, 2003; 
Gergen, 1995; Sykes, 199l; Scott, 1987; and Fried, 1981), who have propounded an expansive 
interpretation of the excuse doctrines, particularly in long-term administrative contracts. In this 
study, I attempt to balance the role of contracts as rigid control and sanctioning tools and as an 
ongoing basis for working out solutions to problems or mistakes and continued collaboration 
akin to Collins (1999).   
  
As an illustrative case study, I examine the concession-based water privatization experience of 
Metro Manila, Philippines for its varied phases of contract enforcement and interesting 
bargaining features. The concession contract was one of the largest water concessions in the world 
in terms of investment commitments. Like many developing economies, the concession-based 
privatization of water service delivery in Metro Manila went through a series of renegotiation 
which also resulted in the downscaling of the performance targets and unabated tariff increases. 
In fact, the system was briefly renationalized after one of the concessionaires filed for bankruptcy 
and was subsequently rehabilitated using public money. Over time, however, the performance 
of water concessionaires has improved, albeit legal and regulatory disputes have persisted.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 is divided into three parts. The first 
part delves into the differences in the bargaining dynamics of public management and concession 
and their impact on the incentive for efficiency, investment and cooperation. The second part 
presents the rationale and fundamentals of a partnership approach to designing and enforcing a 
concession contract. The third part further explores the design and enforcement of the concession 
focusing on key ex-ante incentive devices (i.e., risk allocation based on the choice of price regulatory 
method and equity structure) and ex-post governance mechanisms (i.e., establishment of a regulatory 
agency and access to international arbitration) within the framework of a partnership contracting. 
Section 2 presents the concession-based privatization experience of the Philippines as an 
illustrative case study. Section 3 concludes with policy recommendations to maximize gains from 
a concession arrangement.  
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2. Concession as an Ownership Choice and the Role of a Partnership 
Contracting: A Conceptual Framework 
 
Public-private partnership (PPP) is attractive to governments that seek solutions to poor public 
service delivery and for investors as an asset class.116 PPP can be tailored to specific needs and 
competencies of the public sector and the private partner through various ex-ante and ex-post 
contractual techniques and devices.117 As noted earlier, concession, a salient mode of PPP, is a 
long-term contractual arrangement designed to overcome political and legal hurdles to outright 
privatization. A concession does not involve full divestiture of public assets to the concession 
holder, but it transfers virtually all decision rights, including the right to maintain, refurbish and 
expand distribution networks to the private partner using the latter’s own financial and technical 
resources. As a result, a concession holder acquires sufficient private ownership which affords 
him bargaining and information advantage to bar inefficient political interference and set tariffs 
and service level principally based on efficiency considerations subject to the terms and 
conditions of the contract. The allocation of control rights embodied in a concession arrangement 
thus preserves the incentive for efficiency and investment of outright privatization with 
additional governance by regulatory contract and ex-post enforcement devices.  
 
But while PPP may strengthen the incentives for investment and efficiency, the long-term 
arrangement is exposed to serious contractual hazards.118 With partially aligned goals of the 
transactors, the concession arrangement can be costly to enforce in sectors that have hard-to-
contract-for quality dimensions and where there is severe information deficit.119 I argue that the 
gains from the exchange, however, would not be fully extinguished when concession is adopted 
in a setting where a concession satisfies the private ownership suitability conditions discussed in 
Section 2.1.   
 

  116See Esty and Sesia (2010) for different financing schemes under public-private partnership.  
  117See McQuaid (2000) and Siemiatycki (2010) for the key features of PPP arrangements.    
  118See Reeves (2013) and Andres, et al. (2007) for the contractual hazards of PPP.   
  119See Hart (2003) for an illustration on how PPP can be designed to mitigate contractual hazards relating to hard-to-contract-for 
quality dimensions of a resource.
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2.1. Concession as an Incentive-Compatible Ownership Choice: PPP represents the 
intermediate cases of a broad spectrum of ownership structure with private ownership and state 
ownership at the opposite ends of the spectrum. There are two basic forms of public ownership: 
municipal department and public corporation. Municipal department or administrative agency 
virtually assigns all property rights to the local government whereas public corporations shifts 
the internal management and operational rights from the political authorities to a corporate entity 
which is often subject to the supervision of external stakeholders. 120  PPP can be broadly 
categorized into: (i) service contract; (ii) management contract; (iii) lease contract; and (iv.) 
concession contract. These PPP schemes differ in the allocation of control rights over the 
financing, management and operation (and, consequently, pricing of water services) of water 
supply systems which is tied to their obligations to finance and deliver specific outcomes. 
 
The first three contractual arrangements are much less complex than concession as they involve 
less complex tasks which can be unambiguously described in the contract and, thus, under-
performance with respect to contractual obligations can be evaluated and verified with minimal 
contract monitoring and enforcement costs. The first two PPP arrangements are considered 
“light” forms of PPP which are usually pursued as cost-cutting measures by local or state 
governments.121 They are also adopted to test the viability of “deeper” forms of privatization such 
as concession. These limited forms of private sector participation are often adopted in civil law 
countries where there are various legal requirements governing contractual rights and 
obligations of parties. Lease and concession are prominent in common law countries where 
parties are relatively free to decide on the form of PPP contracts.122 
 
Service contract: A service contract involves the outsourcing by the government of less complex 
tasks to a private firm (e.g., fixing leaks, collecting bills). The contract is therefore adequate to govern 
the behavior of the private operator, allowing the realization of contractual objectives with 
minimal contract monitoring and enforcement costs. 
Management contract: A management contract is a comprehensive form of contracting out 
involving the assignment of decision rights on the daily operations of the water utility to the 

  120 See Menard and Saleth (2011). 
121 See Davis (2005). 
  122 See Delmon (2014). 
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private operator.123 The operator provides a bundled service without an obligation to make any 
investment unless the contract lasts for a long time.124As the private operator does not make 
sizeable investment and thus bears no substantial risks, the renegotiation cost is minimized, albeit 
the incentive for efficiency is dulled. The private operator is paid a fixed fee for his services, 
although some management contracts have performance-based reward. Depending on the 
complexity of water sector operations, management contracts may require strong monitoring 
capacities to ensure that all aspects of performance obligations in the contract are satisfied. 
Lease contracts: Lease contracts assign the rights and obligations to manage, operate and finance 
the maintenance and rehabilitation of the water supply systems to a private operator. 
Remuneration is tied to the profits of the company over a contract period of ten to twelve years. 
The transfer of such decision rights increases the costs of bargaining over performance outcomes. 
But since the government still maintains the decision rights over major investments, access to 
crucial information on investment, which largely influences pricing, is expected to lower the 
transaction costs of monitoring and regulating water utilities.  
Concession: Under a concession arrangement, the concession holder assumes the right and 
obligation to manage, operate and finance water supply systems in accordance with the terms 
and conditions of the contract. The concession holder possesses the control rights over how to 
produce the service and may unilaterally adopt any cost-saving innovation and collect user fees 
provided he meets performance targets and standards specified in the contract. 125 As in a lease 
agreement, the government still holds ownership of the asset but the facilities, properties and 
inventories, including all records and transactions are turned over to the concessionaire.The 
contract period typically lasts for at least 25 years to allow the concessionaires to recover its 
investment through the collection of tariff revenues from the water users over the life of the 
contract.126 At the end of the contract period, control over the utility's assets reverts to the public 
sector. Since asset ownership remains in the public hands and the transaction generates 
externalities (e.g., water distribution and consumption generates health and environmental 
externalities), the government sets performance targets and standards on asset maintenance, 

  123 See Davis (2005). 
  124 See Menard and Saleth (2011). 
  125 See Menard and Saleth (2011). 
  126 Japan PFI Association (2003). 
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rehabilitation and expansion to ensure that the private operator transfers the infrastructure to the 
state in better condition.127 
 
As noted earlier, the high likelihood of costly bargaining in concession contracts drives preference 
towards “light” forms of PPP (e.g., service contract; management contract; lease contract). Akin to 
public management, “light” forms of PPP engenders a low-powered incentive structure that 
limits exploitation of agency benefits (i.e., capital and technical resources of the private operator). When 
measured against bargaining cost, I argue that the agency benefits from a concession arrangement 
may still generate greater welfare gains (i.e. gains from increased investment and efficiency) compared 
to public management, especially in a large, complex water supply system in urban areas in 
developing countries where there are high investment and efficiency requirements; water users 
have high ability to pay; and there is excessive political interference. These private ownership 
suitability conditions fit the high-powered incentive structure embodied in a concession 
arrangement. The substantial agency benefits derived from exploiting the financial and technical 
resource advantage of the private operator to meet sizable investment and efficiency 
requirements justify the accommodation of profit motive; it makes profit a significant welfare 
component. The assignment of control rights to the private operator likewise limits both private 
opportunism and public opportunism through the use of various incentive devices and public 
accountability mechanisms, which cannot be credibly enforced under public ownership on 
account of the internalization of the bargaining game.  
 
In a setting where concession is deemed an incentive-compatible choice as described above, a 
concession arrangement strengthens incentives for efficiency and investment and minimizes 
bargaining cost as it: (i) limits public opportunism; (ii) enhances accountability; and (iii) serves as a 
credible commitment device.  
 
Concession limits public opportunism. Managing complex water supply systems in urban areas (e.g., 
severe water resource constraint brought by fast-growing urban population) requires huge sunk 
investment and a high level of technical competence and efficiency. A significant investment and 
effort level demands an equally substantial rent which may not be accorded adequate protection 

  127 See Davis (2005). 
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and incentive under public ownership as losses and benefits are extensively and inefficiently 
shared via the political bargaining process. Political bargaining process is driven by political 
expediencies of vote maximization characterized by accommodation of varied goals and interests 
and blurry ties to performance.128 Such is perilous in a setting that demands a high level of 
efficiency and investment. To shield the transaction from an inefficiently redistributive political 
bargaining, a concession arrangement shifts the control rights to the private operator by assigning 
to the latter hard-to-contract-for investment obligations and management and operational rights. 
With the possession of control rights, the private operator acquires informational and bargaining 
advantage to protect his rightful share of efficiency and investment gains thereby strengthening 
efficiency and investment incentives.    
 
Concession promotes accountability. The allocation of virtually all control rights to the private 
operator does not only increase the bargaining and information advantage of private operator 
and affords him increased protection against public opportunism, it also promotes accountability 
among public agents and private agents. In a concession arrangement, the government bargains 
with the private operator on an equal footing; the former waives its sovereign immunity and 
agrees to be bound by the terms and conditions of the contract with the intent of strengthening 
efficiency and investment incentives. A concession arrangement, in effect, externalizes the 
bargaining game, allowing private agents and public agents to actively negotiate for their fair 
share of the trade gains under the governance of the contract and regulatory and arbitral 
institutions, which are all designed to safeguard the incentives for investment and efficiency.  
 
Establishing clear lines of accountability and enforcing compliance is made easier by the transfer 
of crucial control rights to a private entity. The assignment of control rights to the private 
operator/owner and his acquisition of informational and bargaining advantage facilitates an 
effective delineation of roles as clients, service providers, and regulator who have their respective 
rights and obligations for which they are held accountable. Incentive devices and public 
accountability mechanisms are weakly enforced under public ownership on account of the 
internalization of the bargaining game; public agents, having no investment obligations, are 
constrained by hierarchical structure and administrative controls and conditioned to 

 128 See Rainey and Bozeman (2002).  
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accommodate varied interests as political expediency dictates. The extensive sharing of decision-
making powers also results in the blurring of roles and functions, making it difficult to hold 
public agents accountable for both their positive and negative actions. Weak accountability and 
the resulting low-powered incentive structure can be costly in a dynamic environment where 
there is a strong demand for efficiency. Such environment requires a high-powered contractual 
arrangement whereby indispensable partners freely engage in constructive negotiation.  
 
The demand for efficiency and flexibility cannot be properly accommodated under public 
ownership where public agents operate within a hierarchical structure bound by rigid rules and 
probity constraints. With increased exigency of bargaining in complex environments, however, 
bargaining between public agents may take place, albeit subdued and less transparent and, hence, 
susceptible to intractable irregularities and defects. In contrast to bargaining under private 
ownership, the outcomes would not be dictated solely by efficiency considerations reflective of 
the vote-maximizing political motives of the political authorities who hold the residual control 
rights under public ownership. Where efficiency and investment requirements are high; 
ownership may have to be assigned to the party who values efficiency and investment more and 
has greater capacity and incentive to supply the same.129 While political authorities may attach a 
high value to investment and efficiency as they enhance service delivery, their valuation cannot 
be higher than that of the private operator by reason of the fact that investment and efficiency 
determine the latter’s very survival and define his purpose. Even if political authorities value 
efficiency and investment, they cannot credibly commit to these goals under public ownership 
where the bargaining process is driven by political expediencies and is thus bound to be highly 
redistributive as noted earlier.  
 
The argument in favor of private ownership is further strengthened when the public sector has 
financial and technical resource disadvantage and there is high efficiency and investment 
requirement.130 Assigning the control rights to the private party that has the resource advantage 
affords the provision of the public good valued by the government at least production and 
bargaining cost (i.e., reduced relevance of ex-post governance mechanisms). The de jure transfer of 

  129 See Grossman and Hart (1986); Besley and Ghatak (2001); and Schmitz (2015)  
  130 See Schmitz (2015) for the role of the parties’ valuation of the good and the investment technology in determining optimal 
ownership structure. 
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control rights to the key contributor of the trade gains minimizes the bargaining cost (i.e., the 
private operator does not have to engage in costly bargaining as he has the bargaining and informational 
advantage to capture his rightful share of the trade gains) and, consequently, investment and efficiency 
incentives are strengthened and bargaining cost is minimized. 
 
Concession as a credible commitment device.  The substantial agency gains from an incentive-
compatible choice constitute an incentive for parties to engage in cooperative bargaining or 
adaptation. The enormous trade gains from shifting to a concession arrangement heightens the 
degree of political commitment to depoliticize the utility and effect genuine privatization. 
Inefficient political interference resulting in poor service delivery would be politically costly in 
an environment where well-moneyed water users demand high service quality. In the parlance 
of Coase, privatization serves as a credible commitment device to properly enforce the contract 
and disengage in opportunistic bargaining when the political marginal cost of inefficiencies 
under public management already exceeds the political marginal cost of delegating water service 
provision to a private entity.  The consequent reduction in the political incentive to interfere in 
the operation of the utility facilitates a de jure and a de facto shift in control rights to a private 
entity. Until the marginal cost of inefficiencies under public management equalizes with the 
marginal cost of a concession arrangement, privatization may continue to be subject to political 
interference, distorting performance incentives. This partly explains why large cities are found to 
make the greatest use of privatization and least likely to provide in-house services.131 Both in the 
United Kingdom and in France, privatization of water utilities occurred when local authorities 
were lacking the technical and financial resources to make new investment required by European 
quality standards.132  
 
2.2. Promoting Value-Preserving Bargaining via Partnership Contracting. As discussed in 
Section 2.1, a concession arrangement in its proper incentive structure is supportive of value-
creating bargaining dynamics. A large pie to be shared affords various allocations of rent that 
would be acceptable to both parties thereby upping the threshold for triggering suspicion of 
private and public opportunism. The parties would tend to be more open to fair and reasonable 
interpretation of the terms of the contract and treats ex-post bargaining as a means to effect 

  131 See Levin and Tadelis (2007) for contractual hazards and safeguards in contracting. 
  132 See Cavaliere et al. (2015) for a normative analysis of local public water utilities.   
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efficient contract adaptation rather than an opportunity by one party to unjustly redistribute 
gains away from the other.  
 
To further promote a value-enhancing ex-post bargaining, I propound a partnership approach to 
designing and enforcing a long-term concession contract whereby contracting parties are induced 
to treat each other as partners on account of their equally large contribution and risks to the 
realization of superior gains from the exchange. To induce the parties to treat each other as 
partners, the same are made to internalize the long-term cost of opportunistic behavior and long-
term benefits of mutual cooperation via a government-led cooperative behavior underpinned by 
(i) ex-ante assignment of risk to the superior risk bearer133; and (ii) a bias towards contract adjustment and 
against termination within the confines of the legal doctrine of commercial impracticability. While 
partnership contracting allows ex-post renegotiation, bargaining would have to occur within the 
metes and bounds of the legal doctrine of commercial impracticability to forestall regulatory 
capture and preserve the incentives for investment, efficiency and cooperation.  
 
2.2.1. Ex-ante Optimal Risk Assignment, Contract Adjustment and Termination: A partnership 
contracting assigns all risks134  to the private operator who is in the best position to evaluate and 
manage risks through risk diversification and mitigating opportunities at the least cost on account 
of his control rights and technical and financial resource advantage. The private operator, 
however, has conditional access to risk-sharing and termination based on the legal doctrine of 
commercial impracticability and frustration of purpose.135 Investment risks are assigned to the 
private operator, while allowing automatic price adjustments to account for variable economic 

  133 See Scott (987) and Smythe (2003) for governance of relational contracts. 
  134 Defined as the probability of a particular event happening multiplied by its corresponding impact level, risks are classified into 
different types. For instance, Grimsey and Lewis (2002, 2004) allude to at least nine risks for infrastructure projects: technical, 
construction, operating, revenue, financial, force majeure, regulatory/political, environmental and project default risks. In their 
taxonomy, risks are categorized into global and elemental with the former covering risks associated with the project agreement, 
including political, legal, commercial and environmental risks and the latter with project per se, encompassing the construction, 
operation, finance and revenue generation risks. Within the framework of a partnership contracting which anchored of superior risk 
bearer principle, the political risks are assumed by the government, commercial risks are assigned to the private operator and 
environmental risks are shared subject to conditional risk-sharing. See Marques and Berg (2010) for a discussion on different types of 
risks. 
  135 The notion is derived from the legal doctrine of impossibility in the English common law where non-performance of a contractual 
obligation is excused due to the emergence of an unanticipated supervening event which is beyond the control of either party and not 
expressly accounted for in the contract. The emergence of an unanticipated event radically changes the circumstances in which 
performance is called to be rendered. For analytical purposes, the doctrine of commercial impracticability refers to the impossibility 
to perform without frustrating the commercial purpose of the contract and thus discharge is claimed by the supplier while for the 
frustration of purpose it is the recipient who claims to be discharged as performance of the supplier renders it useless to the recipient 
as result of a radical change in circumstances. See Kovac (2011) for a detailed discussion of the different interpretations of the legal 
doctrine of impossibility.  
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risks (e.g., inflation rate and exchange rate risks) and emergence of unbargained-for circumstances. 
The absence of automatic price adjustment mechanism for volatile macroeconomic variables 
could lead to high risk premium and costly bargaining, while an unstable market environment 
precipitates numerous irregular events that would be efficiently dealt with ex-post. Owing to 
their relatively low probability of occurrence and adverse impacts on the contractual balance, 
irregular events are unbargained for; they are accorded proper treatment when it happens. The 
non-occurrence of these unbargained-for irregular events constitutes the basis of the initial terms 
of the agreement such that when it occurs the contract would have to be adjusted in order to 
approximate the expected level and distribution of gains and, consequently, preserve the 
incentive for efficiency, investment and cooperation. 
 
Accordingly, a partnership contracting allows contract adjustment in the emergence of 
unbargained-for circumstances and permits termination if efficiency and investment objectives 
of a concession contract are frustrated on account of an enduring shift in market and political 
environment (e.g., substantial reduction in the level of investment and operational efficiency requirement) 
which would render a concession arrangement an incompatible contractual choice. With the 
occurrence of an unbargained-for event sans a clear showing that investment and efficiency 
objectives have been frustrated, the parties may temporarily share the risks or explore various 
adjustment mechanisms, such as modifications in the price regulatory method or a slight 
alteration in the equity structure as discussed in Section 2.3. In effect, a partnership contracting 
exhibits a strong bias towards adjustment rather than discharge by requiring a fundamental 
breach of the contract (i.e., frustration of investment and efficiency goals of concession) to trigger 
termination. This is akin to the stance of French administrative jurisprudence which is anchored 
on the critical role of private water companies in enhancing service delivery during the time when 
municipalities could not finance investments needed for universal access to water.136  
 
For developing countries, I argue that there are more compelling reasons to be biased towards 
contract adjustment and against discharge: (i) while a concession-based privatization scheme is 
explored as a crucial reform strategy to enhance service delivery, there is a traditional bias towards public 
ownership and against profit-seeking private corporations; and (ii) there are significant but manageable 

  136 See Blanc and Botton (2010). 
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informational restraints due to unstable market environment and limited regulatory experience resulting 
in poor estimates of variables used in setting performance obligations (e.g., future consumption patterns, 
exchange rates, inflation and other macro-economic variables) and limited credibility in enforcing a 
contract, which, in turn, spawns acrimonious bargaining. The gains from a concession arrangement 
are thus high and so is the temptation to terminate it. That being the case, terminating the contract 
would therefore mean forgoing a crucial governance mechanism and incurring substantial 
welfare losses (i.e., reinforcing the threat of public opportunism resulting in increased risk premium).  
 
Where concession is an incentive-compatible choice, the bargaining cost is set to diminish over 
time as incentives for  mutual cooperation is established. A bias towards contract adjustment thus 
seeks to compel the parties to mutually cooperate (i.e., private partner invests and operate efficiently 
and the government accords the former a reasonable rent)  and realize the superior long-term benefits 
of a concession arrangement by inducing them to internalize the long-term cost of non-
cooperative behavior (i.e., allowing retaliation as additional information becomes available to allow 
proper assessment of performance). By compelling the parties to stick to the contractual relationship 
sans any irrevocable fundamental shift in market environment and substantial breach of the 
contract, a partnership contracting seeks to minimize transaction cost associated with having to 
find new partners with no guaranteed change in the contracting behavior as institutional 
incentives for mutual cooperation have yet to be established.   
 
Under partnership contracting, either party may seek contract adaptation and termination before 
the arbitration tribunal. The arbitration court may decide to terminate the contract if there is a 
clear showing that the private operator frustrates the efficiency and investment objectives of a 
concession arrangement without any fault on the part of the government (e.g., indirect 
expropriation by disallowing appropriate price adjustments). When the frustration of investment and 
efficiency objectives is imputable to both parties, a partnership contracting endorses a 
continuation of the agreement unless the concession ceases to be an incentive-compatible choice. 
Without any enduring shift in market environment, a partnership contracting allows termination 
only after a reasonable period when investment is largely recouped in order to facilitate proper 
ascertainment of whether the private operator makes a fundamental breach of his obligations 
without any fault of the government based on efficiency and investment tests as detailed below. 
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2.2.2. Government-led Conditional Cooperation. Partnership contracting obliges the government to 
adopt a conditional cooperative behavior to neutralize the greatest threat to the transaction: 
public opportunism. The threat of public opportunism is substantial and imminent in a 
bargaining environment marked by massive sunk investment and pervasive political 
interference. By reducing the threat of public opportunism, a government-led cooperative 
behavior sets the contractual relationship off for a highly rewarding stable pattern of mutual 
cooperation by making opportunistic behavior less attractive than a cooperative behavior. Within 
the framework of a partnership contracting, the regulator is contractually bound to make a 
reasonably generous application of efficiency and investment tests where there is uncertainty 
surrounding the performance of the private partner, and to continually enhance its regulatory 
capacity. Any doubt as to how the terms of the contract may be interpreted and applied would 
have to be resolved in favor of the private operator.  
 
While a government-led cooperative behavior may appear to accommodate skewed distribution 
of gains in favor of the private operator, it actually seeks to increase the premium on mutual 
cooperation. In the long run, trade gains are expected to increase as adequate incentives for 
mutual cooperation are established. Moreover, the skewness of the distribution of gains in favor 
of the private operator arising from a generous application of efficiency and investment tests 
cannot be too large and persistent where concession is an incentive-compatible choice. 
Concession as an incentive-compatible choice is anchored on proportionality between the 
bargaining and informational advantage of the private operator (arising from his investment and 
operational rights), the investment and efficiency requirement and the concomitant exigency to 
insulate the transaction from redistributive political interference, and pervasiveness of inefficient 
political interference.  As a result, the scope for private opportunism and public opportunism is 
sufficiently constrained precluding highly unequal distribution of gains. 
 
2.2.3. Bargaining Dynamics of a Government-led Partnership Contracting. To demonstrate the 
rationale of a partnership contracting, consider a government who awarded a concession contract 
to a private operator through a competitive bidding process. The  intent of the government upon 
entering into a concession contract is to encourage investment and enhance operational efficiency 
in order to improve service delivery at least cost. The private operator, on the other hand, expects 
to realize a fair and reasonable compensation on the use of his financial and technical resources. 
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With limited competition, the goals of the contracting parties are partially aligned, i.e., profit 
maximization could compromise service affordability and/or quality undermining consumer welfare. But 
as discussed in Section 2.1, producer and consumer welfare are sufficiently aligned in a context 
where a concession arrangement is deemed an incentive-compatible ownership choice. Where 
there is high investment and efficiency requirement and consumers have high ability to pay, the 
private operator gets to fully exploit his financial and technical resource advantage and realize 
economies of scale yielding efficiency and investment gains large enough to amply benefit 
himself and the consumers.   
 
Consistent with the private operator’s financial and technical capacity declared in the technical 
and financial proposals he submitted during the bidding preparation stage, the private operator 
promised to deliver a service level ௣ܻ௥଴  at price ௣ܲ௥଴ . The output ௣ܻ௥଴  and price ௣ܲ௥଴  are expressly 
stipulated in the contract. The private operator is granted the right to decide on inputs, namely, 
effort ݁ and investment ܫ. Based on the private operator’s estimates, ௣ܻ௥଴ would require a level of 
investment ܫ௣௥଴ . At projected level of risk and uncertainty ߪ௣௥଴  at the time of contracting, the private 
operator envisaged an effort level  ݁௣௥଴  (e.g., finding an optimal financing mix and innovative ways of 
enhancing operational efficiency) to minimize the cost of investment or capital  ܫ௣௥଴ at ܥ௣௥଴ . The 
financial and operational efficiency ݁௣௥଴ required to deliver ௣ܻ௥଴  at minimum cost ܥ௣௥଴  demands an 
efficient commercially practicable rent ߎ௣௥଴ . With the projected service cost at ܥ௣௥଴  and the 
commercially practicable rent at ߎ௣௥଴ , the service price is perched at ௣ܲ௥଴ . ௣ܻ௥଴ at ௣ܲ௥଴  is valued by the 
government at ௣ܸ௥଴ ǡhigher than the value of performance of the utility under public management 
௣ܸ௨ሺ ௣ܻ௨ǡ ௣ܲ௨ሻ by ߮௣௥ǡ௣௨଴ . Under public management, the price of the service was kept at  ௣ܲ௨ ൏  ௣ܲ௥଴  
but under-investment and operational inefficiency resulted in a service level that is far inferior to 
what the private operator is expected and promised to deliver during the contract period such 
that: ௣ܸ௨൫ ௣ܻ௨ǡ ௣ܲ௨൯ ൏ ௣ܸ௥൫ ௣ܻ௥଴ ǡ ௣ܲ௥଴ ൯ by ߮௣௥ǡ௣௨଴ .  
 
Efficient Commercially Practicable Rent and Financial Equilibrium. In entering into the concession 
agreement, the government expects to realize long-term gains ߮௣௥ǡ௣௨଴  while the private operator 
perceives a long-term return on his effort and expenditures of ߎ௣௥଴  on the assumption that the 
inputs required to deliver ௣ܻ௥଴  at price ௣ܲ௥଴  are ܫ௣௥଴  and ݁௣௥଴  which are contingent on the level of risk 
and uncertainty ߪ௣௥଴ . Assuming that the perceived state of nature ߪ௣௥଴ of the private operator is 
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sustained over the contract period, the marginal disutility of exerting effort level   ݁௣௥଴   and ܫ௣௥଴  is 
equal to the marginal benefit of the agreement to the private operator ߎ௣௥଴  yielding gains to the 
government ߮௣௥ǡ௣௨଴ . As argued earlier, the public and private gains ߎ௣௥଴  and ߮௣௥ǡ௣௨଴ , respectively, 
are equally substantial when concession is an incentive-compatible choice; the trade gains of the 
government ߮௣௥ǡ௣௨଴  are strongly positively related to the private gains ߎ௣௥଴ . To preserve the 
incentives for efficiency, investment and cooperation, the government would have to 
accommodate the necessary adaptation to keep the equilibrium of the contract intact, i.e., the 
government shares risks if there is a radical shift in the state of nature causing disproportionate burden to 
the private operator. Otherwise, efficiency and investment incentives are distorted and the private 
operator may fully exploit his bargaining and informational advantage (i.e., engage in costly 
bargaining and performance shading) as shown below. Keeping the balance of the contract intact 
serves to preserve the incentives for efficiency, investment and cooperation and, consequently, 
precludes the dissipation of gains from the exchange. 
 
With perfect information, i.e., the projected and actual state of nature are the same, ߎ௣௥଴  represents an 
efficient commercially practicable rent. To realize the expected efficiency and investment gains 
ߎ௣௥଴  and ߮௣௥ǡ௣௨଴ , both parties must operate within the zone of efficient commercially practicable 
rent. Absent any substantial change in the investment level and market risk and uncertainty, 
significant deviations from the focal efficient commercially practicable rent attenuates efficiency 
and investment incentives, thus, gradually frustrating the efficiency and investment objectives of 
a concession arrangement. The expected gains from a concession arrangement may not therefore 
materialize when the terms of the contract are grossly violated or when the necessary 
equilibrium-restoring contract adjustments are not effected. The state of nature, however, may 
irrevocably vary to an extent that private financing becomes exorbitantly expensive with respect 
to the ability of the consumers to pay, thus, demanding a significant alteration of the terms of the 
contract, i.e., a different ownership structure involving mixed financing.  
 
Informational restraints makes negotiation towards proper adjustment of the efficient 
commercially practicable transaction cost-intensive. At the early stage of contracting, for instance, 
information relevant to the negotiation may be deficient, if not privately held. It may be difficult 
to make a precise assessment of the performance of the private operator with respect to his 
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contractual obligations. The government, however, could utilize information signals which may 
be correlated with the private operator’s information on the real impact of a drastic change of 
circumstances on the welfare of the private operator. For instance, the government may refer to 
the performance of the public corporation or past reports of the private operator.  
 
To further elucidate the exigency of contract adaptation and the government-led cooperative 
behavior, let us suppose that an equilibrium-distorting unbargained-for event occurs (e.g., a spike 
in borrowing costs that would not have made trade possible if it were the circumstances that prevailed or 
expected to prevail by the parties at the time of contracting given the tight profit constraint). As a 
consequence, the actual risk of the private operator turned out to be exceedingly higher than what 
the private operator intended to cover when he agreed to deliver ௣ܸ௥଴  at an efficient commercially 
practicable rent ߎ௣௥଴   during the time of contracting. Absent any contract adjustment,  the 
distribution of gains would be unreasonably and unfairly unequal. With ௣ܸ௥଴  the private operator 
now has to pay a higher cost of capital ܥ௣௥ଵ  reducing the rent (on his investment and operational 
efficiency) from ߎ௣௥଴  to ߎ௣௥ଵ . To maintain the financial equilibrium of the contract, the private 
operator petitions for an adjustment in service level ௣ܻ௥ or price ௣ܲ௥.  
 
There exists an efficient commercially practicable adjustment or risk-sharing ߜ௣௥כ that keeps the 
incentive structure of a concession arrangement intact. The private operator and the government, 
however, may have different estimates of the efficient commercially practicable adjustment. With 
a partnership contracting, the government is obliged to share the losses based on efficiency and 
investment tests. The efficiency and investment tests ascertain whether the commercial losses or 
the substantial reduction in rent arising from the occurrence of adverse unbargained-for 
circumstance could have been minimized had the private operator exercised the level of financial 
and operational efficiency it claimed to have during the pre-bidding stage. To reduce uncertainty 
about government’s private valuation of the concession (i.e., to reduce perceived regulatory risks), a 
partnership contracting obliges the government to adopt a generous application of these two tests 
at the early stage of concession where there are severe informational deficiencies. The regulatory 
agency may thus share at least half of the losses if:  (i) the size of the investment made by the private 
operator is higher than under public management over comparable periods adjusted for differences in 
market risk and uncertainty that prevailed during said periods (ܫ௣௥ > ܫ௣௨ሻ: the investment test; or (ii) 
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operational efficiency (e.g., staff productivity) of the utility under the concession arrangement is higher 
than under public management ݁௣௥ > ݁௣௨: the efficiency test. If either of the two tests is satisfied, the 
private operator may not have fully exploited his bargaining and informational advantage, 
making it highly plausible that the desired performance outcomes can still be attained in the long 
run as informational deficits are reduced and incentives for mutual cooperation is established.  
 
Rationale behind a Government-led Cooperative Behavior. A government-led conditional cooperative 
behavior whereby the government manifests willingness to accommodate some information rent 
in favor of the private operator is an optimal strategic response to the emergence of an 
equilibrium-distorting event in a long-term contract with informational deficiencies. A 
cooperative behavior offers the government higher payoff than the alternative as can be 
illustrated in  a sequential bargaining game. The private operator may adopt two strategies: (i) a 
cooperative strategy otherwise called as a fair profit strategy; and (ii) a noncooperative strategy, 
alternatively termed as a redistributive profit strategy. For the private operator, a cooperative 
strategy means engaging in performance shading and bargaining only to an extent necessary to 
recover investment and efficiency losses brought by the emergence of an unbargained-for event, 
while a  noncooperative strategy involves full exploitation of bargaining and informational 
advantage to capture virtually all gains from the exchange. As regards the regulator, a 
cooperative strategy means enforcing the contract in accordance with a partnership contracting, 
i.e., adjust the contract when an unbargained-for event occurs based on a generous application of 
investment and efficiency tests. A noncooperative strategy by the regulator pertains to a rigid 
enforcement of the contract without due regard to the equilibrium-distorting radical shift in 
market circumstances.  
 
State’s Noncooperative Strategy: Relative Payoffs of the Contracting Parties 
 
If the government chooses to narrowly interpret the contract in a manner that grossly prejudices 
the private operator but the latter still opts to take a cooperative strategy, the former’s long-term 
payoff would be his expected gains from the agreement߮௣௥଴  diminished by reduced efficiency 
and investment gains arising from private operator’s exploitation of his bargaining and 
informational advantage ߠ (i.e., shirking on hard-to-contract-for quality of investments)  ݒ௡௖ሺߠሻ, the 
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bargaining cost ܾ௡௖ሺߠሻ  and the arbitral awards ߬௡௖ሺߠሻ  to the private operator. When the 
government strictly enforces the contract, the payoff to the private operator who opts to take a 
cooperative strategy would be his expected gains ߎ௣௥଴  reduced by losses occasioned by the 
emergence of an unbargained-for event ɀሺɁ୮୰כ ሻ and the bargaining cost ܾ௡௖ሺߠሻ but offset by gains 
from innocuous performance shading ݒ௡௖ሺߠሻ  and the arbitral awards ߬௡௖ . Innocuous 
performance shading refers to a level of performance shading that may not be detected and, 
hence, would not be subject to penalties; it has no adverse impact on long-term efficiency.  
 
Concession:  
Pay-off Matrix 
Public Partner 
Rigid Contract Enforcement Partnership-based Contract Adjustment 
   
   
 P
ri
va
te
 P
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Fair profit 
strategy 
߮௣௥଴ െݒ௡௖൫ߜ௣௥כ ൯ െ ܾ௡௖ሺߠሻെ߬௡௖ሺߠሻ,  
ߎ௣௥଴ െ ߛሺߜ௣௥כ ሻ +ݒ௡௖൫ߜ௣௥כ ൯ െ
ܾ௡௖ሺߠሻ൅߬௡௖ሺߠሻ  
 
߮௣௥଴ െ ܾ௖௖ሺߠሻǡ ߎ௣௥଴ െ ܾ௖௖ሺߠሻ 
Redistributive 
profit strategy 
߮௣௥଴ െݒ௡௡ሺߠሻ െ ܾ௡௡ሺߠሻ 
ߎ௣௥଴ െ ߛሺߜ௣௥כ ሻ ൅ݒ௡௡ሺߠሻ െ ܾ௡௡ሺߠሻ 
 
߮௣௥଴ െݒ௖௡ሺߠሻ െ ܾ௖௡ሺߠሻ൅߬௖௡ሺߠሻ,  
ߎ௣௥଴ ൅ݒ௖௡ሺߠሻ െ ܾ௖௡ሺߠሻെ߬௖௡ሺߠሻ 
 
If the regulator’s strict enforcement of contract, however, is matched by the private operator’s 
redistributive profit strategy, the government’s payoff would be the expected gains  from a 
concession arrangement ߮௣௥଴  diminished by efficiency and investment losses of excessive 
performance shading ݒ௡௡ሺߠሻ, which is larger than ݒ௡௖ሺߜ௣௥כ ሻ, and bargaining cost ܾ௡௡ሺߠሻ, which is 
higher than ܾ௖௡ሺߠሻ  and ܾ௡௖ሺߠሻ . The private operator fully exploits his bargaining and 
informational advantage ߠby scrimping on quality-enhancing investments beyond what is 
necessary to offset the losses brought by the emergence of an unbargained-for event and even 
institutes an action for recovery of losses before the arbitral court. The payoff to the private 
operator in taking a noncooperative strategy as a response to the noncooperative behavior of the 
regulator would be his expected profit ߎ௣௥଴  plus the gains from performance shading ݒ௡௡ሺߠሻ but 
reduced by bargaining cost ܾ௡௡ሺߠሻ, which is higher than ܾ௖௡ሺߠሻ and ܾ௡௖ሺߠሻ.  This results in large 
investment and efficiency losses and escalating bargaining cost hurting both parties. Since both 
parties are at fault, neither party is entitled to an arbitral award. A cooperative strategy would be 
preferred by the private operator even with rigid contract enforcement unless the contract is 
highly incomplete, which in turn provides the private operator strong de facto bargaining and 
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informational advantage. In a severely incomplete contract setting (i.e., wide scope for bargainng 
due to the emergence of unbargained-for events) with high efficiency and investment requirement, the 
private operator enjoys greater bargaining and informational advantage; it can be difficult to 
make him fully internalize the investment and efficiency losses of performance shading yielding 
an exceedingly high ݒ௡௡ሺߠሻ. As a result, a noncooperative strategy becomes more attractive to the 
private operator than the cooperative one.  
 
State’s Cooperative Strategy: Relative Payoffs of the Contracting Parties  
 
Irrespective of the strategy of the private operator, the government stands to gain more from 
taking a cooperative behavior with severe contractual incompleteness, high efficiency and 
investment requirement and, consequently, strong bargaining and information advantage of the 
private operator. Under such conditions, the government’s noncooperative strategy would result 
in massive efficiency and investment losses ݒ௡௡ሺߠሻ  and bargaining cost ܾ௡௡ሺߠሻ  would be 
exceedingly large. The private operator thus faces a weak incentive to cooperate demanding a 
government-led cooperative behavior to make a cooperative strategy more attractive than a 
noncooperative strategy. If the government initiates to behave cooperatively, i.e., adjusts the 
contract in accordance with the legal doctrine of commercial practicability, and the private operator 
responds favorably, the long-term gains of the former would be ߮௣௥଴ െ ܾ௖௖ሺߠሻ. The bargaining cost 
ܾ௖௖ሺߠሻ pertains to the minimum cost of properly evaluating performance of the concessionaires 
via constructive negotiation or good faith bargaining. If the government’s cooperative behavior 
is matched by the private operator with a noncooperative strategy, the payoff to the government 
would be ߮௣௥଴  diminished by performance shading ݒ௖௡ሺߠሻand bargaining cost ܾ௖௡ሺߠሻ, which is 
lower than when the government takes a noncooperative strategy ܾ௖௡ሺߠሻ ൏ ܾ௡௖ሺߠሻ ൏ ܾ௡௡ሺߠሻ. The 
payoff to the government, however, may be further increased by penalties and charges ߬௖௡ሺߠሻ 
imposed by the regulator and affirmed by a panel of arbitrators on the private operator. The 
payoff to the government of taking a cooperative strategy if matched by the private operator with 
a noncooperative strategy is higher than when both adopt a noncooperative strategy due to 
escalating bargaining cost and investment and efficiency losses. When the government behaves 
cooperatively, the private operator would have much to gain from taking a cooperative strategy 
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than otherwise as the latter is able to economize on bargaining cost and do away with penalties 
and charges.    
 
Over time, the parties would increasingly benefit from mutual cooperation and the private 
operator is set to suffer greater losses if he maintains a noncooperative behavior. The cost of 
noncooperative behavior is bound to rise sharply over time as informational and bargaining 
advantage ߠ decreases on account of increased regulatory experience and capacity and reduced 
informational deficits, making it easier to detect performance shading. Also, the scope for 
performance shading narrows as the adverse effects of under-investment in network 
maintenance and rehabilitation and the impact of low effort level on service quality become more 
evident (e.g., more supply interruptions and increased water distribution losses due to leakages). 
Incentives for efficiency and cooperation is thus strengthened at the latter stage of the concession; 
hence, the efficient bias towards contract adjustment and against termination.  
 
To sum up the discussion above, the incentive for mutual cooperation is anchored on the 
following conditions: (i) the suitability of a concession arrangement as a choice of ownership, i.e., 
high efficiency and investment requirement combined with pervasive political interference, which jointly 
determine the magnitude of gains from the exchange and the bargaining advantage of the private 
operator; (ii) the degree of contractual incompleteness (e.g., importance of hard-to-contract-for quality 
attributes of the service and inevitability of ex-post bargaining due to difficulties to account for the impact 
of irregular events on service obligations), which determines the de facto bargaining and informational 
advantage of the private operator; and (iii) the regulatory and arbitral institutions, which amplify 
the cost of noncooperative behavior and the gains of taking a cooperative strategy by the 
contracting parties.  Without substantial trade gains of an incentive-compatible concession 
contract, the contracting parties would not have an incentive to sustain the agreement if one party 
is perceived by the other to have taken a noncooperative strategy. With meager gains from the 
exchange, the gains derived by one party from behaving opportunistically would have adverse 
effects to the other party, inciting costly bargaining leading to the dissipation of the trade gains. 
In an incomplete contract setting where the private operator enjoys strong informational and 
bargaining advantage and where a concession arrangement serves as a key reform strategy, the 
payoff to the government of taking a conditional cooperative behavior would be manifestly larger 
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than the alternative. But while regulatory and arbitral decisions may be constrained to forestall 
private opportunism in an incomplete contact setting, there are numerous incentive mechanisms 
that may be explored to reduce informational and bargaining advantage of the private operator, 
affording a greater role for regulatory and arbitral institutions as detailed in Section 2.3. 
   
2.3. Ex-ante and Ex-post Incentive Mechanisms. A principal advantage of a contractual 
arrangement under sufficient private ownership is the increased availability and enforceability 
of ex-ante and ex-post incentive devices which may be adapted and improved over time to suit 
evolving needs and competencies of the contracting parties. These incentive devices can be 
relational, transactional in orientation or a mix of the two. From an ex-ante incentive (i.e., allocation 
of control rights to a private entity to strengthen investment and efficiency incentives) and ex-post 
transaction cost (i.e., bargaining over proper contract adjustments or ex-post risk reallocation) 
standpoint, I explore how the choice of price regulatory method, equity structure, the 
establishment of a regulatory agency and an arbitration mechanism may influence incentives for 
efficiency, investment and cooperation.  
 
The concession arrangement has been assailed for its failure to generate substantial cost savings 
and enhance service delivery on account of the strong profit orientation of the private operator, 
high cost of private capital, and contractual failures. 137 These contractual hazards, however, can 
be remedied through proper contract design and enforcement strategies in consonance with the 
principles of a partnership contracting. A partnership  contracting generally favors the use of a 
price cap method with cost pass-through clauses, limited public financing, a cooperative 
approach to regulation, and a recourse to arbitration tribunal subject to limited judicial review. 
Over time, however, the contract may limit the scope for bargaining via the adoption of high-
powered, transactional ex-ante and ex-post incentive mechanisms.   
 
2.3.1. Price regulatory method 
 
To preclude excessive pricing (i.e., pricing strategies that generate increasing profits sans any 
significant improvement is service delivery), the price of the service is regulated using either of the 
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two methods or their variants: (i) price cap; and (ii) rate of return. Price regulatory methods are 
sometimes used as a permanent or temporary substitute for a regulatory agency, which may not 
be established until the contract is already in force.138 In an incomplete contract setting, however, 
proper enforcement of a price-regulatory method may require an independent and competent 
regulatory agency and a recourse to an arbitration tribunal to ascertain efficient price 
adjustments. The relative suitability of a price cap and a rate-of-return regulation is primarily 
influenced by: (i.) the contractibility of the exchange; (ii) the level of market risk and uncertainty; (iii.) 
availability of capital; (iv) importance of hard-to-contract-for quality attributes of a resource; and (v.) the 
presence of a well-functioning regulatory agency. 
 
Under a price-cap regulation, a fixed payment is transferred to the firm independent of the 
realized cost.139 In setting the cap, the regulator estimates the operating cost of the firm and other 
related costs and capital expenditures. To maximize profit, firms would then have to keep the 
unit operating cost as low as possible from the price cap. A price cap scheme thus creates a high-
powered incentive for cost-cutting measures, which may not be desirable if it generates hard-to-
contract-for negative externalities on other equally important areas of the performance.140 For 
instance, setting the price at sub-optimally low level may induce firms to invest less in hard-to-
contract-for quality attributes of the service, such as system maintenance and improvements 
resulting in supply interruptions and poor water quality. Aside from creating a bias against hard-
to-contract-for quality attributes, a price cap may reduce incentive for cooperative adjustments in 
the emergence of unbargained-for circumstances. The government may insist on implementing 
the price cap to extort cooperation rents as demonstrated by disruptive renegotiation of 
concession contracts in Latin America where price cap regulation is widely adopted. The 
likelihood of a rigid enforcement of contract could increase risk premium and discourage 
investment, especially in countries where there is a long history of below-cost pricing of water 
services.  
 
The disincentive to engage in cooperative bargaining can be moderately remedied, however, by 
a partnership contracting as discussed in Section 2.2 where the parties are obliged to accommodate 
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  139 See Gautier and Yvrande-Billon (2008) and Porcher (2010). 
  140 See Hart (2003). 
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contract adjustments in the occurrence of an equilibrium-distorting unbargained-for 
circumstances.  This is facilitated by a price cap method with cost pass-through clauses to account 
for unbargained-for market reversals in the pricing of the service.141 The rate-of-return is more 
relational in orientation than a price cap; the former is widely adopted among water public 
corporations. Under a rate-of-return regulation, regulatory agencies decide on the revenue 
requirement or cost of service, hence, it is also called cost of service regulation, based on which 
the price structure is determined for different consumer categories. Although the process can be 
cumbersome in that it requires constant monitoring and auditing of firm’s expenses, it encourages 
parties to engage in consultation and negotiation which could help avoid future conflicts.  
 
Too much latitude for consultation and negotiation, however, may undermine efficiency in the 
absence of a well-functioning regulatory agency. The consumers may end up vastly subsidizing 
private capital through high water costs, while incurring substantial ex-post negotiation cost over 
the “prudence” and “efficiency” of the investment made by the firms and the “appropriate” rate 
of return on investment. Under the rate-of-return scheme, the firms do not only increase revenue 
per unit of good sold, but also for every unit of capital investment made, thus, creating an 
incentive to over-invest. The perverse investment incentive effects are likely to be minimal, 
however, in a sector that is highly capital—intensive and where there is substantial supply and 
demand uncertainty and regulatory risks, such as water service provision in developing 
countries. The cost reimbursement method may be preferred when: (i) the value of the service has multiple 
interdependent, hard-to-contract-for attributes; (ii) the market environment is unstable making the ex-ante 
contract susceptible to negotiation; (iii) there is severe under-investment on account of high market and 
political risks and uncertainty; and (iv.) there exists a well-functioning regulatory body. 
 
2.3.2. Financing Structure   
 
To remedy the inadequacies of any price regulatory method, private financing may be 
complemented with public financing. Equity participation by the government offers numerous 
advantages in terms of minimizing regulatory costs, reducing risk premium, and protecting 
consumer welfare. Under mixed financing or institutionalized PPPs, public sector retains 
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corporate control, while the management of technical operations is typically carried out by a 
private company. The infusion of public equity could help stabilize and lower the rent on 
investments in developing countries where the financial markets are too thin and unstable to 
supply reasonably priced capital 142  Reduced information asymmetry and burden-sharing 
resulting from mixed financing also entitles the government to obtain more accurate information 
and bargain for enhanced consumer welfare. The impact of risk-sharing effect of public financing 
could be significant in water supply sector where there is substantial supply and demand risks 
(e.g., water supply situation may be affected by weather conditions and level of demand by housing 
projects). The positive risk-reducing effect and shrinkage in information asymmetry, however, 
may have to be weighed against the opportunity cost of public financing and its impact on 
efficiency incentives and regulatory risks.  
 
As the equity structure becomes more public, the relationship could be “inefficiently” relational 
leading to accommodation of both political and commercial interests and various forms of 
compromises. Indeed, mixed ownership structure has been found to be less efficient than pure 
ownership forms. While government equity participation may increase public accountability, 
ease informational constraints and facilitate internal resolution of disputes, the regulatory process 
is made more complicated due to obvious conflicts of interest in the role of the government as 
both a client and an equity holder.143 On the producer side, there are concerns on how the 
nominated director from the government would perform its duties and obligations to the 
company pertaining to the confidentiality of information and organizational/operational 
strategy in dealing with disputes/termination. When there is substantial threat of public 
opportunism, private operator may demand sufficient private ownership. Public financing thus 
tends to be disfavored when the motivation is to limit inefficient political interference and 
strengthen efficiency incentives. Hence, the preference towards full private financing of 
concession contracts with conditional access to risk-sharing in a partnership contracting as 
detailed above.144 It is worth mentioning that in several developed economies where the political 
market is relatively efficient (e.g. France, Spain, Italy and Germany), the government heavily 
subsidized network investment, while the private operator finances operating expenses.145  
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Where inefficient political interference results in substantial resource losses and under-
investment, full private financing may be considered within the framework of a partnership 
contracting. Limited public financing, however, may be explored where a large segment of the 
population have limited ability to pay; there is wide information asymmetry; and contract is 
highly incomplete. If there is substantial market and political risk and uncertainty, but consumers 
have high ability to pay and efficiency and investment requirement is high, full private financing 
within the framework of a partnership contracting would be well-suited;  it would reduce risk-
premium and encourage investment without undermining efficiency incentives. At high level of 
risk and uncertainty, however, public financing could reduce risks to levels that may encourage 
long-term, quality-enhancing investments. Hard-to-contract-for quality investments tend to be 
stifled by strong risk concerns.  
 
To further constrain political interference, preclude subsidization of capital and avoid conflicts of 
interest, the contract may set specific conditions such as: (i) the public party shares may not have 
voting rights, but only economic rights (sometimes known as class B shares); (ii) the public party 
as an equity partner may not be obliged to infuse additional equity; otherwise, the economic 
rights of the public party would be maintained even if its equity share increased; and (iii) define 
the rights to sell to third parties subject to prohibitions on the disposal of public assets.146 Other 
incentive tools may also be explored to  achieve the risk-sharing and premium-reducing effect of 
public financing within the framework of a partnership contracting. These include the provision 
of fiscal incentives, temporary equity financing to fill viability gap, and the establishment of 
contingent claims (e.g., political risks, including sudden changes in laws and policies, loss-recovery 
provisions due to unexpected market reversals, including wide swing in the exchange rate and price levels).  
 
2.3.3. Ex-post Governance Mechanisms: Regulation and Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
 
A well-capacitated and independent regulatory agency and dispute resolution mechanisms 
accord additional ex-post governance in the enforcement of a regulatory contract. As discussed 
above, these two mechanisms play a vital role in facilitating a value-enhancing bargaining 
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dynamics; they moderate the negative effects of information and bargaining asymmetries on 
incentives for investment, efficiency and cooperation through effective contract monitoring. 
Contract monitoring covers a wide range of activities, such as supervising service quality, 
resolving contractual disputes, applying sanctions and rewards, and public consultation, among 
others. 
 
Regulatory Agency: An independent and competent regulatory agency plays a vital role in 
minimizing the transaction cost of enforcing an incomplete contract. A partnership contracting, 
as discussed in Section 2.2, endorses a government-led cooperative behavior in interpreting and 
implementing an incomplete contract. A conditional cooperative behavior as opposed to a control 
approach is particularly important at the early stage of concession when the regulatory agency 
has yet to gain adequate regulatory experience and competence. A control approach is fixated on 
deterring non-compliance with contractual obligations through sanctioning mechanisms. This 
may not be suitable when compliance is difficult to establish due to information and capacity 
constraints. Taking a control approach at the early stage of concession may lead to more legal and 
regulatory disputes due to informational deficiencies. This is aggravated by the fact that at the 
early stage of the concession regulatory capacity may still be too weak to afford the regulator 
sufficient credibility to enforce compliance.  
 
Rather than relying on sanction mechanisms, a conditional cooperative approach focuses on 
setting clear guidelines on developing reporting requirements and obliging the concessionaires 
to make regular, timely and consistent reporting in order to detect problems early, reduce 
information asymmetry and minimize bargaining cost.147 At the latter stage of the concession, the 
regulator may combine elements of cooperative and control approaches as parties acquire better 
market information and regulatory capacity is enhanced. The subsequent shift from a cooperative 
approach to a control approach may also be desirable to limit regulatory capture. Specific 
regulatory treatments (e.g. stricter auditing rules) are important at the latter stage of concession 
to guard against possible under-regulation as the regulator and the private operator may have 
already developed a highly cooperative relationship to an extent of stifling proper regulation. 
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Dispute Resolution Mechanism. The presence of a contract-based dispute resolution mechanism is 
an integral component of long-term concession contracts, especially in developing countries 
where administrative and legal institutions are too weak to grant informed and unbiased 
resolution of disputes.148 The incorporation of special arbitration procedures into the agreement 
could lend additional governance in enforcing long-term contracts; it facilitates an impartial 
investigation of facts pertinent to the settlement of the dispute. As pointed out in Section 2.2, the 
arbitration tribunal is essential in administering socially efficient contract adjustment and 
termination. If one of the parties behaves opportunistically (i.e. significantly deviate from the efficient 
commercially practicable rent), the aggrieved party may file a complaint for recovery of efficiency 
and investment losses before the arbitration tribunal. In contrast to litigation, arbitration is an 
attenuated adversarial process of resolving disputes using relatively simple and informal 
methods.  
 
Although parties may choose to define the powers of the arbitrators and set the procedures to be 
used in arbitration, arbitrators are typically chosen from among individuals unrelated to the 
parties in the dispute and are selected on the basis of their technical expertise and integrity. The 
industry-specific knowledge of arbitrators enable them to effectively assume the role of a “gap-
filler”, i.e., arbitrators determine the appropriate contract adaptation and supply the terms of the 
agreement, which the contracting parties failed to unambiguously provide for, in order to resolve disputes. 
In resolving disputes, arbitrators tend to use extra-contract evidence to establish the intent of the 
contracting parties.149 To safeguard the neutrality and simplicity of contract enforcement, the 
parties often agree that arbitral decision be made final and executory with limited judicial review. 
Limited judicial review would minimize uncertainty into the contractual relationship and 
establish proper relationship between arbitration and the judicial process. Contractually 
expanded review could put courts in the awkward position of having to apply unfamiliar rules 
and procedures.150 The arbitral decisions, however, may be subject to judicial review when there 
is doubt on the fairness and neutrality in the arbitrator’s interpretation of the parties’ agreement 

  148 In developed economies where markets are relatively stable and thus the need for contract adaptation is minimal, an effective 
enforcement of a regulatory contract may not necessitate the establishment of contract-based arbitration mechanism nor an 
independent regulatory agency. The disputes are settled through a highly knowledgeable and experienced appellate court that settles 
disputes as in the case of France. Over centuries of case law and legal doctrines facilitate consistent and effective implementation of 
administrative contracts (See Bakovic et al. 2003). 
  149 See Kirgis (2007).  
  150 See Goldman (2003). 
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or arbitral awards are  capricious or manifest a disregard of the law (e.g., the awards are procured 
by corruption or fraud, arbitrators are guilty of misconduct or exceeded powers).151  
 
Arbitral decisions are alleged to be investor-bias.152  The perceived partiality of arbitral decisions, 
however, relates to the failure of the parties, particularly the government to make the appropriate 
balancing of the interest of consumers and the private operator. The arguably pro-investor 
arbitral decisions were made on account of indirect and direct expropriation by the government 
through “emergency” measures aimed at avoiding supply disruptions and deterioration in the 
delivery of service (e.g., usurpation of management control, deportation of the company manager, abrupt 
termination and repudiation of the concession contract and take-over of the water facilities and business by 
the local state-owned supplier, the use of regulatory authority to compel the company to stop invoicing 
customers for certain taxes; and the unilateral change of the legal framework that governed the company). 
The arbitration tribunal found these measures to be “going beyond normal contractual behavior” 
and constitutive of indirect expropriation as they have the effect of “destroying the economic 
viability of the concession”; “depriving the investor of the use or value of its investment”, and 
“impairing by unreasonable or discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment or disposal of investments”, and “unreasonably disrupting the contract for political 
reasons”.  The state was faulted for failing to provide “fair and equitable” treatment of the 
investment made by the private partner, i.e., the government did not accommodate appropriate contract 
adjustments necessary to “restore a reasonable equilibrium to the concession” and preclude the frustration 
of “legitimate expectations of the company’s investment”. It is worth stressing, however, that although 
most arbitral awards required the government to pay large compensation, there are a few cases 
where the tribunal awarded no compensation to the investors as the latter were unable to prove 
any quantifiable or commercial loss nor any causal link between the violations of the government 
and the diminution of the value of its investment. 
 
Although recourse to arbitration is supposed to facilitate efficient contract adjustment and 
termination, most of the cases brought to the arbitration tribunal lead to termination of the 
contract and subsequent take-over by the government of the facility. There is a clear showing of 
double-sided opportunism in arbitration cases with the claims made by the private partner often 
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more than three times the arbitral awards. In most cases, both the governments and the 
companies refused to make any compensatory payment. Arbitration claims were often dropped 
as part of a negotiated settlement to minimize reputational damage for both parties. Such 
negotiated settlements between the government and the private operator, however, may not be 
socially optimal, especially in a context where a concession arrangement constitutes a key reform 
strategy as detailed in Section 2.1. This points to the exigency of proper design of ex-ante incentive 
mechanisms to narrow the scope for disagreement and induce cooperative adjustments via the 
espousal of the principles of a partnership contracting. 
 
3. An Illustrative Case Study: Privatization of Water Service Delivery in 
Metro Manila 
 
 
As in most parts of the world, the provision of water services had been a monopoly of the public 
sector in the Philippines until 1997 when the public water utility, Metropolitan Waterworks and 
Sewerage System (MWSS), was privatized. With a service area that spanned 40 cities and 
municipalities and a total population of 11 million, the privatization of the MWSS was the largest 
in the world with an investment commitment of over USD7 billion, which was more than half of 
the total investment commitments to private infrastructure projects in water and sewerage in the 
world in 1997.153 But while the privatization of MWSS has helped the government address the 
wide investment gap in the water supply sector and improve operational efficiency, the 
desirability of the concession-based privatization is besmirched by recurrent regulatory disputes 
and unmitigated tariff increases. Within the framework of a partnership contracting, I set out to 
explain the dynamics of bargaining and the consequent level and allocation of trade gains 
between the parties by examining the design of the contract, including ex-post governance 
mechanisms in light of the bargaining environment at the time of contracting, especially the 
motivation behind the shift from public management to a concession arrangement. 
 
  

  153 See Negishi (n.d.). 
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3.1. Why MWSS was privatized 
 
Just like many countries in the world, there has been a strong policy bias towards public 
management in the water supply sector in the Philippines. In the mid-1990s, however, a 
confluence of events made privatization economically exigent and politically viable: (i) decades of 
operational inefficiencies and under-investment culminated in a “water crisis” which the government was 
hard put in resolving under the old institutional set-up; and (ii) the installation of a reform-oriented 
government.  
 
Factors behind the Water Crisis Situation. Since 1878, water service delivery in Metro Manila and 
adjacent provinces had been under public management. Akin to many public utilities in 
developing countries, however, the public corporation struggled with inefficient political 
interference, limited public financing and bureaucratic rigidity. In 1971 Metropolitan Waterworks 
and Sewerage System (MWSS) was created in an attempt to address said issues under Republic 
Act 6273. Said statute granted the MWSS through its Board of Trustees corporate powers and 
functions. The key management decisions (e.g., setting water rates) were essentially decided upon 
by the President who held appointing rights over the members of the MWSS Board and its 
General Manager. Water rates were set at below cost-recovery levels at variance with the 12 
percent rate of return prescribed by law. Water payments represented only 13 percent of MWSS 
income.  
 
As a public corporation, public financing was discouraged; MWSS had to borrow money from 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) agencies, such as the World Bank, which was fully 
guaranteed by the national government pursuant to the MWSS Charter. The Department of 
Finance also wanted the MWSS to take full responsibility of its financial obligations in order to 
reduce the fiscal burden of the national government. Although ODA loans were long-term and 
low-cost, they carry financial conditionalities, i.e., they required the MWSS to run the utility like 
a private company meaning it had to be a profit-making entity. 154  With cost inefficiencies, the 
MWSS stayed afloat by scrimping on network maintenance. As a result, service quality further 
deteriorated making users even less willing to pay for water supply services.155  
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Overstaffing likewise was one of the culprits of the weak financial stance of the MWSS. The intent 
of the MWSS Charter to strengthen staff performance incentives failed to deliver the intended 
results. With 8,000 employees, receiving competitive salaries, the MWSS maintained 13 
employees per 1,000 connections, which was at least twice the figure of comparable utilities in 
the region.156 The figure was reduced to nine employees per 1,000 connections during mid-1990s, 
albeit still higher than that of water utilities in comparable cities, such as Bangkok (4.6) and 
Jakarta (7.7). The relatively low staff productivity level of MWSS was attributed to several factors, 
such as the disregard of performance reviews in determining staff compensation; the legal 
constraints on firing poor performers; and nepotism; among others.157 The adverse effects of 
inefficient staffing patterns were made worse by bureaucratic procurement procedures; securing 
office supplies would involve filling up all sorts of forms with the whole procurement process 
taking several months.158  
 
Increasing Demands for Efficiency and Investment: By mid-1990s, MWSS was debt-laden and services 
continued to deteriorate. Meeting water service requirements of the burgeoning urban 
population demanded a sizable investment. About one-third of the 10.6 million residents in Metro 
Manila did not have individual household connections. Most of these unserved households 
belonged to low-income group who lived in informal settlements. MWSS had established 
standpipes in slum areas but these were very limited in number. Many of these standpoints were 
not operational because its management failed to remit collected funds. Households were also 
unwilling to continue payment due to intermittent water supply. 159  Only a quarter of those that 
had piped connections had 24-hour piped supply. Fringe areas were subjected to scheduled water 
rationing during summer months when water supply became limited. On the average, water 
supply services were available 16 hours a day.160 A large proportion of households in Metro 
Manila relied on vended water. Based on a ground study by JICA (1992), 40 percent of total water 
use were supplied by private water supply systems while 80 percent of industrial establishments 
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  156 See Dumol (2000). 
  157 See Rivera (2014). 
ϭϱϴProcuring large items would take an average of four years as it required a feasibility study, a loan approval by a multilateral 
financing institution, and biddings for consultants and civil works (See Dumol 2000). 
  159 See David and Inocencio (1998) 
  160 See David and Inocencio (1998). 
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relied on private water systems and their own wells.161 A significant share of water sold through 
vendors was actually MWSS water secured by meter tampering and illegal connections. With 
widespread leakages and pilferage, water distribution losses ranged from 55 to 67 percent from 
early 1980 up to mid-1990s with only less than half of the water produced earned revenues.162  
 
Cost of Restructuring under Public Management vs. Privatization. To stem further resource losses, the 
government contemplated on restructuring the organizational set-up, enhancing staff 
compensation incentive scheme, instituting training and reorienting behavioral practices, 
adjusting tariff and administering cost-saving measures and prudent investment and sound asset 
management practices.  All of these measures were expected to be funded through government 
equity, loans and grants from multilateral agencies and donor governments, syndicated financing 
arrangements and internal cash generation.163 Aside from the hefty price tag of those policy 
reforms, there was widespread belief that they would all come to naught sans a complete 
overhaul of the ownership structure.164 Many of the problems of the MWSS, particularly those 
relating to procurement and financing and the proclivities of staff to extract as many benefits as 
possible from the company with minimal effort were attributed to the company’s being owned 
and operated by the government.165  
 
The exigency of privatization resonated with the reform-oriented Ramos Administration which 
implemented the most aggressive privatization programs in infrastructure. Although there were 
policy impediments to MWSS privatization (e.g., As per MWSS Charter, the water supply system and 
its operation and maintenance must be supervised and controlled by the state), the Ramos 
Administration was encouraged to pursue the same by the successful privatization of the energy 
sector in the early 1990s. Cognizant of public sentiments against privatization, the Ramos 
Administration ventured to raise public awareness of an impending water crisis to galvanize 
public support for privatization. The information campaign was followed by the enactment of 
the National Water Crisis Act (NWCA) and other policy issuances that sought to strengthen the 
legal basis for MWSS privatization. NWCA granted the President the legal authority to privatize 
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MWSS. As part of the reorganization of the utility, the MWSS reduced its workforce by 30 percent 
via early retirement program and cut tariffs by 38 percent.166The NWCA also criminalized water 
theft. The front loading of reforms signified the political commitment of the Ramos 
Administration to restructure the utility.  
 
3.2. Contract Preparation and Bidding Procedures 
 
Without any prior experience in privatizing a large water utility, state officials sought the 
assistance of International Finance Corporation to design the bidding procedures and write the 
contract. The French consultancy firms were also hired as a precondition for a grant extended by 
the French government. The winning bidders covered the rest of the consultancy fees. Several 
committees were formed to draw up a privatization strategy. Considering the political sensitivity 
of water privatization, the Philippines eschewed several offers of rewarding the contract on a 
negotiated basis and opted for an open and transparent bidding procedure. The open bidding 
process was based on a two-envelope system containing technical and financial proposals. The 
proposals were accompanied by performance bonds. To pre-qualify in the bidding process, the 
companies had to be a consortium of a local sponsor with financial and managerial capabilities 
to implement the business plan and an international operator with global experience in managing 
water utilities. The bidders had to satisfy several other structural qualifications. As per 
constitutional requirements, foreign shareholding of the consortium had to be held at a maximum 
share of 40 per cent; the same had to be managed and operated by Philippine nationals. More 
than half of the shareholdings should be Philippine-owned, broken down into 10 per cent for 
employees, 20 to 30 per cent for the main sponsor and 20 per cent for the other local investors.167 
 
Around 50 local and foreign companies expressed interest to participate in the pre-qualifying 
stage of the bidding, which was remarkably high by developing country standard.25 Of the 50 
companies that submitted bidding proposals, four consortia pre-qualified for the bidding: (i.) 
Manila Water, which included International Water and Ayala Corporation; (ii.) Maynilad, which 
comprised Lyonnaise des Eaux and Benpres Holdings; (iii.) Compagnie Generale de Eaux and 
Aboitiz Equity Ventures; (iv.) Anglian Water Corporation and Metro Pacific Corporation.29 
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Table 1. Bids of the Four Bidders 
West Zone 
      Ayala-International Water 
      Benpres-Lyonnaise des Eaux 
      Aboitiz-Compagnie Generable des Eaux 
      Metro Pacific-Anglian Water International 
Percent Bids 
28.63 
56.59 
56.88 
66.90 
Peso Bids 
Php 2.5 
Php 4.97 
Php 4.99 
Php 5.87 
East Zone 
       Ayala-International Water 
       Aboitiz-Compagnie Generable des Eaux 
       Metro Pacific-Anglian Water International 
       Benpres-Lyonnaise des Eaux 
 
26.39 
62.88 
64.51 
69.79 
 
Php 2.32 
Php 5.52 
Php 5.66 
Php 6.13 
Source: Dumol, 2000 
 
For benchmarking purposes, the MWSS service area was divided into East Zone and West Zone 
to be operated separately by the two winning bidders. Splitting the service area into two was also 
envisaged to serve two other purposes: to have a ready replacement in case the other concessionaire 
fails to provide the service, and to balance the negotiation power between the concessionaires and the newly 
established regulator.168 To ensure that the privatization would immediately deliver a reduction in 
water rates, bids were capped at the existing MWSS tariffs of 8.78 Philippine peso per cubic meter. 
The concessions were awarded based on the lowest average water tariff bids. All the bids turned 
out to be substantially lower than the prevailing MWSS rate of Php8.78 per cubic meter. Manila 
Water (Ayala Corporation, Philippines, and International Water, UK-USA) and Maynilad (Benpres 
Corporation, Philippines, and Lyonnaise des Eaux, France) won the bidding after submitting 
exceedingly low bids of P2.3 per cubic meter and P4.9 per cubic meter, respectively. 169The 
government attributed the remarkably low bids to high investor confidence, while the less 
sanguine critics thought the bids were dive bids that were meant to win the contract with the 
expectation that they can be renegotiated.  
 
The lowest bidder Manila Water was given the option to choose one of the two zones of the MWSS 
service area. Manila Water opted for the east zone where most of its business establishments were 
located. The west zone, which covered the largest and the most developed and densely populated 
area of the city with a total population of seven million or 60 percent of the population and water 
connections in the service area, went to Maynilad.170 The west zone was bounded in the west by 
the coastal area of Manila Bay where groundwater depletion had already lowered water tables 
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increasing pumping costs and causing saline water intrusion. With an older pipe distribution 
network, the west zone registered relatively large water distribution losses (estimated to be 60-70% 
in comparison to 50-55% for the East Zone).  
 
Table 2. Features of the Service Area  
Features West Zone East Zone 
Land Area (sq. km.) 540 1,400 
Service Area 17 cities/municipalities 23 cities/municipalities 
Total Population, 2007 8 M 6 M 
Population Served, 2007 5.6 M 5.4 M 
Water Production 2,400 MLD 1,600 MLD 
House Service Connections App. 700,000 App. 610,000 
Source: MWSS 
 
3.3. Salient Provisions of the Contract  
 
The delegation of water service provision to Maynilad and Manila Water operates under a 25-
year concession contract.171 The Concession Agreement (CA) grants the private operators an 
exclusive right to manage, operate, repair and refurbish the facilities in their service area, 
including the right to bill and collect revenues for the water services supplied in order to recover 
all their investments within the contract period. At the end of the concession period, the asset 
base and all additional assets invested by the concessionaires are turned over to the public sector. 
The government, however, may choose to extend the contract, organize another competitive 
bidding or directly run the system.  
 
The CA embodies the tenor of a partnership-based contracting, albeit with greater relational slant. 
The CA encourages the parties to “use reasonable efforts to resolve any disagreements or disputes 
concerning the interpretation or implementation of the CA” through consultation and negotiation. 
Under Article 7 of the CA, the MWSS is expected upon the request of the concessionaire to 
“cooperate in all reasonable ways to facilitate the fulfillment by the concessionaire of its responsibilities 
under the Concession”. The cooperation to be rendered by the MWSS does not involve any form of financial 
assistance or guarantees, which is consistent with the intent of a concession arrangement, i.e., to attract 
private capital and strengthen incentives for efficiency. As provided in Article 10 of the CA, either 
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party may file for early termination if the other party fails to fulfill his end of the bargain. The 
concessionaires may file for early termination if the MWSS is found to prevent the concessionaire 
from performing its obligations. The MWSS may also terminate the contract if the concessionaire, 
based on the reasonable opinion of the Regulatory Office, effectively abandons the CA, i.e., the 
concessionaire jeopardizes the provision of water services in a significant part of its service area. Based on 
these provisions, the CA sets a high threshold for triggering termination by the government, 
exemplifying a strong bias against termination in conformity with the stance of a partnership 
contracting. 
 
3.3.1. Price regulatory method 
 
The CA adopts a low-powered price regulatory method, setting tariffs based on a cost-plus 
scheme where all costs are reimbursed and earn a market-based appropriate discount rate (ADR). 
Article 9 of the CA provides for general procedures for rate adjustments but it does not set any 
fixed formula on how to achieve specific service level or imposes efficiency targets using key 
performance indicators. Article 9.4 of the CA states: 
 
Article 9.4: It is the intention of the parties that the rates shall be set at a level that will permit the 
concessionaire to recover over the 25-year term of the concession net of grants, operating, capital 
maintenance and investment expenditures efficiently and prudently incurred. 
 
The absence of a rigid formula for price adjustments provides the private partner ample leeway 
to focus on expanding service coverage and enhancing service quality. Water rates are adjusted 
to permit the concessionaire to recover all the “efficiently and prudently” expenses incurred over 
the concession period of 25 years plus Philippine business taxes and payments corresponding to 
debt service on MWSS loans and concessionaire loans incurred to finance such expenditures. The 
key performance indicators (KPIs) mutually agreed between the concessionaires and MWSS/RO 
serve as the basis for determining the prudent and efficient expenditures of the Concessionaires. 
Other mechanisms to determine prudency and efficiency of expenses are to be explored by the RO with the 
concessionaires. As expected of a long-term partnership contract, the contract are couched in broad terms 
to accommodate transparent and structured negotiation between the contracting parties necessary to 
account for changes in bargaining conditions.  
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In lieu of a rigid price regulatory method, the private operators have to meet specific criteria for 
price adjustments. The contract expressly requires the concessionaires to take into account the 
following: (i) impact of the proposed adjustments on low-income domestic households; (ii) the 
desirability of sending economically efficient price signals to customers to encourage sustainable 
consumption patterns; and (iii) the appropriateness of reducing cross-subsidies between different 
customer categories.  
 
The adjustment of the tariffs is undertaken every five years through a rate rebasing exercise. The 
rate rebasing exercise involves a detailed review of past and projected cash flows necessary for 
the fulfillment of the performance obligations of the concessionaires. The determination of the 
“appropriate” rate of return is made separately at the time of each generalized rate rebasing. The 
ADR is adjusted to keep it in line with the prevailing rates of return charged on the operation of 
long-term infrastructure concession arrangements in other countries that have similar credit 
standing as the Philippines.  The ADR approximates the efficient commercially practicable rent 
discussed in Section 2.1 with the latter laying greater emphasis on evolving bargaining conditions 
(e.g., informational asymmetry and regulatory capacity). 
 
The use of an investor-friendly cost-plus scheme reflected the desired size of investment and the 
prevailing bargaining conditions at the time of contracting. The private operator agreed to 
assume the financial obligations of the government on top of their service obligations in exchange 
for an investor-friendly price regulatory method. The financial and service obligations include 
the following:    
 
(i) The concessionaires must pay concession fees to repay MWSS debts and fund the operating 
budget of the Regulatory Office and the residual MWSS; 
(ii) The private operators have to pay the cost of expanding raw water supply needed to meet water 
service obligations during the first ten years of the concession period. This means having to 
reduce non-revenue water and rehabilitating old facilities and developing new ones. Within a 
ten-year period, water service coverage was expected to reach 96 percent. The expansion in 
service coverage included the establishment of public standpipes for households in depressed 
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areas where users may not be able to pay individual connection fees or where the cost of 
connection may be too high relative to expected revenue172; 
(iii) The concessionaires were also under obligation to provide uninterrupted water supply to all 
connections and maintain water pressure at 16 psi three years from the date the agreement 
entered into force, and meet national health and environmental standards on quality of 
drinking water.  
 
As an additional safeguard to preserve the efficiency and investment objectives of a concession 
arrangement, the CA also requires the concessionaires to maintain an equity share of 20 percent 
for the first five years and 10 percent thereafter and post a performance bond, bank guarantee or 
other security acceptable to MWSS on each rebasing date from which the penalty for non-
compliance with the CA would be deducted.  
 
3.3.2. Ex-post Risk-sharing mechanisms 
 
To make the concession arrangement even more attractive to investors, the cost-reimbursement 
method comes with various cost pass-through schemes. The CA provides for adjustment and 
loss-recovery mechanisms to account for the impact of a change in circumstances on the 
commercial practicability of the transaction. The adjustment and loss-recovery mechanisms include 
(i) inflation indexation which allows the concessionaires to adjust their tariffs annually to 
consumer price index (CPI)-based inflation; and (ii) extra-ordinary price adjustment (EPA) to 
accommodate any adjustment arising from unforeseen events, including changes in law and 
government regulations.  
 
Article 9.3 of the CA states that it is the intention of the parties that should certain unforeseen 
events occur during the term of the concession, rates may be adjusted to account for the financial 
consequences of such events. The concessionaire may at any time require the Regulatory Office 
to consider circumstances that the concessionaires believe constitutes grounds for extra-ordinary 
price adjustment and vice versa. The EPA may be effected if the Regulatory Office, following 
consultation with the concessionaire, determines that amendments should be made to the service 
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obligations. In effect, the concessionaires are insured against unanticipated or unaccounted-for variations 
in market and regulatory risks. These are risks that the parties did not intend to cover when they promised 
to deliver the performance targets (i.e., unbargained-for events).  
 
To further entice the concessionaires to invest, the contract grants several fiscal incentives, 
including a six-year income tax holiday, a preferential tariff of three per cent on capital equipment 
imports and tax credits on locally fabricated capital equipment; and exemption from local 
government and franchise taxes and the Value Added Tax (VAT) on the supply and distribution 
of water.  
 
3.3.3. Regulatory and arbitral institutions 
 
With a wide scope for negotiation, gap-filling mechanisms, i.e., regulatory agency and arbitration 
court are crucial for the proper interpretation and enforcement of the contract. An incomplete 
contract affords substantial residual control rights to the regulator, the concessionaires and 
arbitration tribunal. The MWSS Regulatory Office (RO) is tasked to monitor and enforce 
compliance with the terms of the contract, implement rate adjustments, arrange for public 
dissemination of relevant information, respond to complaints against concessionaires, and 
prosecute or defend proceedings before the Appeals Panel. The CA, however, was constrained 
by the MWSS Charter in establishing an independent and well-capacitated regulatory body. The 
original plan, as advised by the IFC, was to create an external regulatory office akin to the Office 
of Water Services of the United Kingdom. The establishment of an external regulatory office, 
however, would have to go through a lengthy legislative enactment process. The government 
thus proceeded to create a semi-autonomous regulatory office within the MWSS. As mentioned 
above, the annual operating budget of the regulatory office would be partly funded by the 
concession fees paid by the water operators. Section 11.1 of the CA provides: 
 
The MWSS Board of Trustees shall establish and fund a regulatory office to be organized and 
operated in a manner consistent with the description contained in Exhibit A hereto, subjected 
to changes thereto that the MWSS Board of Trustees may make from time to time, and shall 
have the functions and powers described in that Exhibit. Decisions of the Regulatory Office 
requiring action by the MWSS Board of Trustees, including decisions affecting the level of 
Standard Rates, shall promptly be submitted to the Board… 
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As noted above, the CA prescribes the parties to “use reasonable efforts to resolve any disagreements 
or disputes concerning the interpretation or implementation of the CA” through consultation and 
negotiation. If parties fail to settle their disputes for themselves, either party may choose to bring 
the dispute before an arbitration panel. As stipulated in Article 13 of the CA, the Appeals Panel 
is composed of a member appointed by concessionaires, a member appointed by MWSS, and a 
third member, the Chairman or presiding arbitrator, appointed by the International Chamber of 
Commerce. Any decision or award of the appeals panel is deemed final and binding upon the 
parties. To the maximum extent permitted by applicable law, the party waives any right to seek 
any interlocutory or other relief from any judicial or regulatory body or to appeal or seek the 
review of an Appeals Panel award by any court, regulatory body or other tribunal. The out-of-
pocket costs incurred by the Appeals Panel in connection with any concession-related proceeding 
brought before it are apportioned by the parties. 
 
3.4. Contract Enforcement: Recurrent Legal and Regulatory Disputes  
 
Despite the introduction of relational norms to the contract, the contractual relationship between 
the MWSS-RO and the two concessionaires was discordant, albeit not to an extent of 
unequivocally frustrating the investment and efficiency objectives of the contract. The parties are 
at variance regarding the application of the provisions on the ADR and what constitutes efficient 
and prudent spending, among others. Except for the most recent dispute, all disagreements were 
resolved with the Philippine government having to: (i.) pay legal fees amounting to several millions 
of dollars; (ii.) accommodate wide price adjustments with the introduction of new loss-recovery 
mechanisms; (iii.) scale-down performance targets; and (iv.) devise a bail-out program for one of the water 
concessionaires.  
 
3.4.1. Early Stage of the Concession. A series of supervening events at the early stage of the 
concession agreement put a strain on contractual relationship. The contract had to be renegotiated 
on account of two major unanticipated events: (i) the Asian financial crisis which led to the 
depreciation of the peso by over 50 percent; and (ii) an unprecedented drought accompanied by a change in 
government rules on the allocation of raw water which reduced water supply by 35 percent. 173 
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MWSS-Manila Water Dispute on the Rate of Return: In March 1998, less than a year into the 
agreement, Manila Water submitted a petition for an extraordinary price adjustment (EPA) to 
account for massive financial losses it suffered owing to the Asian financial crisis and a severe 
drought. Unanticipated cost overruns of existing projects that were originally developed by the 
government  put further strain on the finances of the company.174 The proposed EPA of Manila 
Water, however, was significantly higher than the figure computed by MWSS-RO, prompting the 
latter to deny the concessionaire’s petition. The company in turn sought redress before the 
Appeals Panel. The wide difference in their EPA estimates resulted from their disparate 
application of the provisions on the appropriate discount rate (ADR). The CA provides the parties 
some flexibilities in determining the ADR: 
 
In determining the Appropriate Discount Rate, the Regulatory Office shall apply 
conventional and internationally accepted methods, and in particular shall make 
estimates of the cost of debt in domestic and international markets, the cost of equity 
for utility businesses in the Philippines and abroad and shall make adjustments to 
such estimates to reflect country risks, exchange risks and any other project risks. 
The Regulatory Office, at its sole discretion, may consider the Concessionaire’s rate 
of return, either state or implied in its bid, in determining the Appropriate Discount 
Rate. 
 
Manila Water argued that the ADR should be based on market conditions that prevailed at the 
time the petition for EPA was made, proposing an ADR of 18 percent, monumentally lower than 
the 5.2 percent ADR computed by the MWSS-RO. The MWSS-RO, on the other hand, determined 
the ADR based on implied discount rate of the financial model submitted in the bid. The crisis, 
however, made it more expensive for the concessionaires to access the Ànancial market for their 
capital investment projects due to the sudden jump in risk premiums as a result of the Asian 
financial crisis.175 The market circumstances during the crisis were radically different from that 
which prevailed during the negotiation of the contract. Aptly so, the Appeals Panel sided with 
Manila Water on the use of current rates as the basis for ADR updating, but the Panel arrived at 
a much lower ADR of 9.3 percent. In the parlance of a partnership contracting, the Appeals Panel 
succeeded in bringing the two parties back in the zone of efficient commercially practicable rent. 
Notwithstanding, the parties were at each other’s throats again during the first rebasing exercise. 
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  174 See Negishi (n.d.). 
   175 See Xun and Malaluan. (2008). 
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Unlike in the previous dispute, however, a compromised agreement was reached as parties’ 
estimates differed only by a small margin. The parties agreed to set the tariff at P17 per cubic 
meter, slightly lower than Maynilad’s proposed tariff of P19.54 per cubic meter and higher than 
the agency’s approved tariff of P15.65 per cubic meter. 
 
MWSS-Maynilad Disputes: Disruptive Renegotiation. Maynilad, on the other hand, was in deeper 
financial trouble owing to its huge foreign-denominated debts which swelled after the peso lost 
half of its value. Maynilad assumed the USD720-million foreign debt of the MWSS; the same also 
inherited much of the water distribution losses of the MWSS caused by aging and poorly 
maintained distribution networks. The size and condition of the water infrastructure in its service 
area was found to be larger and in a poorer state than was indicated in the bidding documents. 
Facing an imminent danger of bankruptcy, Maynilad asked the government for additional loss-
recovery mechanisms. Although initially the MWSS-RO was not amenable to Maynilad’s 
proposed amendments, a series of negotiations led to the accommodation of Maynilad’ request 
through Amendment No. 1.  
 
Amendment No. 1 introduced two key mechanisms: the foreign currency differential adjustment 
(FCDA); and the accelerated extraordinary price adjustment (AEPA). The FCDA was a quarterly rate 
adjustment of P4.07 per cubic meter which allowed the concessionaires to recover present and 
future foreign exchange losses incurred from servicing the foreign-denominated debt of the 
MWSS beginning 2002 until the end of the contract period.176 AEPA, on the other hand, was a rate 
adjustment of P4.21 per cubic meter for Maynilad and P1 per cubic meter for Manila Water to 
recover foreign exchange losses from 1997 to 2000. A Special Transitory Mechanism was also in 
place to enable the concessionaires to recover the foreign exchange losses during the period not 
covered by the FCDA and the AEPA. Additionally, targets for expansion and NRW were also 
revised downwards to lower capital expenditure requirements in the early years of operation. 
Shortly after Amendment No. 1, average tariff of Manila Water increased from P2.32 per cubic meter in 
1997 to P4.51 pcm in 2002, while that of Maynilad rose sharply to Php11.39 pcm in 2002 from P4.96 pcm 
in 1997.  
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Early Termination and Arbitral Decision. In the first-rate rebasing exercise in 2002, Maynilad sought 
further tariff adjustments. In 2001, the company was already operating at an annual net loss of 
1.1 billion pesos. Subsequently, the company stopped paying concession fees and requested the 
MWSS to initiate a price adjustment. The proposed price adjustment, however, would perch the 
tariff at P34.72 per cubic meter, much higher than the P24 per cubic meter recommended by 
MWSS-RO’s external experts; hence, Maynilad’s petition was denied. Instead of filing a comlaint 
before the Appeals Panel, one of the consortium’s partner filed a notice of early termination, citing 
that MWSS’s refusal to grant its request for a tariff relief in 2002 constituted a failure to conduct 
a fair and objective rate rebasing exercise. The concessionaire accused the MWSS-RO of 
preventing it from fulfilling its obligations to creditors and government in violation of the terms 
of the CA.  
 
MWSS-RO, however, contended that it was Maynilad that failed to comply with the Agreement 
as the latter discontinued to pay concession fees and was unable to reduce NRW, maintain and 
construct two aqueducts and infuse USD80 million in equity. The MWSS-RO further claimed that 
it gave all necessary support to Maynilad and that the financial troubles of the company were 
brought by its overestimation of revenue, underestimation of costs, and failure to cushion itself 
from foreign exchange risks. It is worth noting that allegations regarding Maynilad’s weak 
financial management were validated by a study conducted by Wu and Malaluan (2008). In its 
defense and counterclaim, Maynilad denied that it was contractually obliged to reduce NRW or 
invest an additional USD60 million in equity. The company further maintained that it had in fact 
performed its obligations to maintain and repair the BNAQ-5 aqueduct and that it was under no 
obligation to construct the other one since the need for the construction of the aqueduct arose 
from the poor construction of the BNAQ-5 aqueduct by the MWSS.  
 
Within a partnership contracting framework discussed in Section 2, Maynila disputably failed to meet the 
efficiency test but not the investment test; the contractual relationship may thus be continued. Taking into 
account the investment made by Maynilad and the severe informational and enforcement constraints of the 
MWSS-RO, the latter could have cut the bargaining costs if it agreed to a price adjustment close to what 
Maynilad demanded and made the necessary price readjustment in subsequent rate rebasing exercise when 
it could better assess Maynilad’s performance. The failure of the regulatory agency to accommodate the 
necessary contract adaptation, however, was addressed by the arbitral court.  
ϭϰϲͮW Ă Ő Ğ 



 
Crucial Arbitral Decisions: The Arbitration Panel ruled in favor of the MWSS on the issue of 
payment of concession fees and drawdown of performance bond to cover all the delinquent fees 
owed by Maynilad to MWSS.177 Maynilad’s non-payment of concession fees compelled MWSS to 
tap the debt market to refinance maturing loans. The arbitral decision was in accordance with the 
intent of a concession contract to unburden the government of any financial obligations. The 
Panel also rightly did not issue any decision on the service target adjustments as these are 
expressly stipulated in the contract, while it sided with the concessionaire on all other issues. 
MWSS was also found to have misinterpreted  the “cash flows” of the company resulting in 
substantial disallowances; hence, the MWSS was ordered to approve the proposed rates of 
Maynilad. More importantly, the Panel found that neither side had sufficient grounds for 
termination and concluded with an order for both parties to continue fulfilling their obligations, 
and restart “goodwill” discussions on the fairness and objectivity of the rate rebasing exercise.178   
 
The Local Court and Politics: To stem its financial hemorrhage, Maynilad filed a petition for 
rehabilitation at the Quezon City Regional Trial Court. The court imposed a stay order which 
protected the company’s assets from its creditors and allowed them to proceed with the 
restructuring plan. The court classified the USD120 million performance bond as part of the 
company’s assets. The MWSS-RO challenged the stay order in the Supreme Court, which was 
allegedly made under pressure of the Executive who was then seeking re-election during that 
year and thus needed the support of the influential local partner of the consortium, the Benpres 
Group 179 . The MWSS-RO was initially opposed to Maynilad’s petition, but it eventually 
negotiated a compromise agreement via Amendment No. 2.  
 
Renationalization and Re-privatization: Amendment No. 2 committed the government to limit its 
drawing of the USD120 performance bond to USD50 million with the unpaid concession fees 
converted into equity.180 The National Economic Development Authority (NEDA),181 however, 
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   177 See Ibon Foundation (2005). 
   178 See Chavez (n. d.). 
   179 The Benpres Group owns the country’s largest electricity distribution company, holds interest in telecoms, toll roads and the 
biggest television channel. 
   180 See Chavez (n. d.). 
   181 NEDA is the agency tasked to approve projects undertaken through build-own-and-operate scheme and contractual 
arrangements. 
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disapproved Amendment No. 2. Maynilad in turn submitted a new rehabilitation plan to the RTC 
in September 2004. The new rehabilitation plan involved the purchase by MWSS of the equity of 
the foreign partners of Maynilad worth USD27 million, a partial write-off of the debts of Maynilad 
to reduce accumulated losses, a tariff adjustment from P19.92 to P30.19 per cubic meter and a 
downscaling of service targets.182 The renationalization of the water system was temporary. The 
government pledged to fully re-privatize the operation when the company’s finances were 
restored. In December 2006, the consortium of DM Consunji Holdings, Inc. (DMCI) and Metro 
Pacific Investments Corp. (MPIC) won the bid for the government’s stake in Maynilad, beating 
Ayala-owned Manila Water Co. and BPI Capital Investments. 
 
3.4.2. Latter Stage of the Concession. Disagreements between the contracting parties persisted even 
at the latter stage of the concession but their disputes now go beyond  ADR and price adjustments. 
It relates to auditing rules and the nature of the agreement, i.e., whether the concessionaires are 
public utilities or mere agents of the MWSS, which would have bearing on their tax obligations 
and profit limits.  
 
MWSS-RO on Downward Price Adjustments. After a series of upward price adjustments during the 
last two rate-rebasing exercises, the third rebasing exercise ordered the concessionaire to reduce 
their rates, inciting another round of disputes between the MWSS-RO and the two 
concessionaires. Manila Water, which proposed a basic rate increase of Php5.83 pcm, was ordered 
to cut its rate by Php1.45 pcm, while Maynilad, which requested a rate increase of Php8.58 pcm, 
was advised to reduce its rates by Php1.29 pcm, placing the average tariff of Manila Water and 
Maynilad at Php23.12 pcm and Php33.99 pcm, respectively.183The reduction in water rates was 
mainly attributed to three factors: (i.) prohibition on passing of income taxes on to customers; (ii.) 
stricter auditing procedures where transaction documents, such as vouchers and receipts are examined to 
determine disallowances of expenses; and (iii) a lower ADR due to declining cost of capital. 
 
Non-recovery of corporate income tax. The restriction on the recovery of corporate income tax 
through customer fees is a new regulation adopted based on the resolution issued by the MWSS-
RO in 2013. Since the start of the concession, corporate income tax had been treated as a 

  182 See Freedom from Debt Coalition (2008). 
  183 See Landingin (2013). 
ϭϰϴͮW Ă Ő Ğ 



recoverable expense by the concessionaires. In March 2004, the MWSS-RO issued a notice of extra-
ordinary price adjustment to both concessionaires to account for the recalculation of the 
recoverable expenses of the concessionaires in response to the Supreme Court ruling. The SC 
resolution dated April 9 2003 in Republic v. Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) held that 
income tax payments of a utility are not expenses which contribute to or are incurred in 
connection with the production of output. The move of the MWSS was questioned by the 
concessionaires citing that unlike MERALCO they are not public utilities; they were mere agents 
and contractors of MWSS as per Concession Agreement. In June 2004, the MWSS Board of 
Trustees directed its RO and concessionaires to create a Technical Working Group (TWG) to help 
the parties find a mutually acceptable resolution.  
 
The TWG took the view that unlike Meralco, the concessionaires were not public utilities, but 
were just agents of MWSS due to the following reasons: (i) the intent of the CA is for the MWSS to 
remain as a public utility providing waterworks and sewerage services, while the concessionaires are its 
agents and contractors, consistent with the framework of a concession arrangement; (ii) it is the MWSS 
that has the legislative franchise under its Charter, while the concessionaires do not have a franchise; (iii) 
the MWSS contracted the services of the concessionaires to perform certain functions and authorized them, 
by way of agency, to exercise certain rights in performing their obligations; (iv) during the bidding and 
selection of concessionaires, the latter had submitted their bids on the basis of MWSS representation that 
it would retain its status as a public utility having jurisdiction, supervision and control over all waterworks 
and sewerage system within Metro Manila, Rizal and Cavite; and (v) based on the framework of the 
Concession Agreements (specifically on Art. 1 Definitions, Art. 2.1 Grant of Concession, and Art. 9.4 
General Rate Setting Policy/Rate Rebasing Determination), the MERALCO ruling has no relevance to the 
concessionaires’ situation.184 The MWSS-RO approved and adopted all the findings and recommendations 
of the TWG report as contained in its memorandum to the MWSS Board of Trustees dated July 29, 2004 
rescinding its previous resolution.  
 
In 2013, however, the MWSS-RO put forward new arguments for disallowing the treatment of 
income tax as a recoverable expense, such as that: (i) income taxes are not in the list of “Philippine 
business taxes” set out in 1997 CA; (ii) concessionaires, as taxpayers, have a duty to pay income tax; and 
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(iii) while the concessionaires may not be public utilities, they are subject to the same laws and rules 
applicable to the principal, the MWSS.185 In disagreement with the MWSS, the concessionaires filed 
a case before the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The ICC, however, issued a different 
ruling on the two concessionaires, that is, it permitted the recovery of corporate income tax for 
Maynilad but not for Manila Water. With disparate ruling on the two concessionaires, the MWSS 
plans to file a case with the Supreme Court of the Philippines. Maynilad, insisted that the arbitral 
decision is final and executory. The CA, however, allows for judicial review under special 
circumstances. With the delays in the tariff adjustments, both concessionaires are demanding the 
Philippine government compensation for revenue losses. Maynilad is demanding P3.44 billion in 
compensation for its revenue losses due to the delayed implementation of the arbitration panel-
approved rate increase in December 2014. Manila Water, on the other hand, is seeking P79 billion 
or approximately USD 1.79 billion in potential revenue losses from 2015 up to the end of its 
contract in 2037 caused by the non-recovery of CIT. 
 
Disallowances of expenses. The downward adjustment in average basic water charges was due to 
the imposition of stricter auditing procedures by the MWSS-RO which resulted in the 
disallowances for operating and capital expenditures. Substantial disallowances were made for 
unsubstantiated expenses and unliquidated cash advances, infrastructure projects and 
unjustified variation orders, among others. The MWSS-RO effected disallowances of over a 
hundred billion pesos in future capital expenditures of the companies. OPEX Accounts with 
major disallowances include salaries and benefits in excess of benchmarks, advertising expenses 
not directly related to Concession operations, unnecessary management and technical fees, 
donations and sponsorship not related to Concession operations and business meetings and 
representation expenses not related to Concession service operations, or in excess of paid 
allowances.186 
 
The MWSS-RO performed three-fold tests to determine whether the expenses should be 
recovered in the form of tariffs: (i) relationship test; (ii) allowable expense test; and (iii) prudence and 
efficiency test. With the contract having been in force for several years, the use of more rigorous 
tests is proper. The relationship test examines if the expenses are made to fulfill concessionaires’ 
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  186 See MWSS Annual Report (2014). 
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obligations, while the allowable expense test sees if the expenses made are covered in the 
contract. The prudence and efficiency test assesses whether the expenses are incurred in a 
prudent and efficient manner. The MWSS-RO also allows variation orders if the concessionaire 
can show that the variation was occasioned by unforeseen events that could not have been 
reasonably anticipated even with due diligence. Although it can be difficult to establish whether 
the expenses are indeed used to fulfill the concessionaires’ obligations efficiently, the MWSS-RO 
presented unarguably valid grounds and used fair and reasonable methods for most of the 
disallowances, such as the disallowances on charitable contributions and media expenses. 
Allowing the concessionaires to recover the charitable contributions does not only amount to 
having the water usersinvoluntarily pay for the company’s charitable contributions, but it also 
allows the concessionaires to earn profit from such contributions through the ADR. As 
reasonably argued by the MWSS-RO, the media expenses cannot all be recovered as they were 
made to promote the services of the concessionaires’ subsidiaries operating outside the 
concession area.  
 
Estimating the ADR. The regulatory office used the 10-Year Republic of the Philippines bond 
yields as the reference risk-free rate, which is one of the components of ADR. The private operator 
insisted on using the 25-year bond which carries more risks and thus charges a higher rate of 
return. The use of shorter tenor was justly argued by the regulatory office to be the more 
appropriate basis for the following reasons: the ADR is adjusted every five years; the debt tenors 
of the private operator averaged between seven and ten years; nearly all regulatory groups in 
world use a risk-free tenor of five to ten years; and reassessment of investment is made at intervals 
shorter than the concession term or the remaining life of the asset. The MWSS-RO set the ADR at 
7.35 percent, lower than that proposed 8.95 percent of ADR of Manila Water and Maynilad, a 
percentage point difference in the ADR amounts to several millions in pesos. Interestingly, the 
two water operators revised the figure down to 7.89 percent when it submitted its proposal to the 
arbitration court, much closer to the ADR of the MWSS-RO.    
 
 
 
 
ϭϱϭͮW Ă Ő Ğ 



3.5. Performance of Water Concessionaires: An Assessment 
 
At the early stage of the 
concession, the concession-
based privatization fell short 
of the desired outcomes. 
Based on a survey 
conducted by the World 
Bank and the MWSS called 
the Public Assessment of 
Water Services in 2000, 67 
percent of the 10,000 
household respondents 
thought that water services did not improve and even became worse since privatization, albeit 
not to an extent of manifestly frustrating the investment and efficiency objectives of a concession 
contract. Against the chronically poor performance of the MWSS, the two concessionaires, 
especially Manila Water, performed better in service coverage and non-revenue water even 
during a crisis period in 1997-1998. Ten years hence, gains from the arrangement have become 
more evident in terms of service coverage, non-revenue water, water availability, and water rates.  
 
3.5.1. Trends in the Prices of Water Supply Services  
Upon entry into force of the concession agreement, the average all-in tariff of Manila Water and 
Maynila fell by 54 percent and 18 percent, respectively (See Table 4). The average tariffs remained 
below pre-privatization level until the third year into the agreement. The concession contracts 
had to be renegotiated on account of the emergence of two supervening events, i.e., the Asian 
financial crisis and an unpredented drought. Water tariffs were drastically adjusted upward to keep 
the water companies afloat.  As a result, all-in tariffs of Manila Water and Maynilad during period 
1998-2002 recorded an average annual growth rate of 33 percent and 44 percent, respectively.  
 
 
Table 3. Non-Revenue Water and Water Service Coverage: Pre and Post-
Privatization 
Period Maynilad, 
Financial 
Model 
Maynilad, 
Actual 
Maynilad, 
Financial 
Model 
Manila Water, 
Actual 
Non-Revenue Water (%) 
Pre-Concession: 58 
1997 57.4 63.3 57.4 63 
1998 47.9 60.5 47.9 55.2 
1999 42 67 42 53 
2000 30.8 65.5 30.8 51 
2001 29.8 65.99 29.8 52 
Water Service Coverage (%)  
Pre-Concession: 67 
2001 87 79 77 76 
2006 97 75 94 98 
Source: MWSS  
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Table 4. Pre and Post-Privatization Tariffs 
Period Average Tariff Average All-In Tariff 
Pre-
Privatization 
8.56 8.78 
Period Manila 
Water 
% 
Change 
Maynilad  % 
Change 
Manila 
Water 
 % 
Change 
Maynilad  % 
Change 
 
Pre v. Post 
Privatiztion: 
Immediate 
Tariff 
Reduction 
 
 
-73% 
 
 
-42.06% 
 
 
-54% 
 
 
-18% 
1998-2002: 
Ave. Annual 
Growth Rate 
24% 32% 33% 44% 
1998 2.32  4.96  4.02  7.21  
1999 2.6 12% 5.8 16.94% 4.37 9% 8.23 14% 
2000 2.76 6% 6.13 5.69% 4.55 4% 8.63 5% 
2001 3.46 25% 8.69 41.76% 5.4 19% 11.72 36% 
2002 4.51 30% 11.39 31.07% 9.37 74% 19.92 70% 
2003-2008: 
Ave. Annual 
Growth Rate 
 
19% 
 
24% 
 
16% 
 
12% 
2003 10.06 123% 11.39 0.00% 13.6 45% 19.92 0% 
2004 10.4 3% 11.39 0.00% 14.01 3% 18.71 -6% 
2005 13.95 34% 19.72 73.13% 18.57 33% 30.19 61% 
2006 14.94 7% 19.84 0.61% 19.87 7% 32.51 8% 
2007 15.90 6% 20.53 3.48% 20.51 3% 32.96 1% 
2008 19.64 24% 24.86 21.09% 24.55 20% 32.05 -3% 
2009-2013: 
Ave. Annual 
Growth Rate 
8% 6% 8% 12.4% 
2009 21.91 12% 26.90 8.21% 27.99 14% 31.19 -3% 
2010 23.08 5% 28.29 5.17% 30.12 8% 37.4 20% 
2011 25.11 9% 30.43 7.56% 33.57 11% 40.80 9% 
2012 27.44 9% 32.92 8.18% 38.12 14% 45.27 11% 
2013 28.99 6% 33.97 3.19% 37.3 -2% 46.66 3% 
Note: The gap between average tariff and all-in average tariff is accounted for by  environmental and sewerage charges, and miscellaneous 
fees 
Source: MWSS-RO 
 
In subsequent years (2003-2008), all-in tariffs continued to increase, albeit at a slower rate. The 
average annual growth rates of all-in tariffs of Manila Water and Maynilad in period 2003-2008 
were 16 percent and 12 percent, respectively. The average annual growth rate of Manila Water’s 
all-in tariffs further declined in 2009-2013, while there was a marginal increase in the average 
annual growth rate of Maynilad’s all-in tariff during said period. The decline in all-in tariffs partly 
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reflected the decrease in risk premium as indicated by the appropriate discount rate (ADR). The 
ADR has been trending downward (i.e., 2003-2007: 10.4 percent; 2008-2012: 9.3 percent; and 2013-
2017: 7.89 percent). 
 
3.5.2. Non-Revenue Water, Water Service Coverage and Water Availability 
 
In terms of NRW 187 , the two concessionaires 
performed poorly in earlier periods due to 
pilferage, leakages in pipes, joints and fittings and 
overflow at the utility’s reservoir. NRW is 
considered as the best overall indicator of efficiency 
of water utility management, particularly in terms 
of operation and system maintenance. Managing 
NRW is one of the most complex and difficult tasks 
of a water operator. 188  In 2001, water distribution 
losses of Maynilad reached 66 percent, higher than the pre-privatization level of 58 percent. There 
is a wide disparity in the projected NRW in the financial model and the actual NRW reflecting 
severe informational deficiencies on the state of water distribution networks buried underground 
and the overall operating environment (See Table 3).  Addressing water distribution losses in 
Metro Manila was made more difficult by inaccurate data provided by MWSS on the length and 
location of the underground networks.189 Maynilad initially planned to decommission old pipe 
lines and lay down new ones to reduce non-revenue water, but the actual length of the network 
turned out to be 4,000 kilometers, much longer than the 2,500 kilometers stated in the bid 
document prepared by the government.190 The additional cost of replacing 1,500 kilometers of 
pipelines led to the abandonment of the plan.  
 
In 2012, water supply coverage of Maynilad and Manila Water was reported to be at 96 percent 
and 99 percent respectively. Manila Water was also able to reduce its non-revenue water to 11 

  187Defined in terms of percentages, NRW refers to the difference between the amount of water put into the distribution system and 
the amount of water billed to consumers.  
  188See Espiritu (2011).  
  189 See Cheng (2013).
  190 See Special Unit for South-South Cooperation. 
Table 5. Maynilad, Performance Indicators, 
2007-2014 
Period Investment 
(Php B) 
Water 
Losses 
Supply 
Coverage 
2007 37.8 (2007-
2012) 
67 46 
2008 60 58 
2009 57 65 
2010 51 71 
2011 42 84 
2012 41 96 
2013 35.4 97.8 
2014 31.1 97.7 
Source: Maynilad 
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percent since 2010, while Maynilad cut the distribution losses from 60 percent in 2008 to 31.1 
percent in 2014 (See Table 5). Maynilad reported an allocation of approximately P2 billion for its 
NRW Reduction program, which covers meter management, leak repairs, and pipe replacement. 
Maynilad under the new management191 has invested Php37.8 billion during period 2007-2014, 
nearly quadrupled the amount invested in period 2003-2006  when the MWSS and Benpres-
Lyonnaise still owned the majority shares of the company. The MWSS-RO, however, could not 
independently verify the figures due to “limited personnel”.192 
 
In 2013, Manila Water and Maynilad recorded over 25,000 and 81,734 new connections in 2013, 
respectively. Over 204,000 families or about 40,000 households mostly in informal settlements in 
Metro Manila, however, have yet to obtain individual piped connections. These areas, however, 
were also underserved under public management. ADB and Manila Water have been reaching 
out to low-income communities through the company’s “Tubig para sa Barangay” (Water for the 
Community) project which offered low connection fees and affordable water tariffs. Just recently, 
ADB and Manila Water also embarked on an education campaign on wastewater management 
to restore the health of the Pasig River, Metro Manila’s polluted main waterway.193 Maynilad, on 
the other hand, has steadily enhanced water availability. Over 96 percent of the customers of 
Maynilad now have 24-hour water supply compared to over one-third in 2006.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Maynilad, Water Availability, 2007-2015 
Indicators 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
24-hour service (% of 
households with 
piped connections) 
46 58 65 71 84 96 97.8 99.9 
Source: Maynilad 

  191Maynilad Water Services, Inc. (Maynilad) was owned by Benpres Holdings Corporation and Suez Lyonnaise de Eaux  In 2005, 
Benpres and Suez ceded management and control of Maynilad to MWSS. It was rebid the following year in which MCI-MPIC Water 
Company, a joint venture between Metro Pacific Investments Corporation (MPIC) and DMCI Holdings, Inc. (DMCI), won and 
acquired 83.96% of Maynilad's shares. In 2013, Marubeni Corporation of Japan acquired a 20% stake in DMCI-MPIC Water 
Company and became a strategic partner of the Metro Pacific-DMCI consortium. 
   192 See Ibon Foundation. (2013). 
   193 See Rivera (2014). 
Table 6. Performance of the Water Concessionaires, 2012 and 2013 
Indicators Manila Water (East Zone) Maynilad (West Zone) 
2012 2013 2012 2013 
Water Service Connections 896,148 921,898 1,969,656 2,051,390 
Non-Revenue Water (%) 11.12 12.3 27.29 25.52 
Source: MWSS-RO 
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3.5.3. Performance of Water Concessionaires vs. Public Corporations and Other Private Utilities 
 
Compared to other large private utilities and corporatized water districts, although they are still 
much smaller than the two water concessionaires in terms of capitalization and number of 
connections, the water rates of Maynilad and Manila Water are lower. The cost of 30 cubic meters 
of water in three largest urban cities in the Philippines (Davao, Cagayan and Cebu), served by 
water districts, is higher than in Metro Manila. In earlier periods (2003 & 2009), the average 
tariffs of the two concessionaire remained comparable to those of other large private utilities, 
while their service coverage was higher than that of other private utilities principally on account 
of their remarkably high staff productivity. 
 
Table 8. Performance of Water Concessionaires v. Comparable Water Utilities, 2016 
Indicators Maynilad Manila 
Water 
Davao  
WD 
Cagayan 
WD 
Cebu 
WD 
Clark Water 
Corporation 
Water Bill (In Php, 30 cubic 
meters), 
651 440 467 842 518 338 
Source: Manila Water 
 
Table 9. Performance of Water Concessionaires v. Other Large Utilities, 2003 & 2009 
Utilities AR Water 
Coverage 
NRW Continuity 
 
Connection 
Fee 
No. of 
Connections 
(In ‘000) 
2003 2009 2003 2009 2003 2009 2003 2009 2003 2009 2003 2009 
   
Maynilad 
.33 .46 - - 68 64 18 24   607.7 762 
Manila 
Water 
.24 - - - 48  21 24   425.8 - 
Subic 
Water 
.42 .59 87 74   24 24  67 27.5 32 
Bohol 
Water 
Utilities 
Inc. 
.12 .25 40 72 58 24 20 24 8.7 52 
 
3.48 12 
Balibago .28 .37 57 67 - - 24 24 8 4.9 9.2 13 
Davao 
WD 
.2  53 59 33 25 24 24 27 62 
 
143.1  
Cebu 
WD 
.37 .6 38 54 32 29 20 22 72 96 99.15 120 
Source: IBNET 
Note: AR=Averag Revenue/Tariff 
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Table 10. Spending and Staffing Behavior of Water Concessionaires vs. Other Large Utilities: 2003 & 2009 
Utilities UOC Staff/1,000 
Conn. 
Labor Cost Share Collection Period 
(days) 
Operating Cost 
Coverage Ratio 
2003 2009 2003 2009 2003 2009 2003 2009 2003 2009 
Maynilad .3 .06 3.9 2.3 25 40   1.08 1.82 
Manila 
Water 
- - - - 30 - - - - - 
Subic 
Water 
.29 .31 6  22 24 118 103 147 2 
Bohol 
Water 
Utilities 
Inc. 
.12 .18 10.5 5 31.6 27 31 47 1.02 1.42 
Balibago .25 .28 6 1.2 22 28 34 69 1.14 1.35 
Davao WD .14 .23 6.5 5.9 27 36 48 62 1.48 1.46 
Cebu WD .25 .39 7.3 7.4 54 16 53 59 1.49 1.52 
Source: IBNET 
Note: UOC=Unit Operating Cost 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The high incidence of costly contract renegotiation in developing countries has been taken as an 
indication that a concession arrangement is an impracticable model for water service provision 
in developing countries. Notwithstanding, the costly bargaining of the contracting parties has 
not shown to frustrate the investment and efficiency objectives of a concession arrangement and 
render the same manifestly inferior to public management. From a regulatory bargaining 
standpoint, the high incidence of contract renegotiation is an invitation to explore proper 
contract design and enforcement strategies in order to realize the envisaged superior gains of 
shifting from public management to a concession arrangement. Drawing on transaction cost 
economics and law and economics scholarship, I have shown that a partnership approach to 
contracting marked by a government-led cooperative behavior and relational application of the 
legal doctrine of impracticability in the enforcement of an incomplete contract would be an 
effective governance strategy to incentivize efficiency, investment and cooperation. This is 
particularly so in an environment where there is severe informational deficiency and high 
efficiency and investment requirement, but regulatory risk is substantial due to the prevalence 
of inefficient political interference.  
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The water service provision in Metro Manila constitutes a context where concession is deemed 
an optimal ownership choice as discussed at length in Section 2.1. Metro Maynila is a large 
market in terms of population and users’ ability to pay; it thus allows the private operator to 
exploit its financial and technical resources and realize substantial economies of scale. As such, 
the shift from public management to a concession arrangement offers hefty gains net of 
bargaining costs thus providing incentives for parties to engage in cooperative adaptation. Also, 
the design of the CA, albeit not without flaws, can be deemed to have substantially complied 
with the elements of a partnership contracting, i.e., it embodies a suitable allocation of control rights 
and adopts the right incentive tools. The CA supports a structured negotiation whereby contracting 
parties are mutually bound to aid each other in fulfilling their reciprocal obligations; otherwise, 
the aggrieved party may file a complaint before the arbitration tribunal. The tenor of the contract 
(i.e., ex-ante risk allocation as reflected in the choice of price regulatory method and early termination 
clauses) which bears strong investment incentives also rightly reflects the exigencies of the 
bargaining environment (i.e., exigency of private investment amidst a high level of perceived regulatory 
risks and uncertainty owing to the substantial resource losses under public management) at the time of 
contracting.  
 
The multiple aspects of the performance of water service provision (i.e., service coverage, non-
revenue water and affordability) combined with the emergence of supervening events rendered the 
CA highly incomplete and susceptible of opportunistic negotiation. Under such conditions, the 
transaction cost economics would tend to disfavor outsourcing the operations to avoid costly 
bargaining. In the case of Metro Manila, however, there was a strong investment and efficiency 
motive arising from the increasing competing needs for public funds and the high efficiency and 
investment requirement of the urbanized and densely populated service area. As noted earlier, 
such market circumstances offer efficiency and investment gains large enough to offset the 
bargaining cost, especially in the long run, barring severely flawed contract design and excessive 
corruption. Still, a highly incomplete contract necessitates a well-functioning regulatory agency 
to facilitate efficiency-promoting cooperative adaptation. A well-functioning regulatory agency 
would be vital in enforcing the contract in accordance with a partnership-based application of 
the doctrine of impracticability. But as mentioned in the preceding chapter, the regulatory 
agency has limited monitoring capacity and independence. With weak regulatory capacity, the 
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use of a cost-plus scheme, fiscal incentives and other risk-sharing mechanisms to attract private 
capital led to sub-optimally high expenditure levels resulting  in substantial rents (as each unit 
of capital earns a rent under a cost-plus scheme) and high water rates.   
 
When regulatory competence and knowledge is limited, a highly pro-consumer regulatory 
stance and a control approach to regulation has shown to be counterproductive; it only resulted 
in costly bargaining with the government still ended up yielding to the demands of the 
concessionaires. Bargaining towards an efficient commercially practicable rent was made costly 
by the regulatory agency’s failure to take a conditional cooperative behavior. The government 
has not taken the lead role in establishing stable patterns of cooperative behavior as 
demonstrated by its insistence to use the implied ADR in the bid despite a drastic reversal of 
market conditions. The issue of corporate income tax being a recoverable expense should have 
been settled between the contracting parties with the MWSS-RO informing the concessionaires 
as to why such tax privilege may no longer be sustained; the agency could have considered 
negotiating for a staggered removal of said fiscal incentive.  
 
Notwithstanding the glitches in the contract design and enforcement, the suitability of a 
concession arrangement in a context marked by high efficiency and investment requirement has 
been established over time. The service level has improved with the distribution of gains 
becoming less skewed towards the private operator over time. Still, there is a wide scope for 
minimizing bargaining costs to enhance the level and distribution of gains from the CA in favor 
of the consumers.  The government may be able to further stabilize water rates at minimum 
bargaining cost by providing minimal public financing, while the MWSS-RO would have to 
continually enhance its regulatory capacity and encourage cooperative behavior via a 
structured, transparent, constructive negotiation underpinned by a partnership-based 
application of the legal doctrine of commercial impracticability. 
 
Strengthening the Regulatory Agency. Strengthening regulatory capacity may help discourage 
frivolous disputes (e.g., Manila Water demanding compensation for projected revenue losses as a result 
of the delayed implementation of the rate adjustments that were not approved by both by the MWSS-RO 
and the arbitration court). The MWSS-RO still lacks the capacity to make an accurate and impartial 
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evaluation of the performance of the concessionaires. Aside from depending on the concession 
fees to carry out their functions, the MWSS-RO relies on the numbers submitted by the 
companies to assess their performance.194 Enhancing independence and capacity of the regulator 
signals to the private operators the intent of the government to curb both public and private 
opportunism (i.e., charitable contributions and donations would not be considered as recoverable 
expenses). This would encourage the private operator to be more prudent and efficient in their 
spending. To narrow the latitude for costly bargaining, the parties may have to continually work 
towards setting proper guidelines and standards for determining what “efficiently and 
prudently” incurred expenses are. Additionally, the parties would have to strive to continually 
engage each other to promote mutual understanding of each partner’s evolving capabilities and 
limitations in fulfilling their respective contractual obligations (i.e., exchange of views on price 
regulatory design, including auditing rules and removal of tax privileges).  
 
Public Financing to Complement Private Financing. Under the existing concession arrangement, the 
private operators have been able to narrow the investment gap in the sector and enhance 
operational efficiency. The disputes between the two parties pertain to the “appropriate” 
allocation of gains and losses which, in turn, affects service affordability. Minimal public 
financing may help narrow bargaining and information asymmetries resulting in minimal 
bargaining cost without distorting the incentive structure. By sharing the burden of the project, 
minimal public financing may also help reduce regulatory risk premium and impel parties to 
engage in dialogues and good faith negotiation.  
 
There are a few concession agreements in the Philippines where the government maintains an 
equity share of 20 percent to 50 percent. These utilities, however, operate in relatively small 
urban areas involving modest level of investment and technical competencies; hence, private 
partner is not likely to demand sufficient private ownership. Considering the performance of 
Subic Water Corporation (SWC) and Bohol Water Utilities Inc. (BWUI), the right equity share 
may be not more than 20 percent. The spending and staffing patterns of BWUI in which the 
provincial government has an equity share of 20 percent, is as efficient as those utilities that are 

  194 See Negishi (n.d). 
 
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fully privately financed, while the water rates have been relatively low. Considering that the 
water users in Metro Manila have relatively high income195 and the concession area involved a 
large amount of capital investment, the equity share of the government in Maynilad and Manila 
Water may not exceed that of BWUI and SWC. Further, public financing may be explored as a 
temporary measure while the MWSS-RO has yet to address institutional inadequacies and 
provide adequate incentives for mutual cooperation.  
  
 
 
 

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  195 Based on the National Statistics Office data, Metro Manila has an average annual income of Php 356,000 or 1.7 times the country’s 
average income. The average annual income of the vast majority of regions falls below Php200, 000. The low-income users represent 
about 20 percent of the total number of water users in Metro Manila.
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The shift away from public ownership and towards private ownership to enhance water utility 
performance has been motivated by the envisaged superior efficiency and investment incentive 
structure of the latter. As manifestly borne out by the experience of many developing countries, 
including the Philippines, however, the gains from ownership shifts vary across transactional 
settings, hence, the seeming irrelevance of ownership. Accordingly, the study examines the role 
of ownership by exploring it as a mode of governance that employs different ex-ante and ex-post 
incentive devices to promote proper regulation of water utilities.  
Ownership-Performance Nexus: Qualifying the Superiority of Private Ownership 

7KHUHVXOWVRIHFRQRPHWULFDQGFDVHVWXGLHVRQWKHSHUIRUPDQFHDQGEHKDYLRURIZDWHUXWLOLWLHVLQ
WKH 3KLOLSSLQHV GHWDLOHG LQChapter 1 KDYH LQGLFDWHG VXSHULRU RYHUDOO SHUIRUPDQFH RI SULYDWH
XWLOLWLHVWRWKDWRIVWDWHRZQHGXWLOLWLHVRQDFFRXQWRIWKHIRUPHU¶VHIILFLHQWDQGHTXLWDEOHSULFLQJ
VSHQGLQJDQGVWDIILQJEHKDYLRUL.e., price reflects service level and water users’ ability to pay
1RWZLWKVWDQGLQJWKHSULYDWHXWLOLWLHVPD\QRWUHDGLO\VXEVWLWXWH/*8UXQXWLOLWLHVLQKLJKO\SROLWLFL]HG
ORZLQFRPHDUHDVZKHUHWKHSULFHVRIZDWHUVXSSO\VHUYLFHVDUHVHWDWEHORZFRVWUHFRYHU\OHYHOV
3ULYDWHXWLOLWLHVKRZHYHUVWDQGWRFRPSHWLWLYHO\SURYLGHZDWHUVXSSO\VHUYLFHVLQOXFUDWLYHDUHDV
ZLGHO\VHUYHGE\ZDWHUGLVWULFWV&RUSRUDWL]DWLRQYLDWKHZDWHUGLVWULFWPRGHOKDVVKRZQWREHD
GHOLFDWHUHPHG\WRWKHLQHIILFLHQF\RISXEOLFO\RZQHGXWLOLWLHV'HVSLWHWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRISULYDWH
VHFWRURSHUDWLQJSULQFLSOHVSDUWLFXODUO\WKHDFFRPPRGDWLRQRISURILWPRWLYHWKHVSHQGLQJSDWWHUQV
RIZDWHUGLVWULFWVUHVHPEOHWKDWRI/*8UXQXWLOLWLHVPDUNHGE\DVWURQJELDVWRZDUGVSHUVRQQHO
H[SHQVHVZKLOHWKHLUSULFLQJEHKDYLRUFRXOGEHOLNHQHGWRWKDWRIDQLOOUHJXODWHGSURILWVHHNLQJ
XWLOLW\7KHDFFRPPRGDWLRQRISURILWPRWLYHDQGLQWURGXFWLRQRISULYDWHVHFWRURSHUDWLQJSULQFLSOHV
GLGQRWDOWHUWKHLQFHQWLYHVWUXFWXUHRIZDWHUGLVWULFWVLWVLPSO\IDFLOLWDWHVIXUWKHUUHGLVWULEXWLRQRI
ZHOIDUHJDLQVDZD\IURPWKHFRQVXPHUVDQGWRZDUGVWKHHPSOR\HHVYLDXQUHDVRQDEO\KLJKWDULIIV
DQGKHIW\SHUVRQQHOFRPSHQVDWLRQ(PSOR\HHVKDYHVKRZQWRFDSWXUHWKHLQWHUQDOUHWXUQVRIWKH
XWLOLW\WRWKHGHWULPHQWRIORZLQFRPHFRQVXPHUV

:LWKWKHLUKLJKSULFLQJEHKDYLRUZDWHUGLVWULFWVKDYHHPHUJHGDVDSRRUDOWHUQDWLYHWR/*8UXQ
XWLOLWLHVLQORZLQFRPHDUHDVZKLOHWKHLUFRVWLQHIILFLHQFLHVUHQGHUWKHPLQIHULRUWRSULYDWHXWLOLWLHV
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LQKLJKLQFRPHDUHDVZLWKKLJKHIILFLHQF\DQGLQYHVWPHQWUHTXLUHPHQW:DWHUGLVWULFWVRSWWRVHUYH
KLJKLQFRPHDUHDVZKHUHWKH\FDQFKDUJHKLJKHUZDWHUUDWHVLQGHSHQGHQWRIWKHVHUYLFHOHYHODQG
XVHUV¶ DELOLW\ WR SD\ DV WKH\ DJJUHVVLYHO\ SXUVXH ILQDQFLDO VXVWDLQDELOLW\ JRDOV 7KH
DFFRPPRGDWLRQ RI SURILWPRWLYH DPRQJ VWDWHRZQHG XWLOLWLHV KDV VKRZQ WR JHQHUDWH SHUYHUVH
LQFHQWLYHHIIHFWVPDLQO\RQDFFRXQWRISRRUHQIRUFHPHQWRIUHJXODWRU\ ODZVDQGSROLFLHVXQGHU
VWDWH RZQHUVKLS 7KH VSHQGLQJ VWDIILQJ DQG SULFLQJ EHKDYLRU RI ZDWHU GLVWULFWV VLJQLI\ WKH
DFFRPPRGDWLRQRILQWHUHVWVRIYDULRXVSXEOLFDQGSULYDWHDJHQWVDWWKHH[SHQVHRIWKHZDWHUXVHUV
7KLVLVLQVWDUNFRQWUDVWZLWKSULYDWHXWLOLWLHVZKLFKSURYHGWREHKLJKO\VXVFHSWLEOHRIEHLQJSURSHUO\
UHJXODWHG:KHUHWKHSROLWLFDOPDUNHWLVLQHIILFLHQWWKHUHVXOWVRIWKHVWXGLHVIDYRUPDLQWDLQLQJWKH
ORZSRZHUHGLQFHQWLYHVWUXFWXUHRISXEOLFRZQHUVKLSDQGFRQILQLQJWKHDGRSWLRQRIKLJKSRZHUHG
FRUSRUDWHSULQFLSOHVZLWKLQWKHUHDOPRISULYDWHRZQHUVKLS

Refocusing the Role of a Regulatory Oversight under a Two-tiered Regulatory System  
0RWLYDWHGE\WKHOLPLWHGHQIRUFHDELOLW\RIUHJXODWRU\ODZVDQGSROLFLHVXQGHUVWDWHRZQHUVKLSDQG
WKHSROLWLFDODQGSROLF\ELDVHVDJDLQVWWKHRSHUDWLRQRISULYDWHZDWHUXWLOLWLHVChapter 2SUHVHQWV
D UHIRFXVHG UROH RI D UHJXODWRU\ RYHUVLJKW ZKHUHE\ WKH VDPH SHUIRUPV LWV KDUPRQL]LQJ DQG
FKHFNLQJIXQFWLRQVWKURXJKLWVDGMXGLFDWRU\SRZHUVRYHURZQHUVKLSVKLIWVDQGUHJXODWRU\FRQIOLFWV
XQGHUDWZRWLHUHGUHJXODWRU\V\VWHP7KHUHJXODWRU\RYHUVLJKWFDQSURPRWHHIILFLHQWIXQFWLRQLQJ
RI DOO RZQHUVKLS W\SHV E\ HQVXULQJ WKDW WUDGLWLRQDO UHJXODWRU\ PHWKRGV DQG DSSURDFKHV DUH
PRGLILHG RU VXSSODQWHG LI WKH\ SURYH WR EH VXVFHSWLEOH WR UHQW H[WUDFWLRQ RU LI WKH\ XQGHUPLQH
HIILFLHQF\DQGLQYHVWPHQWLQFHQWLYHV$UHJXODWRU\RYHUVLJKWLVWKXVGHSLFWHGDVDQH[DQWHDQG
H[SRVW JRYHUQDQFH PHFKDQLVP WKDW SURPRWH UHJXODWRU\ FRPSOLDQFH DQG FRPSHWLWLRQ PDLQO\
WKURXJK LWV DGMXGLFDWH SRZHUV FRQFHUQLQJ RZQHUVKLS VKLIWV DQG UHJXODWRU\ FRQIOLFWV ZLWK UXOH
PDNLQJ IXQFWLRQV RQ WKH JXLGLQJ SULQFLSOHV RQ WKH GHVLJQ DQG HQIRUFHPHQW RI FRQWUDFWV DQG
OLFHQVHVWRRSHUDWH7KLVFRQVWLWXWHVDQLQFUHPHQWDOJRYHUQDQFHDSSURDFKWRSURPRWLQJSULYDWH
VHFWRUSDUWLFLSDWLRQDQGRYHUDOOUHJXODWRU\HIIHFWLYHQHVVDLPHGDWDYRLGLQJDGYHUVHRXWFRPHVRI
ZURQJIXOO\LPSRVLQJDfeasibleDQGfavoredRZQHUVKLSVWUXFWXUH:KHUHRQHRZQHUVKLSVWUXFWXUH
FDQQRWEHUHDGLO\VXEVWLWXWHGIRUDQRWKHUGXHWRDGLUHWUDQVDFWLRQDOVHWWLQJ (i.e., prevalence of 
inefficient political interference and, concomitantly, high degree of market risk and uncertainty 
thereby discouraging private operators)DQRXWULJKWSROLF\SUHIHUHQFHWRZDUGVSULYDWHRZQHUVKLS
LVERXQGWREHIUXVWUDWHG

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,QWKHVDPHYHLQDWZRWLHUHGUHJXODWRU\V\VWHPZKHUHVSHFLDOL]HGUHJXODWRUVDUHSODFHGXQGHU
D FRPPRQ UHJXODWRU\ RYHUVLJKW ZLWK DGMXGLFDWLYH IXQFWLRQV LV SUHIHUUHG WR D VLQJOH UHJXODWRU
6SHFLDOL]HGUHJXODWRUVZRXOGEHQHFHVVDU\ZKHUHHDFKRZQHUVKLS W\SH LVPDGHWRUHVSRQGWR
GLVSDUDWH PDUNHW FRQVWUDLQWV DQG LQFHQWLYHV WKXV UHTXLULQJ VSHFLDO DQG GLIIHUHQWLDO UHJXODWRU\
WUHDWPHQWVXQGHUWKHJRYHUQDQFHRIDUHJXODWRU\RYHUVLJKW$UHJXODWRU\RYHUVLJKWWKDWRSHUDWHV
ZLWKLQWKHUHODWLYHO\GHSROLWLFL]HGDUHQDRIDGMXGLFDWLRQZLWKZHOOWDUJHWHGSROLF\PDNLQJIXQFWLRQV
i.e., promote regulatory competition and compliance by adjudicating ownership shifts and 
regulatory conflicts LV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH SROLF\ RULHQWDWLRQ RI WKH 3KLOLSSLQHV WRZDUGV
GHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQ DQG GHEXUHDXFUDWL]DWLRQ RI DGPLQLVWUDWLYH UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV WR HQKDQFH
DFFRXQWDELOLW\

A Partnership Approach to Contracting: Explicating the Functioning of Private Ownership 

7R IXUWKHU UHVROYH WKH VHHPLQJ LUUHOHYDQFH RI RZQHUVKLS, Chapter 3 GLVVHFWV WKH VWUXFWXUDO
DWWULEXWHV RI SULYDWH RZQHUVKLS WR H[SOLFDWH LWV DGYDQWDJHV DQG OLPLWDWLRQV DV D PRGH RI
JRYHUQDQFH DQG FRQFRPLWDQWO\ LQWURGXFHV private ownership suitability conditions DQG D
partnership approach WR GHVLJQLQJ DQG HQIRUFLQJ UHJXODWRU\ FRQWUDFWV 8QGHU D SDUWQHUVKLS
FRQWUDFWLQJ WKHSDUWLHVDUH LQGXFHGWRWUHDWHDFKRWKHUDVSDUWQHUVRQDFFRXQWRI WKHLUHTXDOO\
ODUJH FRQWULEXWLRQ DQG ULVNV WR WKH UHDOL]DWLRQ RI VXSHULRU JDLQV IURP DQ LQFHQWLYHFRPSDWLEOH
RZQHUVKLSDUUDQJHPHQW7RLQGXFHWKHSDUWLHVWRWUHDWHDFKRWKHUDVSDUWQHUVWKHVDPHDUHPDGH
WR LQWHUQDOL]H WKH ORQJWHUP FRVW RI RSSRUWXQLVWLF EHKDYLRU DQG ORQJWHUP EHQHILWV RI PXWXDO
FRRSHUDWLRQYLDDJRYHUQPHQWOHGFRRSHUDWLYHEHKDYLRUXQGHUSLQQHGE\(i) ex-ante assignment of 
risk to the superior risk bearer  ; and (ii) a bias towards contract adjustment and against 
termination within the confines of the legal doctrine of commercial impracticability. :KLOH
SDUWQHUVKLS FRQWUDFWLQJ DOORZV H[SRVW UHQHJRWLDWLRQ DQG D ZLGH VFRSH IRU VKDULQJ JDLQV DQG
ORVVHVWKHEDUJDLQLQJZRXOGKDYHWRRFFXUZLWKLQWKHPHWHVDQGERXQGVRIWKHOHJDOGRFWULQHRI
FRPPHUFLDO LPSUDFWLFDELOLW\ WR IRUHVWDOO UHJXODWRU\ FDSWXUH DQG SUHVHUYH WKH LQFHQWLYHV IRU
LQYHVWPHQWHIILFLHQF\DQGFRRSHUDWLRQ

$SUREHLQWRWKHVWUXFWXUDOSURSHUWLHVRISULYDWHRZQHUVKLSXQUDYHOVYDULRXVH[DQWHDQGH[SRVW
LQFHQWLYH GHYLFHV (e.g., design of regulatory agencies and contracts and other enforcement 
strategies)WKDWFDQEHDGDSWHGWRGLVSDUDWHWUDQVDFWLRQDOVHWWLQJV$PRUHFUHGLEOHHQIRUFHPHQW

  196 See Scott (987) and Smythe (2003) for governance of relational contracts. 
ϭϲϰͮW Ă Ő Ğ 



RIWKHVHLQFHQWLYHGHYLFHVXQGHUSULYDWHRZQHUVKLSPDNHVWKHZHOIDUHJDLQVRIWKHVDPHVXSHULRU
WRWKRVHRIVWDWHRZQHUVKLS5HODWHGO\WKHQXOOLI\LQJH[DQWHLQFHQWLYHDQGWKHH[SRVWWUDQVDFWLRQ
FRVWPLQLPL]LQJPRWLYHVRIVKLIWLQJWRSULYDWHRZQHUVKLSFDQEHUHFRQFLOHGDVIXUWKHUGLVFXVVHG
EHORZ 2QH RI WKH PDMRU WDNHDZD\V LQ WKH VWXG\ LV WKDW D ORQJWHUP EDUJDLQLQJ DFFRXQW RI
RZQHUVKLS LV D FRJHQW DQDO\WLFDO IUDPHZRUN LQ XQUDYHOLQJ WKH IXQGDPHQWDO GLIIHUHQFHV LQ WKH
LQFHQWLYHVWUXFWXUHDQGUHJXODWRU\HIIHFWLYHQHVVRISXEOLFRZQHUVKLSDQGSULYDWHRZQHUVKLSDQG
WKHLUYDULDQWVDVPRGHVRIJRYHUQDQFHLWLVDOVRKLJKO\LQVWUXFWLYHLQDVFHUWDLQLQJWKHSURSHUGHVLJQ
DQGHQIRUFHPHQWRIH[DQWHDQGH[SRVWLQFHQWLYHPHFKDQLVPVH.g., the design of a regulatory 
agency, financing schemes and price regulatory method 7KURXJK WKH SULVP RI UHJXODWRU\
EDUJDLQLQJ,KDYHVKRZQKRZSULYDWHRZQHUVKLSPD\SURYLGHLQFHQWLYHVIRUHIILFLHQF\LQYHVWPHQW
DQGFRRSHUDWLRQ\LHOGLQJWKHIROORZLQJILQGLQJV 
i. Efficiency, investment, and flexibility are desirable goals that are best served under 
sufficient private ownership characterized by the assumption of greater 
responsibilities, risks and bargaining advantage over the resulting gains by the private 
operator; 
ii. The incentive motive, i.e., the high-powered incentives for efficiency and investment 
of shifting from public management to private ownership, is intimately tied to the 
transaction cost-minimizing motive. The reasons being that the incentive mechanisms 
acquire greater enforceability under private ownership which in turn minimizes 
transaction cost. Further, the substantial investment and efficiency gains presented by 
an incentive-compatible concession arrangement induce mutual cooperation between 
contracting parties; 
iii. Proper design and use of a suite of incentive devices to strengthen incentives for 
mutual cooperation entails taking into account evolving bargaining realities, 
particularly informational deficiencies and bargaining asymmetries. A partnership 
contracting shows that a context-based relational use of the legal doctrine of 
commercial impracticability in enforcing a concession arrangement enhances 
incentives for efficiency, investment and cooperation; and 
iv. Relatedly, concession as an incentive-compatible ownership choice is anchored on 
proportionality between the bargaining and informational advantage of the private 
operator (arising from his investment and operational rights), the investment and 
efficiency requirement and the concomitant exigency to insulate the transaction from 
redistributive political interference, and pervasiveness of political interference.  This 
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narrows the scope for private and public opportunism thereby creating an incentive for 
efficiency, investment and cooperation. 
A Bargaining Account of Ownership: The Incentive and Transaction Cost Problem 

,Q WUDQVDFWLRQ FRVW HFRQRPLFV DQG LQFRPSOHWH FRQWUDFWLQJ OLWHUDWXUH SULYDWH RZQHUVKLS LV D
WUDQVIHU RI FUXFLDO FRQWURO ULJKWV WR D SULYDWH HQWLW\ ,Q DQ LQFRPSOHWH FRQWUDFW VHWWLQJ VXFK
DVVLJQPHQWRIFRQWUROULJKWVWRDSULYDWHHQWLW\DOWHUVWKHLQFHQWLYHVWUXFWXUHRIWKHXWLOLW\LWDIIRUGV
LQIRUPDWLRQDO DQGEDUJDLQLQJDGYDQWDJH WR WKHSDUW\ZKRKDVERWK WKH ILQDQFLDO DQG UHVRXUFH
DGYDQWDJHDQGVXSHULRUYDOXDWLRQRILQYHVWPHQWDQGHIILFLHQF\DVWKHSULYDWHRSHUDWRU¶VRZQHU¶V
SXUSRVHDQGVXUYLYDODUHKLQJHGRQLQYHVWPHQWDQGHIILFLHQF\WKHUHE\LQFHQWLYL]LQJLQYHVWPHQW
DQGHIILFLHQF\DQGPLQLPL]LQJEDUJDLQLQJFRVW(i.e., the private operator does not have to engage 
in costly bargaining to obtain his larger share of the trade gains,QSXEOLFFRQWUDFWLQJWKHSULYDWH
RSHUDWRU ZKR LV REOLJHG WR PDNH D VL]DEOH VXQN LQYHVWPHQW IDFHV VXEVWDQWLDO ULVNV RI
H[SURSULDWLRQE\WKHJRYHUQPHQW3XEOLFRSSRUWXQLVPKRZHYHULVFRQVWUDLQHGE\WKHWKUHDWRIWKH
SULYDWH RSHUDWRU¶V IXOO H[SORLWDWLRQ RI KLV LQIRUPDWLRQDO DQG EDUJDLQLQJ DGYDQWDJH :LWK WKH
VXEVWDQWLDOJDLQVIURPDVXLWDEOHRZQHUVKLSFKRLFHWKHGRXEOHVLGHGRSSRUWXQLVPLVVKRZQLQWKH
VWXG\WRFRQYHUJHWRZDUGVPXWXDOFRRSHUDWLRQWKURXJKSURSHUHQIRUFHPHQWVWUDWHJLHVHPERGLHG
LQDSDUWQHUVKLSFRQWUDFWLQJDVGHWDLOHGEHORZ
7KHGLVVRFLDWLRQRIWKHLQFHQWLYHDQGWUDQVDFWLRQFRVWPRWLYHDSSHDUVWRDULVHIURPQRWWDNLQJD
ORQJWHUP UHODWLRQDO EDUJDLQLQJ DFFRXQW RI RZQHUVKLS :KLOH SXEOLF PDQDJHPHQW PD\ KDYH
LQWHUQDOL]HGWKHEDUJDLQLQJJDPHPDNLQJLWDSSHDUPRUHWUDQVDFWLRQFRVWHIILFLHQWWKDQSULYDWH
RZQHUVKLSWKHUHDOFRVWRIEDUJDLQLQJOLHVLQWKHLQFHQWLYHHIIHFWVRILQWHUQDOL]LQJWKHEDUJDLQLQJ
JDPH$VHYLGHQFHGE\ WKHSHUIRUPDQFHRIFRUSRUDWL]HGZDWHUGLVWULFWV LQ WKH3KLOLSSLQHV WKH
LQWHUQDOL]DWLRQ RI WKH EDUJDLQLQJ JDPH JHQHUDWHV JDUJDQWXDQ UHVRXUFH ORVVHV FUHDWLQJ DQ
H[LJHQF\WRGUDVWLFDOO\DOWHUWKHFRQWUROVWUXFWXUHWRZDUGVSULYDWHRZQHUVKLSLQRUGHUWRVWUHQJWKHQ
HIILFLHQF\ LQFHQWLYHV ,Q WKHFDVHRI WKHKLJKO\SROLWLFL]HGZDWHUVHUYLFHSURYLVLRQ LQGHYHORSLQJ
FRXQWULHVWKHH[WHUQDOL]DWLRQRIWKHEDUJDLQLQJJDPHRIIHUVDZLGHVFRSHIRUWKHPXFKQHHGHG
UHEDODQFLQJRILQWHUHVWVEHWZHHQLQYHVWRUVDQGFRQVXPHUV$VGHPRQVWUDWHGE\WKHSULYDWL]DWLRQ
H[SHULHQFH RI WKH 3KLOLSSLQHV WKH FRQWURO VWUXFWXUH RI SULYDWH RZQHUVKLS WHQGV WR FUHDWH D
PRGHUDWLQJHIIHFWWRWKHLQHIILFLHQWSULFLQJVSHQGLQJDQGVWDIILQJELDVHVRISXEOLFO\RZQHGXWLOLWLHV

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7KHKLJKEDUJDLQLQJFRVWDWWKHHDUO\VWDJHRIWKHFRQFHVVLRQUHIOHFWVWKHELDVHVRIWKHSDUWLHV
DJDLQVWHDFKRWKHU¶V LQWHUHVWZKLFKQHHGWREHQHXWUDOL]HGYLDDEDUJDLQLQJSURFHVVXQGHUWKH
JRYHUQDQFHRIYDULRXVLQFHQWLYHWRROVDQGUHJXODWRU\DQGDUELWUDOLQVWLWXWLRQV$OWKRXJKLQFHQWLYH
GHYLFHVSDUWLFXODUO\WKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDZHOOIXQFWLRQLQJUHJXODWRU\DJHQF\PD\DSSHDUWREH
D WDOO RUGHU IRU GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV D ORQJWHUP LQYHVWPHQW LQ SURSHU FRQWUDFW GHVLJQ DQG
HQIRUFHPHQWXQGHUSULYDWHRZQHUVKLSZRXOG\LHOGHQRUPRXVUHWXUQVDVLWVWUHQJWKHQVLQFHQWLYHV
IRUHIILFLHQF\LQYHVWPHQWDQGFRRSHUDWLRQEHWZHHQSXEOLFDQGSULYDWHDJHQWV7KHSUHVHQFHRI
ZHOOSHUIRUPLQJSULYDWHXWLOLWLHVLVERXQGWRXSWKHOHYHORIFRPSHWLWLRQLQWKHZDWHUVXSSO\VHFWRU
LQGXFLQJVWDWHRZQHGZDWHUXWLOLWLHVWREHPRUHGHPDQGUHVSRQVLYH7KLVLQWXUQZRXOGSHUFKWKH
JRYHUQPHQWLQDIDYRUDEOHEDUJDLQLQJSRVLWLRQWRREWDLQIDLUFRQWUDFWWHUPVXQGHUGLIIHUHQW333
VFKHPHV

Forestalling Ownership Irrelevance 
$VQRWHGHDUOLHUWKHHQYLVDJHGJDLQVIURPSULYDWHRZQHUVKLSDUHQRWDXWRPDWLFEXWH[WHUQDOL]LQJ
WKHEDUJDLQLQJJDPHXQGHUUHJXODWHGSULYDWHRZQHUVKLSHQKDQFHVWKHHQIRUFHDELOLW\RIDQDUVHQDO
RIH[DQWHDQGH[SRVW LQFHQWLYHGHYLFHVZKLFKFRXOGEHXVHGWR LQGXFHSURILWRULHQWHGSULYDWH
RSHUDWRUVWRVHUYHSXEOLFZHOIDUHFRQFHUQVE\VWUHQJWKHQLQJLQFHQWLYHVIRUHIILFLHQF\LQYHVWPHQW
DQG FRRSHUDWLRQ $ SDUWQHUVKLS DSSURDFK WR FRQWUDFWLQJ GHYHORSHG KHUHLQ LV HVVHQWLDOO\ DQ
HQIRUFHPHQW VWUDWHJ\ZKLFK LV DQ DQWLWKHVLV RI WKH1HZ3XEOLF0DQDJHPHQW DSSURDFK130
H[SORUHVYDULRXVLQVWLWXWLRQDOUHIRUPVLQFOXGLQJWKHDGRSWLRQRISULYDWHVHFWRURSHUDWLQJSULQFLSOHV
ZLWKLQSXEOLFRZQHUVKLS$SDUWQHUVKLSFRQWUDFWLQJRQWKHRWKHUKDQGXQGHUVFRUHVWKHUHOHYDQFH
RIRZQHUVKLSZLWKDVODQWWRZDUGVVXIILFLHQWSULYDWHRZQHUVKLSGXHLQ ODUJHSDUWWRWKHIRUPHU¶V
VWUXFWXUHGEDUJDLQLQJG\QDPLFVJRYHUQHGE\WKHUHJXODWRU\FRQWUDFWDQGLQVWLWXWLRQVWKDWVHHNWR
SUHVHUYHHIILFLHQF\DQGLQYHVWPHQWLQFHQWLYHV

:LWKLQWKHIUDPHZRUNRIDSDUWQHUVKLSFRQWUDFWLQJWKHJRYHUQPHQWYLDWKHUHJXODWRU\DJHQF\LV
REOLJHG WR LQLWLDOO\ HVWDEOLVK WKH LQFHQWLYHV IRU PXWXDO FRRSHUDWLRQ E\ PDNLQJ D UHODWLRQDO
DSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKH OHJDO GRFWULQH RI FRPPHUFLDO LPSUDFWLFDELOLW\ $ UHODWLRQDO XVH RI WKH OHJDO
GRFWULQHRIFRPPHUFLDOLPSUDFWLFDELOLW\SXUSRUWVDGMXVWLQJWKHFRQWUDFWLIDQHTXLOLEULXPGLVWRUWLQJ
XQEDUJDLQHGIRUHYHQWRFFXUVEDVHGRQWKHHIILFLHQF\DQGLQYHVWPHQWWHVWV$WWKHHDUO\VWDJHRI
WKHFRQFHVVLRQDSDUWQHUVKLSUHFRPPHQGVDJHQHURXVDSSOLFDWLRQRILQYHVWPHQWDQGHIILFLHQF\
WHVWVRQDFFRXQWRILQIRUPDWLRQDOGHILFLHQFLHV7KHELDVDJDLQVWFRQWUDFWDGMXVWPHQWLVDQFKRUHG
RQ WKH UROH RI FRQFHVVLRQ DV D UHIRUP VWUDWHJ\ ZKLFK PD\ QRW EH WKH FDVH LQ GHYHORSHG
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HFRQRPLHVKHQFHWKHWLOWWRZDUGVFRQWUDFWDGMXVWPHQWPD\EHUHH[DPLQHGZKHQDSSOLHGLQD
GLVSDUDWHVHWWLQJ7KHWLOWWRZDUGVFRQWUDFWDGMXVWPHQWVHHNVWRPDNHWKHSDUWLHVLQWHUQDOL]HWKH
VXSHULRUJDLQV IURPPXWXDO FRRSHUDWLRQDQG WKH FRVW RI QRQFRRSHUDWLYHEHKDYLRU LQD FRQWH[W
ZKHUH FRQFHVVLRQ LV DQ LQFHQWLYHFRPSDWLEOH FKRLFH  $ SDUWQHUVKLS FRQWUDFWLQJ DUJXHV IRU D
JRYHUQPHQWOHG FRRSHUDWLYH EHKDYLRU RI ZKLFK H[LJHQF\ LV HYLGHQW LQ DQ LQFRPSOHWH FRQWUDFW
VHWWLQJ ZKHUH SXEOLF RSSRUWXQLVP FDQ EH PDWFKHG E\ IXOO H[SORLWDWLRQ RI EDUJDLQLQJ DQG
LQIRUPDWLRQDO DGYDQWDJH E\ WKH SULYDWH RSHUDWRU 7KLV UHVXOWV LQ VXEVWDQWLDO HIILFLHQF\ DQG
LQYHVWPHQWORVVHVDQGHVFDODWLQJEDUJDLQLQJFRVWDVLOOXVWUDWHGLQDVHTXHQWLDOEDUJDLQLQJJDPH
$VLGHIURPPDNLQJDQH[SUHVVFRQWUDFWXDOSURYLVLRQRQJRYHUQPHQWOHGFRRSHUDWLYHEHKDYLRUWKH
JRYHUQPHQWLVLQGXFHGWRHVWDEOLVKWKHLQFHQWLYHVIRUPXWXDOFRRSHUDWLRQWKURXJKWKHXVHRIORZ
SRZHUHG LQFHQWLYH GHYLFHV DQG H[SRVW JRYHUQDQFH PHFKDQLVPV DW WKH HDUO\ VWDJH RI WKH
FRQWUDFWXDOUHODWLRQVKLSZKHUHWKHUHLVVHYHUHLQIRUPDWLRQDOGHILFLHQFLHVDERXWWKHSDUWLHVDQGWKH
RSHUDWLQJHQYLURQPHQW

Avenues for Further Research 
,QWKLVVWXG\,VLPSO\LOOXVWUDWHKRZRZQHUVKLSDVDJRYHUQDQFHPHFKDQLVPVKDSHVWKHLQFHQWLYH
VWUXFWXUHRI WKHXWLOLWLHVDQGPLQLPL]HV WUDQVDFWLRQFRVW IURPDQ LQWHJUDWHGG\QDPLFEDUJDLQLQJ
VWDQGSRLQW7KHGLVFXVVLRQRQWKHVHLQFHQWLYHPHFKDQLVPVLVDLPHGDWH[SOLFDWLQJWKHPHULWVDQG
OLPLWDWLRQVRISULYDWHRZQHUVKLSYLVjYLVSXEOLFRZQHUVKLSDVFLWHGDERYH$QGZKLOHLWLGHQWLILHV
VSHFLILFFRQGLWLRQVXQGHUZKLFKFHUWDLQLQFHQWLYHGHYLFHVPD\EHVXLWDEOHLWGRHVQRWHQGHDYRU
WR PDNH SROLF\ UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV RQ KRZ HDFK DQG HYHU\ LQFHQWLYH GHYLFH PD\ KDYH WR EH
GHVLJQHG IRU HDFK DQG HYHU\ VHW RI FLUFXPVWDQFHV $OWKRXJK WKH VLWXDWLRQ RI ZDWHU VHUYLFH
SURYLVLRQLQWKH3KLOLSSLQHVSURYLGHVDOXVKVHWWLQJWRH[SORUHWKHFRPSOH[LWLHVRIRZQHUVKLSDVD
FRQWURODQGLQFHQWLYHVWUXFWXUHDVQRWHGHDUOLHUWKHXVHRIWKHVDPHDVDQLOOXVWUDWLYHFDVHVWXG\
ZDVSXUVXHGPLQGIXORIWKHYDULHGQHVVRI WKHH[SHULHQFHVRIGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHVKHQFH WKH
GLVLQFOLQDWLRQ WRPDNHVZHHSLQJSROLF\SUHVFULSWLRQV ,WKDVEHHQPDGHFOHDU LQ WKHVWXG\ WKDW
IXUWKHU H[DPLQDWLRQ RI YDULRXV LQFHQWLYH WRROV ZKLFK HPERG\ YDU\LQJ PL[ RI UHODWLRQDO DQG
WUDQVDFWLRQDOQRUPVXQGHUSXEOLFDQGSULYDWHRZQHUVKLSDFURVVGLVSDUDWHVHWWLQJVZRXOGSURYLGH
FRJHQWSROLF\LQVLJKWVRQKRZWRIDFLOLWDWHSURSHUIXQFWLRQLQJRIGLIIHUHQWRZQHUVKLSW\SHV

$QLQWHUHVWLQJDUHDIRUIXUWKHUUHVHDUFKZRXOGEHWRH[DPLQHKRZWUDGLWLRQDOSXEOLFDFFRXQWDELOLW\
PHFKDQLVPVVXFKDVFRQVXOWDWLRQDQGXWLOLW\XVHUVSDUWQHUVKLSVRSHUDWHXQGHUSULYDWHRZQHUVKLS
DQGH[SORUHVWUDWHJLHVWRSURIHVVLRQDOL]HWKHVHPHFKDQLVPVZLWKRXWLQHIILFLHQWO\SROLWLFL]LQJWKH
ϭϲϴͮW Ă Ő Ğ 



SULYDWL]DWLRQ SURFHVV DQG LPSDLULQJ WKH GHVLUHG LQFHQWLYH VWUXFWXUH )XUWKHU H[SORUDWLRQ RI
UHODWLRQDODQGWUDQVDFWLRQDOQRUPVLQWKHGHVLJQDQGHQIRUFHPHQWRIGLIIHUHQWLQFHQWLYHGHYLFHV
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SUMMARY 
After three decades of privatization and anti-state rhetoric, government ownership and public 
management appear to be back in vogue in water supply sector.1 The movement away from full 
private ownership or sufficient private ownership (e.g. concession) and towards corporatization 
and other hybrid ownership structures under public ownership is said to be motivated by the 
“inadequate” quality and scant cost savings of privatization.2 Notwithstanding, the shift in 
ownership patterns does not provide a credible policy guide on what is a suitable ownership 
arrangement for a particular country, city, or municipality. Both theories and empirics do not 
provide conclusive findings on the optimal choice of ownership in water service provision. This 
can be attributed to the fact that water supply sector is traditionally controlled by the state, 
creating a well-entrenched political and institutional bias against privatization. Approximately 
90 per cent of (urban) water services in the world are delivered by public water utilities, a vast 
majority of which are corporatized utilities. In France, most water undertakings had been 
privately operated, but both ownership and responsibility of water remained within the public 
sector. Aggressive privatization efforts by international financing institutions in developing 
countries in the 1990s, had to contend with various institutional, economic and political hurdles 
which may have affected the design of PPP schemes and, consequently, impaired the efficient 
functioning of the arrangement.  
In view of this, I bring sharply into focus the differences in the bargaining dynamics between 
public management and a concession arrangement to establish the relative advantages of a 
concession-based privatization to corporatization. I argue that a concession may be preferred in 
a transactional setting where a high level of efficiency and investment is required but cannot be 
  1 D. Cardwell. 2013.”Cities weigh taking over from private utilities”, New York Times, 13 March.  
  2 D. McDonald, 2014, ed., Rethinking Corporatization and Public Services in the Global South. New York: Zed Books Ltd. 
met under public management due to inefficient political interference, such as the case with a 
large, complex water supply system in urban areas in developing countries. The reasons are as 
follows:  (i) The high level of investment and efficiency requirement of large, complex water supply systems 
would demand substantial rents that cannot be accorded adequate protection and incentive under public 
ownership as benefits under administrative hierarchies are extensively shared; (ii) The allocation of 
virtually all control rights to the private operator makes accountability less costly to enforce as the cost of 
any decision or choice is largely thrust on the private operator whose sizeable investment makes him 
internalize the cost of his inefficient actions; (iii) The delineation of service provision and regulation makes 
the bargaining process transparent and open to exploration of potential remedies to contractual hazards; 
and (iv) The high demand for investment and efficiency of the system reduces the political benefit of low-
cost pricing and increases the political cost of poor service quality and other bureaucratic inefficiencies 
making the decision of politicians to shift from public management to concession a credible commitment 
device (not to interfere in the operation of the utility). 
 
To maximize the gains from a concession-based privatization and privately-run utilities and, in 
effect, forestall ownership irrelevance, I explore two strategies: (i) adopting a partnership approach 
to contracting; and (ii) establishing a two-tiered unified regulatory framework where all ownership types 
and their regulators are subject to a common regulatory oversight.  The partnership approach derives 
its rationale from the legal doctrine of impracticability which allows contract adjustment and 
burden-sharing in the emergence of an event of which impact on the financial value of the 
transaction is beyond the reasonable expectations of the parties. Taking into account specific 
bargaining conditions (e.g. size of investment, and the level of regulatory and market risks) a 
partnership contracting explores a proper mix of relational and formal elements in the choice of 
incentive devices (e.g., risk allocation) and ex-post governance mechanisms (e.g., regulatory agency 
and arbitration) to facilitate a value-preserving bargaining process. Specifically, the approach seeks 
to overcome double-sided opportunism in administrative contracts (i.e. government imposes highly 
redistributive regulatory policies and the private operator maximizes rents) via double-sided threat of 
punishment and reward. The government is contractually obligated to accommodate risk-sharing 
and grant a generous rent that is proportional to the information and bargaining advantage of 
the private operator in order to reduce the value of outside option of the private operator relative 
to the concession agreement and to lower the threat of public opportunism, which is high in a 
traditionally publicly-managed water supply sector provided it does not frustrate the efficiency 
and investment motive of shifting from public management to a concession arrangement. By 
disallowing the termination of the contract unless objectives of both parties have been frustrated, 
the parties are made to internalize the cost of deviating from their contractual obligations and are 
induced to mutually cooperate.  
 
Another way of maximizing the gains from a concession arrangement is to establish a unified 
regulatory framework.  A sound regulatory framework may help facilitate efficient functioning 
of all ownership types. A favorable performance of public utilities could increase the outside 
option of the government, perching the state in a better position to bargain for highly favorable 
contract terms and outcomes under a concession arrangement. At the same time, enhanced 
performance of publicly-owned utilities may attract private capital paving the way for increased 
private sector participation in the water supply sector. 
  
To motivate the analysis of the relevance of ownership structure and explore the empirical 
validity of the propositions made or alluded to in the study, I conducted regression analysis and 
case studies on the performance of publicly-owned and private utilities in the Philippines. The 
empirical results generally lend support to the superiority of a concession arrangement and 
private utilities to public management or corporatized utilities. In fact, the demerits of 
corporatization have shown to be magnified in the case of the Philippines where there are serious 
flaws in the corporatization strategy.  The key findings of the study are as follows: (i) Privately-
owned and run water utilities register a highly favorable trade-off between affordability and level of service 
(e.g. service coverage) on account of efficient staffing and spending patterns, where salaries are strongly 
tied to staff productivity improvement, and performance-based profit orientation; and (ii) Corporatization 
has shown to be most effective in modifying the pricing behavior and profit orientation of water utilities – 
it makes water utilities adversely commercially-oriented. Water tariffs of water districts are vastly driven 
by operational inefficiencies and profit motive almost without regard for the ability of consumers to pay. 
Water districts register high water rates even in low-income areas. Large spending in non-personnel 
expenses has not been accompanied by an improvement in service quality. The most profitable water 
districts can be the worst-performing water districts.  
 
With accumulated experience with contracting, adoption of a partnership contracting and 
establishment of a unified regulatory framework, the study predicts a gradual increase in private 
sector participation in developing economies. Through the prism of a partnership contracting and 
as illustrated by privatization experience of the Philippines, the gains from a concession 
arrangement may be maximized if the investment and efficiency requirements are high enough 
to fully exploit the financial and technical resources of the private operator and make profit a 
significant welfare component. In such case, an increase in the rent of the private operator would 
offer similar benefits to the consumers, enhancing the incentive for mutual cooperation. Also, 
political commitment to a concession-based privatization as a reform strategy is critical for the 
success of a concession-based privatization. With limited political commitment, the government 
may refuse to respect bargaining and informational constraints, which is crucial for establishing 
a stable pattern of mutual cooperation in a sector where there is substantial regulatory risks.  
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Short bio  
A Filipino economist who focuses on areas of regulatory law and economics and 
trade, investment and development.  
 
Education 
Masters in International and Development Economics, University of 
Namur and Université Catholique de Louvain  
2013 
Masters of Economics of International Trade and European 
Integration
2008 
Masters in Applied Economics, De La Salle University 2005 
  
Work experience 
Consultant, Philippine Exporters Confederation 2010-2012 
Researcher, International Trade and Economics Unit, Foreign Service 
Institute 
2003-2009 
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Name PhD student : Ritchelle J. Alburo   
PhD-period  :  2013-2018   
Promoters  : Prof. Roger Van den Bergh and Prof. Raimondello Orsini  
   
  
  
 
PhD training 
 
Bologna courses         year 
Introduction to the Italian Legal System 2013 
Statistics 2013 
Economic  Analysis of the Law 2013 
Game Theory and the Law 2013 
Experimental Law and Economics 2014 
Behavioral Law and Economics I – Game Theory 2013 
Behavioral Law and Economics II – Enforcement  Mechanism 2014 
Specific courses         year 
 Seminar ‘How to write a PhD’ 2014 
 Academic Writing Skills for PhD students (Rotterdam) 2014 
 Seminar Series ‘Empirical Legal Studies’ 2014 
 …..  
  
Seminars and workshops       year 
 Bologna November seminar (attendance) 2013 
 BACT seminar series (attendance) 2013 
 EGSL lunch seminars (attendance) 2013 
 Joint Seminar ‘The Future of Law and Economics’ 
 (attendance) 
2014 
 Rotterdam Fall seminar series (peer feedback) 2015 
 Rotterdam Winter seminar series (peer feedback) 2016 
 …….  
  
Presentations         year 
 Bologna March seminar  2014 
 Hamburg June seminar  2014 
 Rotterdam Fall seminar series  2014 
Rotterdam Winter seminar series 2014
 Bologna November seminar  2015 




  
 ……  
  
Attendance (international) conferences     year 
Russian Summer Conference  2016 
  
  
  
  
  
Teaching          year 
 ….  
  
  
Others          year 
 ….  
  
  
  
 
 
